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ABSTRACT 
Retail shop leasing in Australia is controlled by different legislation in each state and 
territory.  With each review the size and complexity of such legislation has increased 
resulting in greater regulatory burden on both lessors and lessees, especially where 
such lessors or lessees operate in more than one jurisdiction. The purpose of this 
thesis is to determine whether such retail shop lease legislation in Australia should 
be simplified taking into account the benefits of such simplified legislation to both 
lessors and lessees in relation to five major topics of concern.  Such a determination 
will be achieved by identifying the benefits of simplified legislation, analysing and 
comparing the different legislation in each Australian jurisdiction as well as the 
Voluntary Codes for England and Wales to ascertain common provisions, 
considering other simplified legislation, and preparing a framework for simplified 
retail leasing legislation.  In an environment where businesses deplore high 
compliance costs, where decisions about investment in a particular jurisdiction can 
be influenced by likely compliance burden and where governments actively institute 
inquiries to reduce such burden it is an appropriate time to consider whether the 
benefits to lessors and lessees, if not to the economy as a whole, demand 
simplification of retail shop leasing legislation.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Despite the fact that issues faced by lessor and lessees are common 
throughout Australia, retail shop leasing is controlled by different legislation 
in each state and territory.1  Retail lease legislation was first enacted in 
Australia in 1984.2 Since then, not only has similar legislation has been 
established in each state and territory, but in some jurisdictions original 
legislation has been completely replaced by new legislation.3 Expansion of 
retail lease legislation continued unabated as attempts were made to “plug 
the gaps” in retail lease legislation to provide greater protection to the 
lessee. 
 
Subsequent government enquiries have recommended simplified retail lease 
legislation 4 together with uniform retail lease legislation 5 or uniform code of 
                                                             
1 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW), Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic), 
Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT), Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) 
1998 (Tas), Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA), Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) 
Agreements Act 1985 (WA), Business Tenancies (Fair Dealing) Act 2003 (NT). 
2 Retail Shop Leases Act (Qld)1984. 
3 For example in South Australia, the Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 replaced Part 4 of the 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1936 which was entitled “Commercial Tenancy Agreements”  which was 
put in place by the Statutes Amendment (Commercial Tenancies) Act 1985. 
4 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 258. 
5 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry Science and Technology, Parliament of 
Australia, Finding a Balance: Towards Fair Trading in Australia, (1997). (“Reid Report 1997”); Joint 
Select Committee on the Retailing Sector, Parliament of Australia, Fair Market or Market Failure, A 
Review of Australia’s Retailing Sector, August 1999, 199-200; Senate Economics Reference 
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conduct 6 and industry organisations have made submissions and issued 
press releases calling for more uniformity in legislation.7  No such  
recommendation has been realised  and, if anything, the differences in the 
legislative schemes have become more pronounced through successive 
amendments. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether such state and territory 
based legislation should be simplified by analysing the benefits of such a 
reform  in relation to selected  common areas of conflict between lessors and 
lessees where the legislation, arguably, in its current form has not met the 
original objectives  of the regulation of this form of transaction. 
 
Determining the benefits of less complex  legislation requires the 
consideration of the historical development of retail lease legislation to 
identify the reasons for the enactment of such legislation and the objectives 
of the legislators.  
 
Simplified legislation must at least deliver the same benefits as provided by 
the current state and territory based legislation. In addition, the voluntary 
leasing code of the United Kingdom will be considered to determine whether 
any aspects may be relevant to Australia. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Need for a National Approach to Retail Leasing Arrangements, 
18 March 2015, [4.57]. 
6 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 242. 
7 Shopping Centre Council of Australia, Submission No 83 to the Productivity Commission, The 
Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia, 31st March 2008, 38; Australian National Retailers 
Association, Submission to the Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in 
Australia, 31st March 2008, 10. 
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Consideration of the development of retail lease legislation must include an 
analysis of: - 
(a) the nature of leasing law affecting retail premises as it existed before 
the enactment of the state based commercial leasing legislation both at 
common law and in statutes; 
(b) the deficiencies in the prior leasing law that led to the enactment of the 
retail leasing legislation; 
(c) the benefits that were envisaged from such legislation (i.e. in what way 
would retail lease legislation “fix” the deficiencies?); and 
(d) the steps if any taken either by the retail leasing industry or by the 
government, prior to the introduction of retail lease legislation, to regulate 
retail leasing by voluntary codes of practice or other form of regulation? 
 
Factors must be identified to evaluate the existing regulation to determine its 
failures and successes.  Such factors can be formulated from the leasing 
regulation itself,  and from the consideration of voluntary codes elsewhere. 
 
1.2 Why this research is necessary 
There have been numerous enquiries into retail shop leases in Australia.  As 
early as 1999 Federal inquiries received submissions recommending the 
simplification of retail leasing legislation.8  These recommendations have 
                                                             
8 Joint Select Committee on the Retailing Sector, Parliament of Australia, Fair Market or Market 
Failure, A Review of Australia’s Retailing Sector, August 1999, 25. 
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been echoed by other enquiries;9 however, no government has resolved to 
change the status quo to this time.  
No previous research or enquiry has considered the historical reasons for 
retail leasing legislation. Rather, such enquiries, informed by public 
submissions, dealt with the problems relevant to them without considering 
the origin of the problem, their extent and the steps taken in the past in 
various jurisdictions to address them. In addition, given the jurisdictional 
limitation of the legislation, most state enquiries consider leasing problems 
from a regional view point only and not a national view.  Such problems are 
only considered holistically in Federal enquiries.  
1.3 Research Question and Hypothesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to consider whether the current state and 
territory based legalisation is too complex and whether such legislation, in 
five core areas could be simplified by analysing the benefit of such reform in 
relation to selected common areas of conflict between lessors and lessees 
where the legalisation, arguably, in its current form has not met the original 
objective of retail leases. 
 
This thesis identifies the areas of such complexity and considers that the 
existing retail lease legislation should be simplified or “rolled back” to allow 
the lessor and lessee to negotiate a mutually beneficial arrangement that will 
see fairer outcomes and economic benefits for the parties and society as a 
whole. 
                                                             
9 For example see -  Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia, 
Report No. 43 (31 March 2008), 249; Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance 
of the Australian Retail Industry (December 2011, 262. 
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1.4 Methodology 
This thesis will use comparative methodology to consider the retail leasing 
legislation in all States and Territories of Australia and the voluntary leasing 
codes in the United Kingdom which are supported by the Landlord and Ten 
ant Act 1954 (UK).   
The keys factors of such comparison are space and time. Spatially, the 
approach adopted by different Australian jurisdictions regarding retail leasing 
regulation will be compared with each other.  In addition the legislative 
approach adopted in Australia would be compared with the voluntary 
approach promoted in the United Kingdom. Historically, retail leasing prior to 
regulation would be compared with the current retail leasing heavily 
regulated landscape. 
 
The benefit of such methodology is that it will show to what extent the 
imposition of retail leasing regulation has altered the retail leasing 
marketplace.  
 
The success or failure of such retail leasing regulation revealed as a result of 
such comparison will allow conclusions to be drawn regarding how such 
regulation could or should be simplified in the future. Review of retail leasing 
regulation will proceed on a normative review basis to ensure that any 
simplification will not only provide financial and economical benefits but also 
limit the power imbalance between the lessor and lessee. 
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1.5 Limitation of Thesis 
This thesis does not attempt a doctrinal analysis of the retail leasing area.  
Rather this thesis proceeds on the basis that retail leasing legislation in 
Australia in well and truly established and seeks to determine whether such 
legalisation should be simplified and if so to what extent. It is also not 
proposed to compare retail leasing legislation with the franchising code of 
conduct as, although, franchising and leasing share commonalities such as a 
powerful lessor/franchisor negotiating with the weaker lessee/franchisee 
there are substantial differences between the two areas.  For example:- 
(a) The lessor, unlike the franchisor, has real property rights in relation to 
the shopping centre which should be protected; 
(b) The Franchising Code of Conduct is a “light touch” by government in 
the franchising area consisting of 45 clauses.  The Retail Shop Leases Act 
1994 (Qld), for example, has over 150 clauses. 
(c) The demand for franchises is based on the quality of the franchised 
product or service and the franchising system adopted by the franchisor.  
These items are created by the franchisor.  On the other hand, the demand 
for shopping centre leases, although based partially on the quality of the 
shopping centre is also based on the drawing power guaranteed by the 
monopoly granted to the shopping centre lessor as a result of town planning 
restrictions.  The bargaining power of the shopping centre lessor is therefore 
greater than the franchisor and the retail lease legislation must therefore 
address this issue. 
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(d) Franchisees are normally granted exclusivity for their business within 
their allocated region.  It is very rare for any such exclusivity to be granted by 
shopping centre lessors. Introduction of competitors into a shopping centre is 
one of the issues raised by lessees in the committees of inquiry.10 
(e) The modern day franchise can be traced back to 1850 or thereabout 
with the Singer sewing machine11 whereas leases have been in existence for 
centuries and have a much greater body of case law. 
 
The differences between retail leasing and franchising outweigh the 
similarities and, as such, the Franchising Code of Conduct has not been 
examined in this thesis. 
1.6 Chapter Outlines 
Chapter One – Introduction 
This chapter is an introduction to the thesis and to leases generally. It 
analyses the leasing market, the nature of leases and the relationship 
between the lessor and lessee in particular the concepts of good faith, 
unconscionability, inequality of bargaining power, and freedom of contract as 
they relate to leasing. This is undertaken against a background of the 
importance of the leasing market to the Australian economy12 and the effect 
of regulation upon that market.13  
                                                             
10 Reid Report 1997, 68; PC Report 2008, 154. 
11 Mario L. Herman, A Brief History of Franchising,  
http://www.franchise-law.com/franchise-law-overview/a-brief-history-of-franchising.shtml. 
12 Shopping Centre Council of Australia, Submission No 83 to the Productivity Commission, The 
Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st March 2008), 5. See also 
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Chapter Two – Areas of Focus and Drivers for Reform 
The first part of Chapter 2 will identify the particular areas of conflict between 
lessors and lessees which have arisen time and time again and do not 
appear to have been remedied by legislation. The second part of Chapter 2 
will discuss the drivers for reform for each such area of conflict.  Suich areas 
of conflict and drivers for reform will be identified by examining the 
recommendations of the inquiries established in various jurisdictions relating 
to such problems. 
Chapter Three – Performance of Past Retail Leasing Reform Legislation. 
This chapter traces the performance of retail leasing regulation since its 
inception in 1984 to the present time by considering the initial purpose for 
establishing such regulation and the methods adopted to achieve such 
regulation, by examining reports of various enquiries between 1984 and the 
present14 and by the assessment of such legislation enacted including 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Shopping Centre Council of Australia, Key Facts, (24 December 2015) <www.scca.org.au./industry-
information/key-facts/>. 
13 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 95.  
14 House Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Small business in Australia: 
Challenges, Problems and Opportunities, January 1990; House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, Parliament of Australia, Finding a Balance: Towards 
Fair Trading in Australia, May 1997; Joint Select Committee on the Retailing Sector, Parliament of 
Australia, Fair Market or Market Failure, A Review of Australia’s Retailing Sector, August 1999;  
Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia, Report No. 43 (31 
March 2008); Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail 
Industry (December 2011); Productivity Commission, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: 
Retail Trade (September 2014); Senate Economics Reference Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Need for a National Approach to Retail Leasing Arrangements, 18 March 2015; Report of the 
Committee of Enquiry into Shopping Complex Leasing Practices, Queensland (19 November 1981) 9. 
(“Cooper Report 1981”); Report of the Retail Tenancies Advisory Committee, Victoria, (February 
1984) (“Arnold Report 1984”); Report of the Inquiry into Shopping Centre Leases, South Australia, 
(1983) (“Hill Report 1983”); Report of the Inquiry into Commercial Tenancy Agreements, Western 
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amendments to such legislation to determine whether the initial purpose has 
been achieved, abandoned or altered in some way. 
 
Chapter Four – Evaluative Factors 
This chapter considers the current retail leasing legislation in Australia to 
determine the effectiveness of such legislation and compares such 
legislation in each state and territory with each other using benchmarks.  
Such benchmarks are identified by considering common problems that occur 
in all Australian jurisdictions and the United Kingdom as well as other 
uniform legislation to determine common principles that led to such reform.  
 
Chapter Five – Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter draws conclusions based upon the content of the previous 
chapters. It identifies the problems with retail lease legislation in Australia, 
discusses the different solutions adopted in Australia and the United 
Kingdom (i.e. Legislation versus Voluntary Code) and considers each of the 
5 areas of concern and makes recommendations for change.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Australia, (February 1984) (“Clarke Report 1984”); Report of the ACT Working Party on Business 
Leases Review Legislation, ACT (1984). (“ACT Report 1984”); Department of Justice and Industrial 
Relations (Tas), Review of the Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulation 1998 
Final Report, March 2002; Report of the Review Committee on the Commercial Tenancy (Retail 
Shops) Agreements Act, Western Australia, 2003. 
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2. Leases 
2.1 Leases Generally 
Whether residential or commercial, leases are common business 
documents.  Unlike residential leases, which vary only slightly from property 
to property, the terms of a commercial lease change depending upon the 
property which is the subject of the lease. Industrial property leases differ 
from showroom leases and professional office leases differ from retail shop 
leases.15 
 
The terms of shop leases themselves vary depending upon whether the 
shop is located in a freestanding building, a strip shopping centre or an 
enclosed shopping centre complex. 
 
At first glance, a commercial lease would appear to document a simple 
transaction – occupation of premises is given by the lessor in exchange for 
the lessee paying rental and complying with various conditions of 
occupation.  
 
Leases, however, represent a significant investment by lessees.16 The 
success of the lessees’ business may depend, amongst other things, not 
only on the location of the leased premises but also on the terms of the lease 
                                                             
15 The Victorian Retail  Tenancy Advisory Committee, despite having the drafting of a uniform lease 
as one of its terms of reference, formed the view that the complexity of  such a lease and the lease 
premises  it must cover would make it extremely difficult to draft such a document. See Arnold 
Report 1984, 6. 
16 Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act (WA) 1985, Tenant Guide for New Retail 
Shop Leases, Form 6. 
‘Recognising the worth or value of the goodwill of your retail business is directly related to 
the tenure you hold. The balance of the current lease term and any options are prime factors 
that the market will assess in determining the goodwill attached to your business.’ 
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itself. Lessees are, often, small business people who have mortgaged their 
homes and redeemed investments to establish their business.17 
 
Although, at one stage, not considered to be a contract,18 the authorities now 
establish that a lease, as well as conferring upon the lessee an interest in 
land, is also a contract.19 It is subject to the same principles as any 
contract20 including the principle of freedom of contract which envisages that 
the parties to the contract, approaching each other in the traditional 
adversarial way, and at arm’s length, are free to offer and accept any 
conditions they choose and it is not for any other party to interfere with such 
agreements, especially where the parties have means or are experienced 
commercial entities.21  The doctrine of laissez-faire liberalism stresses the 
importance of freedom of contract without intervention from the state as a 
means to allow the individual to pursue their own self-interest. 22 
                                                             
17 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 12 November 1986,1939 (McGrath). 
18 K Lewison, Commercial Property – Are Leases Different?,  (1989) The Law Society Gazette, 
86.45(23). 
19 Progressive Mailing House v Tabali (1985) 157 CLR 17, Mason J [29] citing William O. Douglas and 
Jerome Frank in "Landlords' Claims in Reorganizations" (1933) 42 Yale Law Journal 1003, nn 6. 
As the law of landlord and tenant had outgrown its origins in feudal tenure, it was more 
appropriate in the light of the essential elements of the bargain, the modern money 
economy and the modern development of contract law that leases should be regulated by 
the principles of the law of contract.  
See also Highway Properties Ltd v. Kelly, Douglas & Co. Ltd (1971) 17 D.L.R. (3d) 710;  Apriaden Pty 
Ltd v Seacrest Pty Ltd& Anor [2005] VSCA 139; Willmott Growers Group Inc v Willmott Forests Pty 
Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (2013) 251 CLR 592, [39]. 
20  Rhodes, Williams and Rhodes, Canadian Law of Landlord and Tenant (5th ed, 1983) [1:1].  
At common law the relation of landlord and tenant is a contractual one, arising when one 
party, retaining in himself a reversion, permits another to have the exclusive possession of a 
corporeal hereditament, for some definite period or for a period which can be made definite 
by either party.  The contract may be express or it may be implied by law.  It is more than a 
mere contract, as it vests in the tenant taking possession an estate or interest in the land or 
premises demised. 
See also Progressive Mailing House v Tabali (1985) 157 CLR 17, 29; Apriaden Pty Ltd v Seacrest Pty 
Ltd & Anor [2005] VSCA 139; Gumland Property Holdings Pty Limited v Duffy Bros Fruit Market 
(Campbelltown) Pty Limited (2008) 244 ALR 1, [58].  
21 GSA Group Limited –v- Siebe PLC (1993) 30 NSWLR 573,579 (Rogers J). 
22 Ian Adams, Political Ideology Today (2002) Manchester University Press, 20. 
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At one stage elevated to the level of a sacred concept,23 the modern view of 
the doctrine of freedom of contract is that it is a reasonable ideal only where 
the parties to the contract are of equal bargaining power and there is no 
harm to the community at large.24 
 
The principles of freedom of contract are relevant in any examination of 
commercial leasing legislation in Australia because the various 
governments, when passing such legislation, have had to balance the 
“freedom of contract perspective” as advanced by the lessors as opposed to 
the “consumer protection perspective” advanced by the lessees.  
 
The lessors submit that the government should not intervene in the market 
place and that market forces will ensure ultimate fairness whereas the 
lessees submit that the market place is so much in favour of the lessors that 
true market forces are distorted. 
 
The principles of freedom of contract were more relevant many years ago 
when the prevailing legal opinion was that a private agreement which was in 
the interests of both parties must also be in the interest of the public.  Today, 
however, externalities and the effect of a contract on third parties such as 
                                                             
23  Printing and Numerical Co –v- Sampson (1875) LR 19 EQ 465 (Jessel MR).  
If there was one thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that men of full 
and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their 
contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced 
by courts of justice.  Therefore you have this paramount public policy to consider in that you 
are not likely to interfere with this freedom of contract.  
24 J Beatson, Ansons Law of Contract (30th Edition Oxford University Press 2016) 4. See also JW 
Carter, Elisabeth Peden and G J Tolhurst , Contract Law in Australia (5th Edition, Australia, 2007) 8. 
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the public must be considered and any harmful effects of contracts on third 
parties must be nullified.25 
 
Generally, governments have always been willing to interfere with the 
relationship between lessors and lessees26 to mitigate undesirable market 
outcomes. In the case of leases, such undesirable market outcomes include 
the number of businesses that fail or suffer damage because of issues 
arising from the lessor/lessee relationship 27 which, in turn, causes social 
and economic damage to the community at large.28   
 
According to Pollock: - 
The truth is … that the law of landlord and tenant has never, at least in any usual 
conditions, been a law of free contract.  It is a law of contract partly expressed, partly 
supplied by judicial interpretation, and partly controlled by legislation and sometimes 
by local custom.29 
 
Such government interference has substantially been to protect the lessee 
and has traditionally been about the terms and enforcement of leases.30 In 
the past three decades, however, such interference has concerned the entire 
                                                             
25 P S Atiyah, Essays on Contract (Clarendon, Oxford 1990) 359. See also AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v 
Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, 194. 
 
26 As far back as The Code of Hammurabi 1760BC Clause 45 and 46. See the Avalon Project, Code of 
Hammurabi <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ancient/hamframe.asp.publisher and date?> at 15 
December 2014. 
27 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, Parliament of 
Australia, Finding a Balance: Towards Fair Trading in Australia, May 1997, [2.10]. 
28 ‘New Deal: Fair Deal - The Federal Government's Fair Trading Statement - Giving Small Business a 
Fair Go’, Ministerial Statement, House of Representatives, September 1997, 4. (Peter Reith, Minister 
for Workplace Relations and Small Business.) 
29 Sir Frederick Pollock, The Land Laws (3rd Ed, UK, 1896), 150. 
30 For example, the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld). 
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retail leasing relationship including pre-lease negotiations between the lessor 
and lessee.  
 
For example, in Queensland, prior to the enactment of the first retail leasing 
legislation in Australia, the Retail Shop Leases Act (1984), limited protection 
for a retail lessee was afforded by property legislation31  which provided 
some remedies to a lessee in many areas including relief against forfeiture,32 
relief against loss of an option33 and ensuring that the lessors consent to 
assignment must not be unreasonably withheld.34 Torrens system leases 
were also protected by registration and the short lease exception to 
indefeasibility.35  
The general leasing provisions36 however concern only the relationship 
between the lessor and lessee after they have entered into the lease.37 
 
It was not until 1984 that the first retail shop lease legislation in Australia was 
introduced in Queensland38 as a result of numerous complaints by lessees 
                                                             
31 Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), Part 8; Landlord and Tenant Act 1936 (SA), ss9 - 12; Conveyancing 
and Law of Property Act 1884 (Tas), s15; Property Law Act 1958 (Vic), s146; Property Law Act 1969 
(WA), s81; Law of Property Act 2000 (NT), s137; Conveyancing Act 1919(NSW), s129; Civil Law 
(Property) Act 2006 (ACT), s426. 
32 For example, Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), s124. 
33 Ibid, s128. 
34 Ibid, s121. 
35 Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s42(1)(d); Land Titles Act 1994 (Qld), s185; Transfer of land Act 
1952 (Vic) s42(2); Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA), s68; Real Property Act 1886 (SA), s69; Land Titles 
Act 1980 (Tas), s40; Land Title Act 2000 (NT), s189; Land Title Act 1925 (ACT), s85. 
36 Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), Part 8; Landlord and Tenant Act 1936 (SA), ss9 - 12; Conveyancing 
and Law of Property Act 1884 (Tas), s15; Property Law Act 1958 (Vic), s146; Property Law Act 1969 
(WA), s81; Law of Property Act 2000 (NT), s137; Conveyancing Act 1919(NSW), s129; Civil Law 
(Property) Act 2006 (ACT), s426. 
37 Legislation in other states and territories of Australia provided similar protection to lessees. For 
example, relief against forfeiture appears in Landlord and Tenant Act 1936 (SA), ss9, 10; 
Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 (Tas), s15; Property Law Act 1958 (Vic), s146; Property 
Law Act 1969 (WA), s81; Law of Property Act 2000 (NT), s137; Conveyancing Act 1919(NSW), s129. 
38 Retail Shop Leases Act 1984 (Qld). 
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and failure by shopping centre owners to satisfy the Queensland government 
that a voluntary code of conduct could work.  The ongoing result has been 
that retail leasing legislation has now been enacted in all States and 
Territories in Australia with the last such legislation being enacted by the 
Northern Territory Government in 2004.39 
 
With such legislation now accepted in the market place, it is unlikely that any 
Australian government will repeal their retail leasing legislation.  Putting 
aside any aspects of fairness to the economically weaker lessee, the 
importance of the retail leasing sector to the economy itself requires 
government regulation.40 
 
The current landscape for retail lease legislation in Australia is as follows: - 
Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Queensland)41 
Retail Lease Act 1994 (New South Wales)42 
Retail Leases Act 2003 (Victoria)43 
Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA)44 
Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT)45 
Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulations 1998 
(TAS)46 
                                                             
39 Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2004 (NT). 
40 Reid Report 1997, [2.10];  Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in 
Australia, Report No. 43 (31 March 2008), 95; Joint Select Committee on the Retailing Sector, 
Parliament of Australia, Fair Market or Market Failure: A Review of Australia’s Retailing Sector, 
August 1999, xi. 
41 “the Queensland Act” 
42 “ the NSW Act” 
43 “the Victorian Act” 
44 “the SA Act” 
45 the ACT Act” 
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Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA)47 
Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2004 (NT)48 
 
In contrast, in the United Kingdom, despite heavy government scrutiny and 
the continued threat of legislation for the past 25 years, the retail leasing 
industry still operates under a voluntary code49 which contains general 
recommendations about lease negotiations, lease terms, use of premises, 
bonds, guarantees, rent review, assignment, service charges, repairs and 
insurance.  There is no formal disclosure document required however the 
lessor is required to clearly state in writing the length of the term, whether 
the lessee will have security of tenure under the Landlord and Tenants Act 
1954 (UK), the lessee’s rights to assign, rent review and repair obligations. 
The voluntary code contains a warning to the lessee that the lessee should 
obtain legal advice regarding the lease however there is no dispute 
resolution clause nor any stated consequences for any breach of lease. The 
lessor is exhorted to be clear in its dealings with the lessee and the word 
“clear” appears frequently in the code. Despite this, there is no disclosure 
required by the lessor of any future alterations or plans regarding the 
premises. 
 
Although voluntary codes have been attempted in Australia they have not 
been found to be effective.  The New South Wales Retail Tenancy Leases 
Code of Practice was adopted in 1992 but only lasted 2 years and was 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
46 “the Tasmanian Code” 
47 “the Western Australian Act: 
48 “the Northern Territory Act. 
49 The Commercial Leases Working Group, The Code for Leasing Business Premises in England and 
Wales (2007). 
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replaced by legislation in that state.  In Queensland, the Cooper Inquiry50  
recommended a voluntary code and in fact such a code was drafted by the 
Building Owners and Managers Association however that code did not 
proceed.51 The Productivity Commission also recommended a voluntary 
code of conduct, noting that a mandatory code would not be much different 
to legislation.52 The voluntary code suggested by the Productivity 
Commission would contain provisions regarding fair trading standards, 
transparency, lodgement of leases, information provision and dispute 
resolution and would not interfere with ordinary commercial decision making 
items such as lease terms, rent levels and security of tenure.53 
Each of the States and Territories in Australia now has mandatory legislation 
controlling a significant portion of commercial lease transactions. The 
legislation applies to retail leases except for stated exemptions, such as, 
where the premises are over 1000 square metres in size54 and leased by a 
listed corporation or subsidiary55 or where the occupancy costs exceed 
$1,000,000.0056 or where the lease is for a limited period such as less than 6 
months57 or 12 months58  or for a lengthy period such as more than 25 
years.59 
                                                             
50 Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Shopping Complex Leasing Practices, Queensland (19 
November 1981) 9. ( “Cooper Report 1981”). 
51 In NSW the Retail Tenancy Leases Code of Practice (NSW) was found to be unworkable.  In 
Queensland the Building Owners and Managers Association prepared a voluntary code in 1983 in an 
unsuccessful attempt to stave of legislation. 
52 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia, Report No. 43 (31 
March 2008), 257. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s3(1); Retail Leases Act 1994 
(NSW), s5. Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings ) Act 2003 (NT), s6. 
55 Retail Shop Lease Act 1994 (Qld) s5. 
56 Retail Leases Act 2003 (VIC) s4. 
57 Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW), s6; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings )Act 2003 (NT) s6. 
58 Retail Leases Act 2003 (VIC) s4. 
59 Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings )Act 2003 (NT), s6. 
18 
 
  
In the United Kingdom, the retail leasing industry has operated under three 
voluntary codes.  The first came into operation in 1995.60 It was replaced by 
the second voluntary code61 in 2002, which was, in turn, replaced, by the 
third voluntary code in 2007.62 The UK Voluntary Codes contain general 
recommendations and do not descend into the same details as the 
Australian legislation. The 2007 Code consists of a lessor’s code, occupiers 
guide and model heads of terms of lease and recommends, for example, 
that: - 
(a)  lessors provide written offers to lease which clearly state the terms of 
the lease and that the lessor be flexible and offer alternative lease terms if 
such lease terms are available; 
(b) If the right to renew a lease under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 is 
to be excluded that the lessee be advised of that position and encouraged to 
seek legal advice; 
(c) The length of lease term must be clear and the pre-conditions to 
lessees exercising break clauses should be minimal; 
(d) The lessee should offer an alternative to upward only rent reviews and 
if alternative rent review cannot be provided then the lessor should state 
reasons for such a position; 
(e) Lessors should provide best estimates of service charges; 
                                                             
60 The Commercial Leases Working Group, A Code of Practice for Commercial Leases in England and 
Wales (1995). 
61 The Commercial Leases Working Group, A Code of Practice for Commercial Leases in England and 
Wales (2nd ed, 2002). 
62 The Commercial Leases Working Group, The Code for Leasing Business Premises in England and 
Wales (2007). 
19 
 
(f) Lessees repair obligations at end of lease should be to return the 
premises to the condition they were in at start of the lease.  Repair 
obligations during the lease should be appropriate to the length of the lease 
term and the condition of the premises. 
(g) Lessees should not be required to remove permitted alterations or 
make good at the end of the lease term unless it is reasonable to do so.  
Decisions about consents for alterations should be made within 15 days; 
(h) Required insurance should be fair and reasonable and rent suspension 
should apply if the premises are damaged or destroyed. 
(i) Lessors should request any further information when considering a 
request from a lessee within 5 working days. 
 
For each version the UK government commissioned a Report63 into the 
effectiveness of the voluntary code and threatened to enact legislation to 
control the leasing process.  So far both lessors and lessees seem to have 
successfully worked together to stave off such legislation64 because of their 
unwillingness to accept government intervention into the market.65     
 
The National Retailers Association in their submission to the Productivity 
Commission in 2008 made the following comment regarding voluntary codes 
in Australia: - 
                                                             
63 Crosby N & Murdoch S, “The Cutting Edge 2000 – Monitoring the UK Commercial Leases Code of 
Practice Colin Code, What Code?” RICS Research Foundation, University of Reading) and Crosby N, 
Murdoch S and Hughes C, ‘Monitoring the 2002 Code of Practice for Commercial Leases’ (Reading 
University, March 2005). 
64 The Australian experience of nation-wide retail leasing legislation may have had some influence 
on lessors and lessees in this regard. 
65 British Retail Consortium, Yearbook 2005, (2005), 211; A Baum et al, Statutory Valuations,   
(Routledge, 4th ed, 2014) 16. 
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‘Based on experience and commercial imperatives, no landlord would 
unilaterally and voluntarily enter into and observe a voluntary code that 
was enforceable.’66 
It is unlikely, therefore, that existing Australian legislation would be repealed 
to be replaced by a voluntary code. 
 
2.2 Retail Leasing Market 
(a) The Importance of the Retail Leasing Market 
In 2008, there were around 290,000 retail tenancy leases in Australia with an 
estimated 58,000 new or renewed leases every year.67 About 192,000 
leases involved businesses retailing goods and the other 98,000 involved 
businesses retailing services.68  About 60,000 of such businesses were 
located within shopping centres with the remainder located in retail shopping 
strips and stand-alone retail premises.69 Shopping centres comprise 38% of 
total retail space, 35% of all retail shops and generate 40% of total retail 
sales.70 Besides the role that shopping centres play as community meeting 
places, shopping centres are additionally a major generator of employment 
and made a direct contribution of 2.8% to the Australian Gross Domestic 
Product.71  
By 2014, retail trade was the second highest contributor to employment and 
7% of the Australian work force was employed in the retail trade in shopping 
                                                             
66 National Retailers Association, Submission No DR162 to the Productivity Commission, The Market 
For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st March 2008), 3. 
67 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 13. 
68 Ibid, 14. 
69 Ibid, 14. 
70 Ibid, 10. 
71 Shopping Centre Council of Australia, Submission No 83 to the Productivity Commission, The 
Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st March 2008), 5. 
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centres. Retail sales through Australian shopping centres amounted to $120 
billion dollars which represented 7.7% of the Australian Gross Domestic 
Product.72 
In view of the large contribution made by the retail leasing industry (and 
shopping centres in particular) to the Australian economy, it is a reasonable 
government concern, therefore, to ensure that that market operates 
efficiently and provides a continued benefit to the community.  Simplification 
of retail leasing legislation does not only involve the adoption of what may be 
considered to be the best elements of legislation from one or more 
jurisdictions. It is acknowledged that there may be rational differences 
between jurisdictions still to be maintained, but, at the same time there must 
be some cogent reason to do so.73 In order to ensure the continued benefit 
to the community, it is necessary to consider the issues affecting the current 
retail leasing market and whether such issues affect the efficient operation of 
the retail leasing market. 
 
(b) Operating an Efficient Market. 
An efficient market allocates its resources such that the community receives 
the highest possible net return and businesses within that market achieve 
such an efficient outcome by making the best use of available resources.74 
The question is whether the lessor and lessee are making the best use of 
their available resources and whether retail leasing legislation helps or 
                                                             
72 Shopping Centre Council of Australia, Industry Information Key Facts (24 December 2015) 
<www.scca.org.au/industry-information/key-facts/>. 
73 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, Parliament of 
Australia, Finding a Balance: Towards Fair Trading in Australia, May 1997, 2. 
74 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 6. 
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hinders such use. An imbalance of power between lessors and lessees does 
not necessarily mean that the retail tenancy market is operating 
inefficiently75 nor is failure of the retail leasing market implied by any 
restriction upon that market.76 Any restriction on a market, such as monopoly 
power, will however reduce efficiency and, thereby, reduce the benefit to the 
community.77 
Areas of the retail leasing market which have been identified as operating 
inefficiently are: - 
 (i) Over regulation of the market.  
Over regulation can cause distortions in the marketplace 
because: - 
1. The conduct of the parties is limited thereby reducing  
commercial activity and minimising commercial options 
for either or both parties to a lease.78 For example, 
requiring the lessor to agree to a new rental before the 
lessee decides whether to exercise its option to renew or 
not may simply result in lessors refusing to grant options 
to renew.79 Where a lessor is required by legislation to 
offer a new lessee a minimum 5 year lease term then the 
lessor may favour an incumbent lessee to whom the 
lessor can offer a lesser lease term.80 
                                                             
75 Ibid, 5. 
76 Ibid, 7. 
77 Dawson G ”The Market and Efficient Resource Allocation” (1989) 9(5) Economic Affairs, 40. 
 78 Ibid, 91. 
79 For an example see Department of Justice and Industrial Relations Consumer Affairs (Tas), 
‘Review of the Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulation 1998 Final Report’ 
March 2002, 46. 
80 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 12 November 1986, 1931 (Hayward). 
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2. Different level of regulation for different types of 
premises, businesses, or lessees may result in a lessor 
preferring a certain type of business causing market 
inefficiencies.81 If current regulation favours a particular 
class of business, then the entry of new business may be 
restricted.82 
3. Overly definite provisions may become inflexible and 
unresponsive to changing views on acceptable conduct.83 
4. Regulation to reduce negotiating power imbalances may 
result in lower incentives to develop negotiating skills.84 
5. The weaker party relies upon the government to ‘fix’ the 
problems which have arisen as a result of the lessee’s 
bad decisions thereby becoming more dependent upon 
the government and more likely to make bad decisions in 
the future.85 
6. Complex legislation will discourage investment in 
shopping centres resulting in fewer shopping centres and 
creating a shortage of retail space.86 
 
Government intervention can only be justified where the benefit 
of such intervention less the compliance costs are greater than 
the costs to the community of the original perceived market 
                                                             
81 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 91. 
82 Ibid, 89. 
83 Ibid, 90. 
84 Ibid, 89. 
85 Ibid, 91. 
86 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 12 November 1986, 1931 (Hayward). 
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failure.87 Australia has the highest level of regulation for the retail 
leasing market in the world.88 Some countries, such as New 
Zealand, have no specific regulation of retail leases.  As a result 
of retail shop leasing legislation being enacted in each State and 
Territory together with the provisions of the Australian Consumer 
Law regarding unconscionable conduct, the increasing 
complexity of the regulation can cause compliance costs to 
increase without delivering results.89 Any extra compliance costs 
incurred by lessors are incorporated into the cost of the lease 
itself which are then passed on by the lessee to the consumer.  
Excessive regulation, therefore, causes the retail leasing market 
to operate inefficiently.90 In addition, complex legislation impacts 
upon the certainty and efficiency of the retail leasing market.91 
Reduction of inconsistencies in regulation of retail leases and in 
the regulation of leases across jurisdictions would reduce 
compliance costs to business. 92  
(ii) Lack of transparency and accessibility to information.  
Despite the current regime of disclosure statements being 
provided to lessees, information gaps still exist.93 Too much 
                                                             
87 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 7. 
88 Shopping Centre Council of Australia, Submission No 83 to the Productivity Commission, The 
Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st March 2008), 7. 
89 Eileen Webb “The Productivity Commission Enquiry Report: The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases 
in Australia” (2009) 16 Australian Property Law Journal 219, 220. 
90 Shopping Centre Council of Australia, Submission No 83 to the Productivity Commission, The 
Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia, August 2008, 17. 
91 Eileen Webb “The Productivity Commission Enquiry Report: The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases 
in Australia” (2009) 16 Australian Property Law Journal 219, 220. 
92 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 264. 
93 Ibid, 163. 
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information, however, can be confusing to lessees and be an 
impediment to effective decision making94 especially where the 
lease itself is expressed in complex terms.95 
(iii) Lack of clarity.  
Lack of clear legislation may result in the lessee, as the more 
poorly resourced and less sophisticated party, making costly 
errors or maintaining a legal position which is not defensible.96 
Specifically, the lack of clarity regarding acceptable conduct of 
the parties and what amounts to unconscionable conduct.97 
Defining the boundaries of acceptable conduct would make it 
easier for lessors to stay within those boundaries and would 
protect small business from harmful conduct and reduce 
restrictions on negotiation options and decision-making.98 
 
(iv) Harsh or unfair conduct of parties.   
Irrespective of retail leasing legislation unfair behaviour 
continues. Such conduct often falls short of being 
unconscionable and may be outside dispute resolution 
arrangements as well.99 Examples of such conduct, mainly 
involving shopping centres, included aggressive and evasive 
negotiating tactics by lessors, open use of turnover data by 
lessors in lease negotiations and slow registration of leases to 
                                                             
94 Ibid, 251. 
95 Ibid, 252. 
96 D & D Ventures Pty Ltd v Evans [2000]NSWADT, 30. 
97 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008, 254. 
98 Ibid, 264. 
99 Ibid, 202. 
26 
 
establish indefeasibility of title.100 Retail tenancy legislation has 
not been successful in improving the relationship between lessor 
and lessee and may have made such relationship worse.101 
 
(v) Inefficient resolution of disputes which leads to greater costs, 
delay and uncertainty.  
 In 1997 the Reid Committee found that dispute resolution 
procedures for retail leases were costly and were not resolved in 
a timely fashion.102 Over a decade later, in 2008, the Productivity 
Commission found that parties to a retail lease now had access 
to low cost dispute resolution but that such dispute resolution 
differed in each jurisdiction and that some of the dispute 
resolution procedures duplicated provisions in the fair trading 
law.103 
Such areas of inefficient operation of the retail leasing market must be 
taken into account in considering any simplified retail leasing 
legislation.104 
 
(c) Restrictions on the supply of retail space.   
                                                             
100 Ibid, 204. 
101 Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry 
- Report No. 56 (December 2011), 273. 
102 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, Parliament 
of Australia, Finding a Balance: Towards Fair Trading in Australia, May 1997, [2.45]. 
103 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 80. 
104 Department of Industry Innovation Science Research and Tertiary Education, Commonwealth 
Governments Response to the Productivity Commissions Report ‘The Market for Retail Tenancies in 
Australia’ (August 2008), 2. 
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The Productivity Commission, in its 2008 Report, although recognising 
the benefit of planning restrictions and zoning controls, believed that 
such restrictions reduced the amount of available retail space, and, 
thereby reduced competition and proposed that State and Territory 
governments should relax such zoning and planning restrictions that 
unduly limit the supply of retail space.105  In its 2011 Report the 
Productivity Commission once again proposed that planning restrictions 
be reduced as such restrictions created a less intense competition for 
retail space which removed pressure from lessors to offer favourable 
terms.106 Such a proposal seems to be based on the premise that by 
relaxing planning restrictions more shopping centres may be built which 
will result in more competition between lessors thereby causing lower 
and more competitive rents and that these price savings will be passed 
on by lessees thereby providing a greater benefit to the community.   
 
 The Productivity Commission has observed: - 
Part of the cost of unnecessarily restrictive planning and zoning systems is 
ultimately passed on to Australian consumers in the form of higher prices for 
retail goods. However, where Australian retailers face growing competition 
from international online traders, the former may find it more difficult to 
continue to pass on any extra costs arising from inefficient planning and 
zoning systems to Australian consumers.107 
 
                                                             
105 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 259-260. 
106 Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry 
- Report No. 56 (December 2011), 271 -272. 
107 Productivity Commission, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade (September 
2014), 124. 
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This proposal, however, seems to disregard the fact that the planning 
restrictions have been put in place for the same reason i.e. the greater 
benefit to the community.  Such benefit is achieved by ensuring 
optimum results in relation to traffic flow, parking, residential and 
environmental concerns. In addition, planning restrictions are not 
simply pronounced by the relevant local authority and accepted by all 
interested parties.  Often planning disputes take years to litigate and 
require input from senior counsel, town planning experts and judges 
before they are settled or resolved. Simply urging local authorities to 
relax their town planning requirements fails to take into account the 
complexities of such law. The monopoly given to lessors as a result of 
town planning restrictions must be considered in relation to any 
simplification of retail leasing law. 
 
2.3 The Nature of Leases 
In assessing the effectiveness of current retail lease legislation it is 
necessary to consider the nature of the lease itself.  The very nature of a 
retail lease may require more specific legislation.  
The purpose of a lease is to effect two results. Firstly, to grant the lessee an 
interest in land and, secondly, to record the contractual arrangements 
between the parties.108 Retail leases have been described as relational 
contracts109 containing features such as: - 
                                                             
108 WD Duncan “The Implications of a Term of Good Faith in Commercial Leases” (2002) 9 
Australian Property Law Journal 1, 2. 
109 Eileen Webb and Luke Villiers “Using Relational Contract Principles to Construe the Landlord / 
Tenant Relationship: Some Preliminary Observations” (2011) 1 Property Law Review 21, 25.  
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(a) the existence of a business relationship between the parties and the 
need to maintain that relationship; 
(b) the extensive commitment by one party to the other;  
(c) the difficulty of reducing important terms to well defined obligations and 
adjusting the relationship over time to provide for unforeseen contingencies; 
(d) incompleteness in that the risk between the parties is not shared fairly; 
and  
(e) expectations of loyalty and inter dependence which becomes the basis 
for the economic planning of the parties.110 
 
The significance of the relational nature of retail leases is that any less 
complex proposed  legislation must, if necessary, take into account such 
factors.  Such regulation may be, if appropriate, existing legislation contained 
within one or more jurisdictions. Alternatively, such regulation may have to 
be something completely new.  The features of a lease as a relational 
contract are considered below. 
 
A. The existence of a business relationship between the parties and the 
need to maintain that relationship and the extensive commitment by one 
party to the other. 
Relational contracts are not discrete transactions and require varying 
degrees of ongoing cooperation between the parties to the contract.111 
Similarly, a lease is a contract governing a long term relationship between 
                                                             
110 Bobux Marketing Limited –v- Raynor Marketing Limited [2002] 1 NZ L R 506, 516 (Thomas J).   
See also Gough and Gilmore Holdings Pty Ltd –v- Caterpillar of Australia Limited (No 11) [2002] 
NSWIRComm 354.  
111 IR McNeil, “Contracts: Adjustment of Long Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neo-
classical and Relational Contract Law” (1977-1978) 72 North Western University Law Review, 84. 
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lessor and lessee, containing numerous complicated arrangements 
regulating the conduct between the parties, most of which relate to traditional 
lease provisions (such as rent, duration of lease etc.) but some of which are 
not traditionally lease provisions (such as the obligation to contribute to a 
marketing fund or the establishment of a tenants’ association).  
 
In a leasing context, the financial commitment of the lessee to the leased 
premises is greater than that of the lessor. However, the interest of both 
parties is the same in that the lessee and the lessor both stand to benefit 
economically from leasing the premises and the lessor’s benefit is directly 
related to the lessee’s benefit.  The result is a continuing relationship 
established for the benefit of both parties.112 This continuing relationship is, 
however, likely to alter during the course of the lease term such that the 
benefits received by both parties will increase or decrease depending upon 
events. Any  legislation must take into account the fact that the continuing 
relationship between the parties will be dynamic and fluid. 
 
B. The difficulty of reducing important terms to well defined obligations 
and adjusting the relationship over time to provide for unforeseen 
contingencies and incompleteness in that the risk between the parties is not 
shared fairly. 
 
The long term nature of the lease results in the parties but, in particular the 
less experienced lessee, being unable to foresee all possibilities which 
                                                             
112 Eileen Webb and Luke Villiers “Using Relational Contract Principles to Construe the Landlord / 
Tenant Relationship: Some Preliminary Observations” (2011) 1 Property Law Review 21, 36. 
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results in the lease containing clauses which provide imprecise and 
indeterminate benefits or burdens.113 
 
The nature of a long term commercial lease can be summarised as follows: 
(a) It is a continuing transaction; 
(b) there is a mutual wish to maximise gain from the one asset where both 
lessor and lessee stand to gain financially if the relationship is harmonious 
and co-operative; 
(c) although each party will wish to protect its own interest in the premises 
from harm by the other it is not possible for all contingencies to be foreseen 
when the contract is formed and the lessee, in particular, is unable to fully 
protect its’ own interests; and 
(d) opportunities become available to the lessor when a situation arises 
not contemplated by the parties and not addressed in the contract 
documentation.114 
 
The long term nature of the relationship between the lessor and the lessee, 
coupled with the inability to foresee all factors in advance,115 and therefore 
the inability to properly allocate risk between the parties results in the ability 
of the lessor, as the stronger commercial party, to act opportunistically, with 
                                                             
113 William M Dixon, “Common Law Obligations of Good Faith in Australian Commercial Contracts – 
A Relational Recipe.” (2005) 33 ABLR 87 94, 94. 
114 William M Dixon “What is the Content of the Common Law Obligation of Good Faith in 
Commercial Leases?” (2007) 14 Australian Property Law Journal 113, 114. 
115 Adam Thatcher "Reflections on Malsons' Case" (1992)8 QUTLawJl 161, 163. 
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the risk of such opportunism arising particularly at the expiry of a lease that 
contains no option to renew.116 
 
Examples of how the power imbalance between the parties and the 
imprecise,117 long term nature of a lease can be used by a lessor for its 
benefit include situations where: - 
(a)  A lessor has an uncontrolled discretion to grant or withhold consent to 
the lessee’s conduct or to act unreasonably.  
In such a case a lessor can withhold its consent and such conduct may not 
be unreasonable118 as a lessor has a right to take into account the benefit to 
the lessor in refusing consent119 even where the intention of the lessor in 
refusing consent is not just to protect its existing position, but to secure 
additional advantages to itself such as forcing the lessee to agree to lease 
terms more favourable to the lessor.120  
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Where the refusal of the lessors consent would leave the lessee entirely at 
the mercy of the lessor,121 and cripple the lessees’ ability to use the 
premises for its business,122  then an implication of a term that the lessor 
would act reasonably may be necessary to give business efficacy to the 
lease.123 Alternatively, where the lessor grants a lease for a certain business 
use and the conduct of the lessor means that the lessee cannot operate 
such a business from the premises, the lessor may be found to be acting in 
derogation of grant. 124 This principle has been incorporated into retail 
leasing legislation such that a lessor who causes significant disruption to the 
lessees trading may be liable to pay compensation to the lessee.125 
 
Where a lessor is not required to proceed reasonably, it is impossible for a 
lessee to predict future outcomes. Even where the lessor is expressly or 
impliedly obliged to act reasonably, for example, in granting or refusing 
consent, it is still impossible for a lessee (and, for that matter, the lessor) to 
predict future outcomes because neither party can know the circumstances 
the parties may find themselves in the future nor predict the actions of third 
parties and how such actions will affect them over the course of the lease.  
For example, in Opera House Investments Pty Ltd v Devon Buildings Pty 
Ltd126 the lease provided that the lessee would pay rent plus interest on a 
loan taken out by the lessor to construct buildings on the leased premises at 
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4% for five years and thereafter at whatever rate the lessor could negotiate.  
After 5 years the lessor, who had other debts, was offered a mortgage for 
the original loan at 4.25% interest rate but was also offered another 
mortgage at 4.5% interest rate which would include all of its debts in the one 
mortgage. The lessees position was that it should only be responsible for 
interest rate at 4.25 percent however the court held that the lessor could take 
into account its own interests such as the commercial convenience of having 
only one mortgage and that if the lessor took out a second mortgage to 
cover its other debts that the rate of any second mortgage on the property 
would be higher than 4.5 percent.127 
 
At the commencement of the lease neither party could have known what the 
borrowing position of the lessor would be like in 5 years or what loan 
products would be available to the lessor.  For the lessee to agree to pay 
interest after five years at whatever rate the lessor could negotiate gives the 
lessee no control over the lessors’ actions. Presumably, the lessee assumed 
that the lessees and the lessors’ interests were aligned in that the lessor 
would seek the lowest interest rate possible so as not to financially injure the 
lessee.  Considered in isolation such an assumption would be reasonable 
however, in reality, the lessor, as a business entity, is likely to be involved in 
a kaleidoscope of financial dealings and it may be in the lessors’ interest to 
allow one business interest to suffer for another business interest to prosper.  
In this case, the lessor chose the advantage of a consolidated loan over its 
relationship with the lessee. The business relationship between the parties 
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does not require the lessor to favour the interests of the lessee over the 
lessors’ own interests. There was no obligation on the part of the lessor to 
inform the lessee of its intentions prior to entering into the new loan even 
though the lessor would have been aware that the lessors conduct was likely 
to cause financial expense to the lessee over and above the level of 
expense the lessee would have anticipated.  In such a circumstance, should 
the lessor be required to notify the lessee prior to acting (as part of the 
“expectation of loyalty”) and should the lessee then have the ability, for 
example, to require a rent review as a result of the greater financial burden 
that has now been placed upon it?  
In reviewing  retail lease legislation from a national perspective , it is relevant 
to consider the effect that any lease as a  the long term contract will have on 
the lease and the parties as well as the future expectations that each party 
will have of the other and of the transaction and whether particular regulation 
may be required to ensure that such expectations are met.   
 
(b) Where the lessor is able to use a lease provision to secure a result that 
neither the lessee nor lessor originally intended or envisaged at the 
commencement of the lease.  
 
For example, in Cuge Pty Limited v Gibo Pty Limited128 the lessor required 
the lessee to undertake repairs to the premises.  The lessee had refused on 
the basis that the damages pre-dated the lease. The lease, however, 
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contained a provision that the lessee had to comply with any notices from 
the local authority. 
The lessor, therefore, approached the local authority to have them issue an 
order for repair work with which the lessee would be obliged to comply.  The 
lessee submitted that the conduct of the lessor in approaching the local 
authority was a breach of the implied obligation of good faith however the 
Court accepted that although the lessor had an ulterior motive in contacting 
the Council, that the predominant motive was the legitimate purpose of 
ensuring that the building complied with the Council requirements. The 
relational nature of the retail lease did not prevent the lessor from exploiting 
the terms of the lease.   
Although an implication of a term of good faith may assist a lessee such a 
term may not necessarily be implied and even if implied it may be difficult to 
show that the lessor lacked good faith. 
In addition, such terms are only implied into a contract when they are 
necessary to give business efficacy to the contract129 and it is unlikely that a 
term of good faith would be implied into a commercial lease as commercial 
leases are normally unique documents rather than standard form contracts 
and effectively cover most important aspects all aspects of the relationship 
between a lessor and a lessee.130 
 
Whether a term of good faith is implied at law or in fact, a lessor would not 
be in breach of such a term where the lessor did not act capriciously, 
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irrationally or in circumstances where there was no objective explanation for 
its conduct 131 A lessor is still entitled to prefer its own self-interest over that 
of a lessee132 even in circumstances where the lessor has damaged the 
lessee133 or where the lessor is guilty of an ulterior motive134 or improper 
commercial conduct135. Although the Courts will commonly examine the 
motives of a lessor regarding its conduct136 if there is a rational and objective 
basis for the lessor’s behaviour, the fact that the lessor may have another 
motive for its conduct will not necessarily result in a breach of the implied 
obligation of good faith.137 The long term nature of the lease can result in 
unforeseen events occurring affecting the relationship not catered for by the 
terms of the lease.  Any revision of legislation must consider this relational 
contract aspect of a retail lease. 
 
C. There are expectations of loyalty and inter dependence which become 
the basis for the economic planning of the parties.138 
Although it is likely at the start of the lease that the lessee and the lessor are 
committed to each other, such loyalty will, during the lease term, start to 
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wane as other opportunities become available to both parties.  Where either 
party acts in a disloyal fashion the other party is likely to be unprepared and 
will suffer economically as a result of such conduct. For example: 
(a) Where a lease allows the lessor to form an opinion that will affect the 
lessee.   
In the common case where a lease contains a provision that the lease may 
be terminated where the premises are damaged to such an extent that, in 
the lessor’s opinion, trading from the premises is not possible and repair of 
the premises is not financially viable then the lessor may have a right to 
terminate the lease. In the absence of any lease provision requiring the 
lessor to obtain expert opinion before making a decision, in such a case, the 
opinion of the lessor does not have to be reasonably formed but simply 
honestly held.139 
 
The use of a subjective test (the lessor’s honest opinion) as opposed to an 
objective test (reasonable opinion) seems to make it difficult, if not 
impossible, for a lessee to challenge the opinion of the lessor.140 In 
circumstances where the lessee is at the mercy of the lessor’s opinion, the 
lessee is unable to plan for the future in the long term.  A lessee may be 
confident of the current lessors’ opinions but the property may be sold at any 
time and a new lessor take over whose thoughts and motivations are 
unknown to the lessee. 
 
                                                             
139 VL Credit Pty Ltd v Switzerland Genuine Insurance Co Limited (No. 2) [1999] 2 VR 311. 
140 Ibid, 315. Cf McIntosh v Dylcote Pty Ltd (1999) BPR 16805, [16]. 
39 
 
(b) Where an express term of the lease allows the lessor to unilaterally act 
to the detriment of the lessee. 
In Blackler v Felpure Pty Limited141 the lease contained a provision 
permitting the lessor to terminate where the lessor wished to renovate the 
premises. The lessor intended to terminate the lease so that they could 
renovate the building and then replace the lessee’s premises with offices 
from which they, the lessor, could conduct their business. 
 
The lessee alleged lack of good faith on the part of the lessor because the 
true reason for the termination was to put the lessor in possession of the 
lessee’s premises and not to renovate the premises.  The Court accepted 
that there was a genuine proposal142 by the lessor to renovate the premises 
and that the notice to terminate was therefore valid.143 The demolition clause 
was a “contractual opportunity”144 which allowed the lessor to terminate the 
lease.145 
 
A lessor, therefore, is entitled to exercise an express contractual right to their 
own advantage to the detriment of the lessee and such exercise of a 
contractual right does not necessarily amount to unconscionability146 or show 
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lack of good faith147 even though such conduct may be “disloyal” for the 
purposes of relational contract theory. The lessor may take advantage of 
contractual opportunities that may arise, not only from changing 
circumstances, but also from changing interpretation of the law by the courts. 
It is unlikely that the lessee would even be aware of any change in law until 
there is litigation between the parties.  The more well-resourced and better 
advised lessor may not only be aware of the change in law but have altered 
its leasing patterns accordingly. The longer the term of the lease, therefore, 
the more likely it is that the legal and economic landscape existing at the 
time the lease was entered into has altered to the detriment of the 
unknowing lessee.  
(c) Where the lease does not require the lessor to co-operate with the 
lessee. 
For example, in Alcatel Australia Limited v Scarcella148 the Court implied a 
term of good faith into a long term commercial lease and determined that the 
lessor had not acted unconscionably or breached that term.149 
The lessor had sought a fire safety inspection from the local authority which 
resulted in a list of requisitions being issued. Pursuant to the terms of the 
lease, satisfying the requisitions were the responsibility of the lessee.  
The lessee wished to appeal the decision of the Council as the lessee 
considered the requirements to be onerous, however, any appeal could only 
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be undertaken by the lessor as owner and the lessor refused to instigate 
such an appeal.   
The Court rejected the argument that there was an implied term of good faith 
that the lessor would co-operate with the lessee to ensure that the lessee 
was not subject to onerous fire safety requisitions and, moreover, found that 
a property owner did not breach any implied term of good faith by ensuring 
that the requirements for fire safety had been put in place and it was the 
contractual duty of the lessee to meet the requirements of Council.150 
Although parties to a contract are required to co-operate to achieve the 
results envisaged in the contract151 such an implied term cannot override 
express provisions of the contract.152 Additionally, the implied duty to co-
operate does not necessarily extend to co-operation in all areas and may 
extend to fundamental terms only.  Where terms are not fundamental, a 
party may decide for itself whether it will co-operate even if failure to co-
operate will disentitle the other party to a benefit.153 
If a lessor, therefore, complies with the terms of a lease, but refuses to co-
operate with a lessee where external difficulties arise (such as local authority 
requisitions), the lessor is not in breach of the lease and the lessee is left 
without a remedy even where the motivation of the lessor is to have the 
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lessee vacate the premises.154  Standard terms of a lease that provide no 
warranty regarding fitness of the premises for the lessees’ use allow the 
lessee to manipulate the circumstances and the terms of the lease for the 
lessor’s benefit.  
 
The above cases make it clear that in circumstances where the lessor’s 
conduct can be explained as an attempt by the lessor to protect or advance 
its own interests, the courts will be reluctant to find lack of good faith and in 
order to show lack of good faith the lessee may be required to show there is 
no other reason for the lessor’s conduct except to harm the lessee.155  
 
Such a situation arose in ACCC –v- Lee Lee Pty Ltd156  where consent to the 
grant of an under lease was withheld allegedly to inflict economic harm on 
the lessee due to the ill will between the parties.  Although the matter settled 
before a final hearing the consent orders filed in the Court contained an 
acknowledgement by the lessor that it had breached Section 51AC (1) of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974.157 
 
Lack of good faith is one aspect that the courts can take into account in 
determining the existence of unconscionability under the Australian 
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Consumer Law.158 However, if such lack of good faith can only be shown 
where the sole motive for the lessor’s conduct is to harm the lessee, it is 
unlikely that lack of good faith could ever be proven as the lessor could 
conceal its real intent to harm the lessee by seemingly making legitimate 
demands upon the lessee under the lease. In considering simplified retail 
lease legislation, it is necessary to consider the shortfalls in the current law.  
The relational nature of leases, therefore, provides opportunities for the 
lessor to secure advantages at the expense of the lessee and results in a 
power imbalance in the lessors’ favour which the basic laws of contract 
cannot remedy. The principles of freedom of contract are of no comfort to the 
lessee where it is bound for a lengthy term into a relational lease contract 
which contains clauses which are necessarily vague because they are 
widely drafted in an attempt to deal with matters in the long term.159  
 
2.4 The Bargaining Power of Lessee and Lessor 
The relational nature of the lease contract and the nature of the parties 
themselves results in a power imbalance in favour of the lessor. Such 
imbalance in bargaining power requires that there be statutory protection for 
a retail lessee. This may be exacerbated by the relational nature of leases 
requiring the maintenance of contractual relationships over a relatively 
lengthy period.     
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 Retail leases, like most contracts, are made between parties of unequal 
bargaining power.160 Such imbalance of power provides opportunities for the 
more powerful party to act in an unfair or oppressive manner.  
The more powerful party, however, is not required to surrender any 
advantages it may have for the sake of equality.161 There is a distinction 
between a party using power in a relationship for its own benefit and the 
abuse of that power to the extent that a party could be said to be acting 
unconscionably.162 
Besides the advantages provided to a lessor arising from the relational 
nature of a lease contract the bargaining power of a retail lessor is enhanced 
by other non-contractual reasons such as: 
a) The Nature of the Parties 
(i) The lessor is usually an experienced “professional” lessor who 
deals with retail lease issues on a daily basis whereas the lessee is not 
in the business of leasing premises and is only required to deal with 
these issues either at the start or renewal of the lease. An 
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unsophisticated lessee cannot foresee the consequences of their own 
actions let alone the consequences of the lease terms.163 
 Putting aside the need for legal advice regarding a lease, an 
experienced lessee will take additional steps to protect its interests 
which would not occur to a novice lessee. Such steps may include, 
before the commencement of a lease, taking advice from a tenants’ 
committee, examining the local area for similar shops, or having the 
equipment that forms part of the lease and the premises inspected or 
tested.  For example, in D & D Ventures Pty Limited vs Evans164, the 
lessee thought that they were entitled to terminate a lease for a 
restaurant because of a mistaken belief that the lessor should have 
advised the lessee of the leaking roof during the leasing negotiations.  
It was held that lessee’s due diligence enquiries should have included a 
building inspection before signing the lease165 and that there was no 
implied warranty that the premises would be fit for use as a 
restaurant.166 It is likely that an experienced lessee would carry out an 
inspection of the premises and make other inquiries regarding the 
premises prior to entry into the lease.167 
 In the writer’s experience, a novice lessee not only knows nothing 
about the lease but does not want to know anything about the lease. 
Such lessees resent being forced to obtain legal and financial advice 
prior to signing the lease because of their mistaken view that: - 
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A. all leases are the same and therefore it is unnecessary to 
examine their contents;  
B. in any event the lessor will not negotiate;168 
C. the time involved in obtaining advice and cooling off periods 
simply delay the lessee from operating their business;169 
D. it is too expensive to comply with the legislation170 
E. the lessor, at all times, wants the lessee to succeed and will take 
no steps to disadvantage the lessee or its business; and 
F. the lessor, as the more experienced party, knows better than the 
lessee and therefore the statements of the lessor or its agents 
should not be challenged.171 
Such lack of experience and distorted views about leases, lessors and 
lease legislation may be cured by bitter experience or, perhaps, by 
education and training.  Leasing regulation must not only protect the 
lessee from the lessor, but also from the lessee itself. 
 
(ii) In addition to the lessor’s greater experience, a retail lessor will 
have access to leasing professionals such as lawyers, valuers and 
managing agents, whereas it is unlikely that the lessee would be able 
to afford such assistance. Retail leasing law can be quite complex in 
both interpretation and application.  
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In Hasler Transport Co Pty Ltd v. Avelian Pty Ltd and Pied Properties 
Pty Ltd172 the lessee, after assigning its lease, sought compensation 
from the lessor for disruption of trade pursuant to section 43 of the 
Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), misrepresentation and 
unconscionable conduct of the lessor. Although the lease contained a 
provision that the lessor would not be liable for any disruption to the 
lessee’s business, Section 19 of the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) 
provided that a lease could not contain a clause excluding a provision 
of the Act.  It was held unnecessary to consider section 19 as the 
lessee had signed a Consent to Assignment Deed that provided that 
the lessee released the lessor from all liability arising under the lease 
and as the Consent to Assignment Deed was not a lease, section 19 
did not apply.  The lessor could therefore rely upon the release clause 
in the Deed. A lessee with appropriate legal advice would not have 
executed the Deed in that form and would have reserved its’ rights 
under the lease.  Lack of proper legal advice affects the lessee not only 
in relation to the provisions of the lease but also in relation to legal 
procedure generally, specifically, in presenting a case before a 
tribunal.173 
(iii)  The lessor, in a shopping centre or a multi-lease complex, has 
knowledge about the other leases in the complex, including rent details.  
Such knowledge includes not only the current leases but also historical 
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data.174 It is very unlikely that the lessee will have access to any such 
information.  The asymmetry of available information increases as a 
result of confidentiality clauses inserted into a lease175 and because 
there is no obligation upon the lessor to make such information 
available.176 Although in some jurisdictions registration of leases are 
common the value of such information is questionable where it is 
possible for the parties to enter into side agreements such as incentive 
agreements which are not registered.177 
(iv) The lessor has different priorities to the lessee, in that the lessor 
requires that the shopping centre as a whole to be a success.  The 
success of any one individual lessee’s business is secondary to the 
success of the majority of lessees as the success of the majority is 
likely to lead to success for the lessor.  
For this reason, the lease normally has: - 
A.  A re-location clause allowing the lessor to move a lessee where 
the lessor believes that altering the mix of lessees is in the best 
interests of the shopping centre as a whole or the majority of the 
lessees in the centre. 
B. A development or demolition clause allowing the lessor to 
terminate the lease where the lessor wishes to make improvements 
to the centre or to make alterations to improve the profitability of the 
centre. 
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C. Where the lessee is obliged to provide turnover information to 
the lessor the lease may also contain a performance clause 
whereby, if the lessee does not maintain a certain level of 
performance, then the lessor may terminate the lease. 
(b) The location of the Premises 
(i) The zoning of a shopping centre is such that it is unlikely that 
there would be a competing shopping centre close by with the result 
that the lessor has a monopoly in relation to the provision of shopping 
centre premises in that area. The restriction on the supply of retail 
space lessens competition between lessors and increases the lessor’s 
bargaining power.178 
The monopoly granted to the lessor by the zoning laws provides the 
lessor with a super-title, in that the lessor has all the benefits of a 
normal land-owner with the added benefit provided by that monopoly. 
(ii) Where similar premises within the local area are not available 
the pressure upon the lessee to agree to the lessors’ terms are 
magnified.  A business’s goodwill may be able to withstand being 
forced to vacate premises within a shopping centre but only if it is able 
to move into premises within the same locality.  Otherwise, the lack of 
convenience will cause the businesses regular customers to fall 
away.179 
(c) The Timing of Negotiations. 
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The lessor’s position is greatly enhanced where the lessee finds himself or 
herself at a negotiating disadvantage, for example, at the expiry of the lease 
term where the lessee has no option to extend.180  In Humphries & Cooke 
Limited v Essendon Airport Limited,181 a lessee who had expended 
considerable sums on the leased premises, found itself at the end of its 
lease term.  The lessor agreed to grant a new lease provided the rental 
increased by 340%.  The lessor’s conduct was not unconscionable because 
the lessee did not have any contractual entitlement to a grant of a new lease.  
In circumstances where the lessor is not required to grant a new lease then 
the granting of a new lease could be on such terms as a lessor may 
determine as a lessor cannot be forced to enter into a new lease.182 
 
Similarly, in ACCC vs CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Limited183 the court found 
that a lessor was not behaving unconscionably where the lessor, in return for 
granting an extension of a retail lease term, demanded additional 
advantages from the lessee.  In that case the lessee wished to obtain an 
extension of their lease to allow them to sell the business.  At that time the 
lessee was involved in ongoing court proceedings which had been brought 
by multiple lessees against the lessor regarding the overcharging of levies 
by the lessor.  The lessors were prepared to grant the extension but only on 
the basis that the lessee released the lessors from all claims and consent to 
the dismissal of any current legal proceedings against them.  The lessee 
reluctantly agreed. 
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The ACCC subsequently brought proceedings on behalf of the lessee 
alleging unconscionable conduct by the lessor pursuant to s51AA of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 but were unsuccessful. 
According to Gummow and Hayne JJ: - 
…a person in a greatly inferior bargaining position nevertheless may not lack capacity 
to make a judgement about that person’s own best interest.  The respondents submit 
that the facts in the present case show that [the lessees] were under no disabling 
condition which affected their ability to make a judgment as per their own best 
interests in agreeing to the stipulation imposed by the owners for the renewal of the 
lease, so as to facilitate the sale by [the lessees] of their business.  Those 
submissions should be accepted.184 
 
In this case the Court found that the lessor had no obligation to grant a new 
lease to the lessee and therefore could demand such terms that the lessor 
deemed fit. The issue of the lease renewal and the litigation were related as 
they both arose from the same lease and the lessor was therefore entitled to 
take all of these matters into account in its negotiations. Even if the issues 
were not related the lessor could still have included them in their 
negotiations as the abandoning of claims is simply ordinary commercial 
dealing.185 
In such a case, a lessor can drive a hard bargain because a lessee has no 
contractual right to insist upon an additional lease term, the lessee has 
invested considerably into the leased premises both in terms of time and 
money and the only way for the lessee to recover its investment is to sell the 
business in circumstances where such sale would be unlikely where there is 
                                                             
184 ACCC vs CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Limited (2003) 214 CLR 51, [56]. 
185 Ibid, [16]. 
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no term left on the lease.  Although the lessee may be vulnerable, such 
vulnerability is only in the commercial sense186 and any disadvantage 
suffered by the lessee is not at a special disadvantage sufficient to allow a 
lessee to claim that the lessor’s conduct was unconscionable.  A lease 
provision may be unfair but still not be unconscionable.187 
 
That situation would be different, however, where the lessor had an 
obligation to enter into a new lease.  For example, in Goldberg Enterprises 
Pty Limited vs Online IT Services Pty Limited188, a lessee was required to 
provide vacant possession within one (1) month.  Prior to termination, the 
lessor represented to the lessee that if the lessee complied with certain 
conditions regarding fixtures installed by the lessee then the lessor would 
grant the lessee a lease. 
 
The lessee complied with those conditions however the lessor still re-entered 
the premises, changed the locks and forced the lessee to relocate.  The 
lessors conduct was unconscionable (even though the lessor was entitled to 
terminate the monthly lease) because of the representation it had made to 
the lessee that it would grant a new lease where the lessor had obviously no 
intention to do that.189 
 
                                                             
186 Tang v Williams Company Ltd [2010] VCAT 411, [34]. 
187 Pacific Lifestyle Financial Services v El Safty Enterprises Pty Ltd [2000] QRSLT 6, [49]. 
188 [2011] NSWADTAP 21. 
189 Ibid, [36]-[37]. 
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Many of the abovementioned factors arose in ACCC v Dukemaster,190 where 
the court found that the lessor engaged in unconscionable conduct involving 
the negotiations and renewals of multiple retail leases. 
Over a period of some years the lessor, in negotiating new leases, had: - 
(i)  suggested a new rental figure and given the lessee a limited 
time in which to respond such that the lessee would have difficulty in 
obtaining legal advice.  
(ii) made representations to the lessee in English when in fact (as 
the lessor knew) the lessee spoke little English.   
(iii) had sought a renewed rental at an exorbitant figure which for 
which there was no basis beyond the lessor’s decision to seek the 
amount stated; 
(iv) had refused to address the lessee’s complaint about the 
excessive rental, 
(v) eventually delivered to the lessee a lease that contained terms 
different to the terms of the original lease; 
(vi) placed pressure upon the lessees by threatening eviction and 
refusing to address the lessees concerns regarding the rent increase.   
(vii) suggested that the new rental had already been determined by 
experts, the rental offered by the lessor was discounted from that 
determination and if the lessee did not agree to the new rental figure 
the lessor would withdraw its offer of the discount.  
 
                                                             
190 [2009] ATPR 42-290. 
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The evidence given by one of the lessees at trial was that she thought she 
had little choice except to agree to the lessee’s terms. The lessor’s conduct, 
was unconscionable because, of amongst other things, the lack of 
bargaining power191 of the lessee. The lessee: - 
(i) at the time of the renewal had been operating her food shop for 
a short period; 
(ii) had limited ability to speak or read English which made it difficult 
for her to understand the process or the documents provided by the 
lessor; 
(iii) had no knowledge of her legal rights and did not understand that 
she could seek a rental determination; 
(iv) was operating a small business with limited scope of growth in 
revenue; and 
(v) needed to renew the lease to recoup the investment she had 
made.  
 
Although the lessor in return suggested, for different reasons, that there was 
parity of bargaining power between the parties, the court disagreed but did 
accept that the balance of bargaining power could be effected by: - 
(i) In circumstances where the lessee had little English, the 
availability of an interpreter; 
(ii) The availability of legal advice; 
(iii) The assistance of other lessees or lessee committees; 
                                                             
191 According to s51AC(3)(a) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (now s22 of the Australian 
Consumer Law) the court may, in determining whether a party acted unconscionably take into 
account the relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the supplier and the business 
consumer.  
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(iv) The business experience of the lessee; 
(v) Simple and straightforward lease documents; 
(vi) Flexibility of market i.e. the availability of other locations and the 
transferability of the lessees’ goodwill; 
(vii) The lessor advising the lessee of its rights.192 
 
To protect itself against claims of unconscionable conduct a lessor must, 
therefore, not merely conduct itself in the classic mode of self-interested 
hard bargaining193 but must also consider the nature of the lessee.  Where, 
to the lessors’ knowledge, the lessee suffers from a disadvantage then the 
lessor should take steps to minimise such a disadvantage, provided that 
such steps do not result in a reduction of the lessors own bargaining power.  
For example, where a lessee does not speak English then the lessor should 
insist upon the lessee obtaining the services of an interpreter. The nature 
and characteristics of the parties to the lease and their surrounding 
circumstances, therefore, can affect the balance of power between them.   
A lessee at the start of a lease who has the option to enter into the lease or 
not is in a more powerful position then that same lessee, years later, who 
has invested considerably into fit-out and marketing of its business who has 
no option to renew. Similarly, a lessee who is experienced and well informed 
and has the benefit of both legal and financial advice is more empowered 
than a novice lessee who has only a tenuous grasp of the terms of the lease 
                                                             
192 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dukemaster Pty Ltd [2009] [2009] ATPR 42-
290, [137] (Gordon J). 
193 As was the case in ACCC vs CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Limited (2003) 214 CLR 51. 
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because of some disadvantage such as inability to speak English or lack of 
education. 
Simplification of retail leasing law must consider the nature and 
characteristics of the parties and their ability to redress the power imbalance 
between the parties. 
 
3. Conclusions 
The purpose of this Chapter has been to provide an introduction to this 
research and to leases generally including the relationship between lessors 
and lessees and the leasing market. The following conclusions can be drawn 
from the material discussed in this chapter: - 
 
3.1 Leases Generally 
1. Significant investment by lessees into their business can be 
frustrated by the conduct of the lessor, in particular, the refusal of a 
lessor to grant an extension of a lease.  
 
2. Traditional principles of freedom of contract will not apply as the 
bargaining power of a shopping centre lessor is so great that the 
market place is distorted. The lessors bargaining power arises 
primarily because of the monopoly granted to the lessor by town 
planning laws which will restrict the construction of another shopping 
centre nearby thereby restricting competition. 
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3. Legislation must balance freedom of contract principles and 
traditional land rights of lessors against consumer protection 
perspectives requiring the protection of the lessee.  
 
4. Retail leasing legislation has existed in Australia for so long that it is 
unlikely that it will be repealed in the future. In addition, voluntary 
codes have not been successful in Australia nor in the United 
Kingdom.  
 
3.2  Retail Leasing Market 
 
1. The retail leasing market provides a significant contribution to the 
Australian Gross Domestic Product.  In 2008 there were 209,000 
retail tenancy leases of which 60,000 were in shopping centres. The 
retail leasing market also provides significant contributions to 
employment in Australia.  
 
2. Imbalance of bargaining power in the retail leasing market reduces 
market efficiency. Such imbalance causes the intervention of the 
Government and the passing of legislation which, over the years, 
becomes larger and more complex. 
 
3. Over regulation of the market will cause distortions in the market by 
limiting the parties conduct or by limiting their commercial options, 
thereby restricting flexibility and stunting negotiation skills and 
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reducing incentives to invest. Compliance costs will therefore 
increase to the detriment of the lessee and consumer. Certainty and 
consistency are also reduced.  
 
4. Too little or too much information or complexity of information may 
confuse the lessee.  Lack of clarity of legislation may result in parties 
adopting an incorrect legal position or making costly errors.  
 
5. Despite extensive regulation, relations between lessors and lessees 
have not improved.  
 
6. Resolution of retail lease disputes must be timely and cost effective 
and provide a certain and reliable result.  
 
3.3 Nature of Leases 
 
1. Leases are relational contracts governing the parties conduct over a 
number of years where not all eventualities can be predicted and the 
risks of any such future events are primarily borne by the lessee 
because of the terms of the lease as drafted by the lessor.    
 
2. Leases require the parties to co-operate where both the lessor and 
lessee stand to benefit.  This results in expectations of loyalty and 
interdependence which influence the economic planning of both 
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parties, however, the lessor as a strong commercial party can act 
opportunistically at the expense of the lessee.  
 
3. The lessor can choose not to co-operate with the lessee and even 
financially harm the lessee’s business and such conduct will not 
necessarily be in breach of good faith or unconscionable.  
 
3.4 Bargaining Power of Lessees and Lessors 
 
1. The lessor is often more experienced and professional than the 
lessee because the lessor is in the business of providing lease 
space whereas the lessee is running its own business and sees the 
lease and lease negotiations as a hurdle to be dealt with as quickly 
as possible.  This results in the lessee often not taking steps to fully 
comprehend the terms of the lease and the obligations contained 
therein and/or accepting the first offer made by the lessor. 
 
2. The lessee has a distorted view about the lease itself, its relationship 
to the lessor and retail leasing legislation.  Problems for the lessee 
can arise often as a result of such views. The lessee must be 
protected not only from the superior bargaining power of the lessor, 
but also from the lessee’s own folly. 
 
3. The lessor is better resourced and has access to leasing 
professionals such as lawyers and valuers whereas it is unlikely that 
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the lessee could afford such resources.  Lack of professional advice 
increases the chances of a lessee not understanding the terms of 
the lease or the terms of legislation to its detriment.  
 
4. The lessor has greater access to information of current leases and 
previous leases.  The asymmetry of information in favour of the 
lessor is enhanced by confidentiality clauses and disclosure of 
turnover clauses contained in leases.  
 
5. Although a lessor benefits if a lessee is successful the success of an 
individual lessee is not the lessor’s primary concern.  Rather the 
lessor simply wishes to make the lessor’s shopping centre as 
profitable if possible even if that means that a particular lessee has 
to be relocated or have their lease terminated.  
 
Chapter Two will discuss why legislation has been imposed in all Australian 
jurisdictions and voluntary codes have been promulgated in the United 
Kingdom.  It will also discuss and justify the various areas of concern to be 
considered by the study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
AREAS OF FOCUS AND DRIVERS FOR REFORM 
 
1. Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter One, the purpose of this thesis is to determine 
whether State and Territory based retail shop lease legislation should be 
made as uniform as possible nationally  by analysing the benefits a reduction 
in regulation   in relation to specific significant areas of conflict. These 
selected areas of conflict are present nationally in the sector.  
 
This Chapter will be divided into two parts.  The first part of this Chapter will 
examine the particular areas of conflict between lessors and lessees which 
have been common and enduring, which have proved problematic since 
retail lease legislation was first introduced and which continue to be 
problematic despite the retail leases legislation.  
 
The second part of this Chapter will analyse the various drivers for reform of 
the legislation in relation to such areas of focus.  
 
2. Areas of Focus 
Large multi tenanted shopping centres first commenced trading in Australia 
in the late 1950’s with the first major planned shopping centre opening in 
Queensland in 1957 at Chermside (“the Chermside Drive-In Shopping 
Centre”). In the same year the Top Ryde Shopping Centre was the first 
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shopping centre to open in Sydney. In 1960 the Chadstone shopping centre 
opened 10 miles from Melbourne. Shopping Centres at Warringah Mall, 
Miranda Fair, Roselands, Burwood Shoppingtown and Bankstown Square 
opened in Sydney between 1963 and 1966. In Queensland the Toombul 
Shopping Centre was built in 1967 followed by Indooroopilly and Mt Gravatt 
in 1970.194  
 
The rapid proliferation of shopping centres occurred from 1975 such that, in 
1983, there was sixty (60) large integrated shopping complexes in Australia, 
most of which had been built since 1975.195 
 
The concept behind a shopping centre is simple: Put a large variety of 
retailers (both large and small) together in the one air-conditioned space with 
convenient parking and the customers will patronise those retailers in large 
numbers because of the convenience and comfort.196  Shopping Centres 
now often contain cinemas and other entertainment precincts which attract 
patrons beyond the retail experience. 
 
The owner of the shopping centre enjoys enhanced bargaining power 
because: - 
(a) The capital cost of constructing a shopping centre is so large that the 
number of competitors will be few;  
                                                             
194 Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Shopping Complex Leasing Practices, Queensland (19 
November 1981) 9. ( “Cooper Report 1981”). 
195 Professor H Tarlo, “The Great Shop Lease Controversy” (1983) University of Queensland Law 
Journal 13 (1), 7.  
196 Ibid.  See also Cooper Report 1981, 10. 
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(b) Zoning regulations place an artificial restriction on the number of retail 
places.  The zoning regulations of most local authorities would not allow the 
construction of another shopping centre close by because of environmental 
and traffic issues; and 197 
(c) The shopping centres themselves focus the retailing activity within an 
area to the extent that the retailers within that area feel that they must have a 
shop within the shopping centre for their business to succeed.198 
(d) There is a strong bias towards the utilisation of shopping centres by 
customers199 as compared with stand-alone shops. 
 
A popular shopping centre has many small existing and prospective lessees 
competing for space, particularly those that rely upon the drawing power of 
the centre and major chain stores, called anchor tenants, rather than their 
own drawing power.  The drawing power of the centre is increased by the 
presence of major lessees and the success of the other businesses within 
the centre.200 
 
                                                             
197 Productivity Commission, “A Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia” Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008),  xx.  
The retail market operates within the confines of zoning and planning controls.  While such 
controls can have merit in preserving public amenity and contributing to the cost effective 
use of public infrastructure, their application can limit competition and erode the efficient 
operation of the market for retail tenancies.  They restrict the number and use of sites, can 
confer some negotiating power on incumbent landlords and retail tenants, and restrict 
commercial opportunities of others.   
198 Preece A, “Property: The Retail Shop leases Act 1984” 1984 April, Queensland Law Society 
Journal, April, 25.  
In the case of large shopping centres there is the consequential factor that they often 
represent such a large proportion of the retail business in a particular locality that 
competition amongst prospective tenants for leases is artificially increased.  To put it briefly, 
so much of the consumers dollar is spent in shopping centres that too many retailers will do 
virtually anything to obtain a lease for premises there. 
199 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 12 November 1986, 1931 (Hayward). 
200 Productivity Commission, “A Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia” Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), xxi. 
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In short, the shopping centre once built, effectively in terms of a market, 
gives the owner a monopoly201 regarding the provision of shopping centre 
services in that area.  This monopoly is preserved by the planning and 
zoning regulations of local authorities202 and is further enhanced by the 
attitude of tenants that they must trade within the shopping centre in order to 
operate an effective business.  Retailers are aware of the monopoly but also 
believe that they will receive better returns in the shopping centre than 
outside the centre which ensures that demand for shopping centre space is 
constant. A shopping centre is, in fact, a mechanism whereby the lessor, for 
a price (rent plus the reimbursement of a proportion of outgoings) may share 
the privileged position it enjoys with others (lessees).  If, through some 
relaxation of town planning regulation, the construction of another shopping 
centre nearby is proposed the lessor and the lessees would collectively 
object to the proposal to ensure that no such new shopping centre was 
built.203 
 
Proliferation of shopping centres from 1975 onwards led to the concentration 
of power in the hands of a limited number of large shopping centre 
                                                             
201 House of Representatives, Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, Parliament 
of Australia, Finding a Balance: Towards Fair Trading in Australia, (May 1997), 20. According to 
Preece:  
‘It is suggested that the reason that the landlord is able to impose a hard bargain on the 
initial grant of the lease is that he enjoys to a greater or lesser degree a monopoly position as 
a result of the existence of zoning controls which artificially restrict the supply of suitable 
business premises.’ 
A Preece, “Property: The Retail Shop Leases Act 1984” (1984) April,  Queensland Law Society 
Journal, 25.  
202 A Preece, “Legislative Regulation of Lease of Business Premises” (1985) 1 Queensland Institute 
of Technology Law Journal, 140. 
203 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 March 1985, 501 (Court). 
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owners.204 Abuse of power by the shopping centre owners or their managers 
in the early 1980s led to many small businesses failing which, in turn, led to 
complaints to governments throughout Australia.  This, in turn, led to the 
establishment of inquiries205 which resulted in a number of government 
reports.206 Some Australian State governments207 reacted in the early 1980s 
however several others208 did not react until much later.  Inquiries were 
called and reports issued in Queensland,209 Victoria,210 South Australia,211 
Western Australia212 and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT).213 
Subsequent inquiries occurred in all other States and Territories. Original 
retail lease legislation has been repealed and replaced by new legislation to 
deal with ongoing problems, changes in retail marketing practices, shortfalls 
in the drafting or to reflect the policy of a new government. Inquiries and 
reports have also occurred in the Federal sphere over the past 25 years.214 
                                                             
204 Murdoch, Rowland and Crosby, “Looking after Small Business Tenants with Voluntary Codes or 
Statutory Intervention: A Comparison of Australian and UK Experiences” (Paper presented at the 7th 
Pacific Rim Real Estate Society Conference, Adelaide Australia, 21 – 24 January 20011) 25. 
205 The Committee of Enquiry into Shopping Complex Leasing Practices (“Cooper Inquiry”) was 
formed in Queensland in 1981. In 1983 the Victorian Retail Tenancies Advisory Committee (“Arnold 
Inquiry”)was formed. The Western Australian Inquiry into Commercial Tenancy Agreements (“Clarke 
Inquiry”) and the ACT Working Party on Business leases (“ACT Working Party”) were formed in 1984. 
The South Australian Working Party on Shopping Centre Leases (“Hill Inquiry”) was formed originally 
in 1981 and then again in 1983. 
206 See below nn 204 – 208. 
207 Queensland, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, Australian Capital Territory. 
208 New South Wales, Tasmania, Northern Territory. 
209 Cooper Report 1981. 
210 Report of the Retail Tenancies Advisory Committee, Victoria, (February 1984) (“Arnold Report 
1984”). 
211 Report of the Inquiry into Shopping Centre Leases, South Australia, (1983) (“Hill Report 1983”). 
212 Report of the Inquiry into Commercial Tenancy Agreements, Western Australia, (February 1984) 
(“Clarke Report 1984”). 
213 Report of the ACT Working Party on Business Leases Review Legislation, ACT (1984) (“ACT 
Report 1984”).  
214 House Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Small Business in Australia: 
Challenges, Problems and Opportunities, January 1990 (“Beddall Report 1990”); House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, Parliament of Australia, 
Finding a Balance: Towards Fair Trading in Australia, May, 1997 (“Reid Report 1997”); Joint Select 
Committee on the Retailing Sector, Parliament of Australia, Fair Market or Market Failure: A Review 
of Australia’s Retailing Sector, August 1999;  Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail 
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Retail leasing legislation often contains provision for a five (5) or seven (7) 
year review giving rise to regular inquiries.215 
 
Although the complaints to governments by lessees were numerous and 
addressed a variety of small retailer concerns, it is the intention of this thesis 
to consider only five major areas of complaint.  Selection of such areas will 
be on the basis that: - 
(a) The area of complaint existed prior to the enactment of retail lease 
legislation and, in this regard, it is intended to examine the reports of the 
early inquiries held in the 1980s; and 
(b) Such complaint did not disappear after the enactment of legislation but 
has continued to the present.  The evidence of the continued existence of 
the areas of complaint appears in the various reports of inquiries held to 
date. 
 
2.1 The Subject of Early Inquiries 
States and Territories that enacted retail leasing legislation in Australia can 
be divided into two groups.  The first group consists of the States that 
introduced such legislation in the early 1980’s and includes Queensland, 
Victoria, Western Australia and South Australia with Queensland being the 
first State off the mark in 1984.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Tenancy Leases in Australia, Report No. 43 (August 2008); Productivity Commission, Economic 
Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry (December 2011) ; Productivity 
Commission, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade (September 2014); Senate 
Economics Reference Committee, Parliament of Australia, Need for a National Approach to Retail 
Leasing Arrangements, 18 March 2015. 
215 For example, Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s122; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW), s86; 
Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s31. 
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The second group consists of those States and Territories that introduced 
such legislation later, such as the Australian Capital Territory,216 New South 
Wales, Tasmania and the Northern Territory.  
 
Analysis of the agitation for change in first group of States is more productive 
when identifying drivers for reform as the second group of States had the 
benefit of the experiences of the first group. New South Wales introduced 
legislation in 1994 only when a voluntary code was found unworkable. 
Analysis of the Queensland legislation is most important because, as the first 
of such legislation in this country, it provided a blue print for other legislation 
that was to follow.217 
Each of the areas of security of tenure, assignment provisions, dispute 
resolution, rent and rent review and disclosure form part of the reports 
issued prior to the enactment of legislation in each State and Territory. It is 
intended to determine the causes for initial reform in the 1980’s and analyse 
such causes. 
 
2.1.1 Lack of Security of Tenure 
The reason behind retail lease legislation in Queensland came from 
numerous complaints made to Government Ministers and to the Queensland 
Small Business Development Corporation by lessees in shopping centres.  
As a result of these complaints the Queensland Government commissioned 
                                                             
216 Although the Australian Capital Territory did not introduce legislation until 1994 that legislation 
came about after 20 years of debates, two sets of draft Business Lease Ordinances and a report of 
the Working Party on Business Leases Review of legislation prepared in November 1984. 
217 W D Duncan, ‘The Regulation of Commercial Tenancies – Heading for the Sunset’ (1990) 2 Bond  
L R 28. 
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two reports from the Small Business Development Corporation (Qld) which 
were completed in June and August 1981.  
 
The Small Business Development Corporation (Qld) report of 22nd June 
1981218 was based on representations made to the Corporation by over 200 
lessees.  The Small Business Development Corporation was limited, in its 
reports, to leases contained in shopping centres only and did not apply to 
leases contained in strip shopping centres or individual leases. The 
complaints of Lessees were not universal.219 
 
In this Report the Small Business Development Corporation (Qld) isolated 
the specific problems faced by lessees of shopping centres which included 
lack of options for renewals of leases220 and recommended that each lease 
should have a minimum initial term with two option periods.221   
The Queensland Government, however, did not act upon such 
recommendations but instead in September 1981 appointed a committee of 
inquiry chaired by Russell Cooper (“Cooper Inquiry”) into shopping complex 
leasing practices.222 
 
The Cooper Inquiry although generally agreeing with the report of the Small 
Business Development Corporation stated: - 
                                                             
218 Small Business Development Corporation (Qld),  Leases by Small Tenants in Shopping Centres 
referred to in Cooper Report 1981, Appendix 2. 
219 Cooper Report 1981, 22. 
220 A situation that still prevails to this day in Queensland.  
221 Small Business Development Corporation (Qld), Leases by Small Tenants in Shopping Centres 
referred to in Cooper Report 1981, Appendix 2. 
222 Committee of Inquiry into Shopping Complex Leasing Practices (“Cooper Inquiry”). The terms of 
reference of which were to examine the reports of the Small Business Development Corporation, 
undertake such further enquiries and investigations and then report to the Minister.  
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The Committee appreciates the concern of small traders for the security of their 
tenure and considers that, in general, a five (5) year term would be reasonable.  
However, it feels that as the terms are understood by the tenant before he commits 
himself, it becomes a matter for market judgment whether he signs a lease or not.  
The Committee also considers that the important aspect is the total period for which a 
tenant has security of tenure and sees no difference whether this period is expressed 
as one (1) term or a term with options.223  
 
The phrase “it becomes a matter for market judgement whether he [the 
tenant] signs a lease or not.” indicates that the Cooper Inquiry accepted the 
submissions of lessors that there was a free enterprise system in place with 
lease terms that were freely negotiable and that such free enterprise system 
should not be disturbed.224 
 
Although, obviously, a lessee can, prior to the commencement of the lease, 
make a “market judgment” as to whether the lessee will accept the terms of 
a lease offered by a lessor, such freedom is not available where, for 
example, a lessee is coming to the end of a lease term. In such a case, the 
lessee is not free to make a market judgment and in fact the lessee has to 
either accept the (sometimes excessive) rental as offered by the lessor or 
forfeit their business. 225  Many lessees contended that they should have 
protection from such excessive increases in rent.226 
 
                                                             
223 Cooper Report 1981, 30. 
224 Cooper Report 1981, 29. See Chapter One for a discussion of Freedom of Contract. 
225 Cooper Report 1981, 30.    
226 Ibid. 
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The Cooper Inquiry determined that the trend for shorter lease terms for 
small lessees placed an extremely effective bargaining tool in the hands of 
lessors, and evidence suggested that this practice had been abused by 
some lessors.227 
 
After the Cooper Report 1981 was published attempts at self-regulation 
followed.  BOMA228 prepared a voluntary code which was not accepted by 
small lessees and eventually, in 1983, the Government convened a joint 
parliamentary committee229 which found that the most common complaint by 
lessees was that they were required to accept forms of leases which 
contained conditions beyond those accepted as normal in traditional leasing 
relationships.230 The Queensland Joint Committee proposed that in any retail 
shop lease it should be implied that the lessee has an option to extend the 
lease by a period equal to the initial term provided that the total of the initial 
period and the extension did not exceed five (5) years.231 
 
Like Queensland the drive for reform in Victoria came from lessees’ 
complaints to the Victorian Small Business Development Corporation (Vic). 
In its’ report dated 8th October 1982232 it identified that a major problem was 
the inability of lessees to understand the terms of the lease before execution 
                                                             
227 Ibid, 4. 
228 BOMA stands for the Building Owners and Managers Association. It has since been replaced by 
the Shopping Centre Council of Australia. 
229 Joint Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry into Retail Shop Leases (Qld) “Discussion Paper on 
Retail Shop Leases” (January 1983) (“Queensland Joint Committee Report 1983”). 
230 Queensland Joint Committee Report 1983, 1. 
231 Ibid, 5. 
232 Small Business Development Corporation (Vic), Report and Recommendation on a Fair Standard 
Lease, Melbourne, 1981 referred to in Arnold Report 1984, 2. 
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and their reluctance to incur the expense of legal advice.233  The 
recommendations of the Victorian Small Business Development 
Corporations were primarily that disclosure be provided to the lessee.234   
After the issue of the report the government established the Retail Tenancy 
Advisory Committee chaired by Michael Arnold (“Arnold Inquiry”) charged 
with considering how the government should legislate for a standard lease 
having regard to problems associated with, amongst other things, lease 
terms and options.235 
 
Submissions by lessees to the Arnold Inquiry were that: - 
(a) Without security of tenure they could not plan for the future; 
(b) A longer lease would allow a longer period to amortise fixtures and 
fittings; 
(c) A longer lease would allow a lessee to offer more to a prospective 
purchaser of the business; 
(d) A reasonable lease period was required to allow a lessee to establish 
their business and recover capital outlays; 
(e) The inequality of bargaining position between the lessor and the lessee 
meant that without the benefit of a long lease term or option that the lessees 
are “held to ransom by the lessor”.236 
 
                                                             
233 Ibid,  2. 
234 Ibid, 3-4. 
235 Arnold Report 1984, terms of reference.  
236 Ibid, 32. 
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Lessors claimed that they needed flexibility in determining tenant mix most 
suitable for the centre and it was easier to control tenant mix through the use 
of shorter leases.237 
The Arnold Committee found that the duration of a lease was of prime 
importance to both lessors and lessees, but as there was no compulsion on 
a lessee to enter into a lease,238 there should be no regulation regarding 
lease term.239  Instead it was proposed that lessors be required to advise 
lessees of their intention to renew or terminate the lease at least three 
months prior to the expiry date of the lease.240  
 
The ACT Working Party noted that some of the submissions from the 
lessees were “emotive complaints centred on the refusal by lessors to renew 
their leases” rather than legitimate submissions.241 Such submissions were: 
(a) Security of tenure was essential to allow a lessee to obtain the reward 
for their efforts in establishing their business and that this concern would 
cause a lessee to yield to unfair demands by a lessor because in the event 
of refusal to renew the lessee would lose their business; 
(b) That a short lease with no option for lease extension effectively 
eliminated rent reviews and forced the lessee to pay the rent demanded by 
the lessor; 
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(c) Under a short lease a lessee could be coerced into spending a large 
amount of money for refurbishment as a condition of lease renewal and in a 
three year lease period this situation could be repeated every three years; 
(d) A short lease would cause the lessee to lose the benefit of its goodwill.  
One example submitted by a lessee was where a lessor had refused to 
renew the lease and the lessor had taken up the goodwill of the business by 
opening the same type of shop in the same premises. In effect the lessor 
had hijacked the lessee’s business.242 
Lessors objected to the automatic renewal of leases because: - 
(a) Such automatic renewal gave the lessees “tenancy at will” thereby 
negating the certainty of the lease and that all tenancy agreements were for 
finite period and there should be no interference with that principle;243 and 
(b) Lessors must be able to change tenant mix to suit customer 
demand;244 and 
(c) It was unreasonable to expect a lessor to be forced to accept a lessee 
who was having a detrimental effect upon the shopping centre or upon other 
lessees.245 
 
In Western Australia the Government formed a Retail Liaison Committee in 
September 1981 which determined that a voluntary code of practice was 
preferable to legislation in relation to commercial leases. In 1983, that 
Government commissioned a further inquiry into commercial tenancies to be 
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conducted by Nigel Clarke (“Clarke Inquiry”). 246 The terms of reference of 
the Inquiry included a requirement that it receive and evaluate submissions 
on problems associated with commercial tenancy agreements.247 
 
Once again one of the main points of conflict identified by the Clarke Inquiry 
was the lack of options to extend the lease period and that lessors normally 
gave option-free leases which would allow the lessor to: - 
(a) refuse to renew a lease without being required to give a reason; 
(b) maintain standards within the shopping centre to allow lessors to 
terminate the lease of an underperforming lessee. A failing business may not 
only reduce the amount of rent to be received by a lessor but may also affect 
the reputation of the shopping centre and other businesses within the 
complex; 
(c) modify lessee mix and re-locate businesses; 
(d) avoid disputes as to whether an option has been validly exercised and 
also avoid arbitration of rental upon the exercise of the option.248 
 
Complaints by lessees included that the lessor would delay dealing with 
applications for renewal and then demand an exorbitant rent for such 
renewal.  If the lease was not renewed and the lessee had to remove their 
business the lessor could then operate the same business from the premises 
and take advantage of the lessee’s good will.249 Lessees claimed that they 
had a moral right to such good will whereas the lessors claimed that the 
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lessor’s property rights should not be diluted and that continuous options 
were offensive to town planning regulation.250 Such assertions by the lessors 
were not accepted in the Clarke Report 1984 which stated: - 
A shopping centre is simply a community of shop keepers, the individual identity of 
whom is a matter of indifference to the landlord.  The latter may have good “shopping 
centre” reasons for refusing renewal.  In their absence the satisfactory sitting tenant 
should enjoy some prior claim to remain.251 
 
In view of such “claims to remain” two options in relation to renewal of a 
lease presented themselves. The first option was that the lessee have the 
first right of refusal to renew a lease.  The second option (which resembles 
provisions contained in the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (UK) in relation to 
renewal of leases) was that a lessor refusing to renew a lease would have to 
justify such a refusal before an arbitrator.  Grounds for refusal may be that 
the premises are required for structural alteration, that the sitting lessee had 
failed to comply with lease provisions, or that the premises were reasonably 
required for the lessors own purposes.252 
 
Most of the recommendations of the Clarke Report 1984 were accepted by 
the government and incorporated into the Commercial Tenancies (Retail 
Shops) Agreement Bill 1985 (South Australia). During parliamentary debate 
regarding the Bill the following comments were made: - 
‘…the Landlord gives one only a three year lease.  One struggles for 
the first couple of years to build up the business and, in the third year, 
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the Landlord says, ‘I’ve got you.  If you want to stay on longer, you 
have to meet these terms for the fourth and fifth years.’253 
 
The difficulties illustrated in this speech are similar to the difficulties faced by 
lessees in other jurisdictions being the inability under a short term lease to 
amortize the fit-out costs or to capitalize on the goodwill generated by their 
business.  As a result of a short term lease the “good years” as referred to 
above never come because once the lessee has endured years of paying 
back fitout costs and other set up fees, the lessee then has to contend with 
the lessor dictating a new increased rent to the lessee.  Failure to agree to 
such rental will result in either the lessee losing his business, moving his 
business to other premises at a significant cost or even having the lessor 
evict the lessee and then operate a similar business from the same 
premises.254 
 
During parliamentary debates regarding the Retail Shop Leases Bill 1995 
(SA) the opposition proposed that the legislation contain a provision that 
there would be an automatic renewal of shop leases unless the lessor could 
show good reason why the lease should not be renewed such as misconduct 
by a lessee, or the lessor receiving a better offer or the lessor wishing to 
change the nature of the centre255 which was another proposal that 
appeared very similar to the provisions of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 
(UK).  The proposal was unsuccessful and instead a provision was inserted 
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into the legislation that a party to a lease should not act vexatiously although 
the legislation did not define what is vexatious.256 
Problems relating to limited lease term do not occur in the United Kingdom 
where lessees have the benefit of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (UK) 
which allows lessees to automatically renew leases subject to certain 
exceptions. 
Conclusion 
It would appear therefore that the drivers for reform regarding the issue of 
security of tenure were that: - 
(a) Short lease terms granted by lessors were insufficient to allow a lessee 
to establish their business and amortise their fitout costs and made the 
lessees business unattractive to a potential buyer.  Additionally, lessees 
argued that leases of short duration could force lessees to incur expenditure 
to refurbish the premises upon the grant of each new lease period.257 
(b) At expiry of the lease term or when attempting to sell their business 
(when the outgoing lessee would be seeking a longer lease term to attract a 
buyer) the lessee was completely at the lessor’s mercy as to whether a new 
lease term would be granted.258 As a result, a lessee would yield to 
excessive rent increases or unfair demands by the lessor; 
(c) Once a lessee vacated the premises, the lessor could take over the 
premises previously occupied by the lessee, run a similar business and profit 
from the goodwill generated by the hard work of the lessee without paying 
the lessee for such good will.259 
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Lessors argued that lessees know what is in their lease when they sign it 
and they should not be able to complain later.  Alternatively, lessors argued 
that granting a right to a lessee to extend the lease term interfered with their 
rights as landowners, negated certainty of the lease and tied their hands in 
relation to tenancy mix.   
A shopping centre is a shop whose products are all the other shops within 
the shopping centre.  The shopping centre must be attractive to customers 
and in order to do so the shops within the shopping centre must also be 
attractive and vibrant. Although a lessor must be free to change the look of a 
shopping centre by changing tenancy mix (in much the same way that a 
shopkeeper may change the look of a shop), many of the examples 
considered by the various inquiries had nothing to do with tenancy mix but 
were simply money grabs by lessors at the expense of the lessees.  
The complaints of lessees seem valid and logical rather than the “emotive 
complaints” referred to by the Arnold Committee whereas the lessors 
concerns regarding erosion of certainty of contract do not appear to have 
much substance as the regulation of the retail leasing market will simply alter 
the playing field rather than promote uncertainty. 
The advantages provided to the lessor of having a short term lease are wide 
and varied. The legitimate advantages are: - 
a) The lessor is able to control lessee mix and thereby ensure that 
customer’s demands are met;  
b) Redevelopment of the shopping centre by the lessor is easier as the 
lessor does not need to relocate a lessee or pay compensation to a lessee.  
The lessor simply has to wait the expiry of the short term lease; 
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c) Rental may be determined in accordance with market forces rather 
than using an artificial method annual method such as a fixed percentage or 
based on changes in the consumer price Index. 
d) The ability to avoid the risk of being unable to remove an unsuitable 
lessee over a long term, either because a lessee is unsuitable or their 
business is underperforming.  
 
Other less legitimate advantages provided to lessors as a result of short term 
leases are the ability: - 
(a) To evict a successful lessee and take over their business; 
(b) To frustrate a potential business sale and then convince the proposed 
purchaser to take premises elsewhere in the centre operating a similar 
business. If, for example, a lessor was to have vacant space within a 
shopping centre and was to become aware that an existing lessee had found 
a purchaser for its business and was seeking consent to assignment then 
that lessor, by making such assignment process too difficult or protracted 
could cause the purchaser to terminate negotiations with the existing lessee. 
The lessor could then approach the purchaser and offer to lease to the 
purchaser the vacant space. The lessor has the advantage of having 2 
lessees whereas the existing lessee has not only lost a purchaser but now 
must compete with the new lessee; 
(c) To extort extremely high rentals from lessees who have no other option 
except to agree or lose their business. 
(d) To “stand over” a lessee to obtain favourable rents, fitouts and lease 
terms.  
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The most relevant issue raised by lessors is that lack of security of tenure is 
often “self-inflicted” in that the lessee knew what they were getting when they 
signed the lease.  It is difficult to understand why a lessee would enter into a 
lease which the lessee knows has a lease term which is insufficient to allow 
a lessee to amortise its outlays or to sell its business with sufficient lease 
term to be attractive to a buyer. The only answer seems to be that the lessee 
believes (incorrectly) that their interests and that of the lessor are aligned 
and that the lessor would not do anything to harm the lessee. In fact, the 
lessor is only marginally aligned with the lessee in that the lessor wishes the 
lessee to be a success so that the lessor can receive its rent but if a better 
opportunity arrives (such as another lessee willing to pay greater rent) then 
the interests of the existing lessee and lessor become opposed. The “true” 
nature of the lessor-lessee relationship may only be made clear to the lessee 
by greater disclosure by lessors and perhaps education of lessees. 
 
2.1.2 Disincentives to Assignment of Leases. 
Complaints were also received regarding the lessor’s practice of taking a 
share of the outgoing lessees’ sale price on assignment of the lease.  
Suggested solutions to such a practice were a limitation on the amount that 
the lessor could charge260 or that the practice be wholly proscribed.261  
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It was generally accepted that the lessor should not be entitled to take any 
premium upon the assignment of the lease262 except the lessor’s costs of the 
assignment.263 However, as a disincentive to the buying and selling of 
leases, it was suggested a lessee who assigned within a short period should 
pay a penalty to the shopping centre promotions fund.264 
The Hill Inquiry formed a view that where the lessor made a continuous 
contribution to increasing the value of the lessees’ business, the lessor 
should be entitled to a proportion of goodwill provided that the lessor has 
applied to a Tribunal for authorisation.265 This proposal appeared extremely 
prejudicial to lessees as not only was it likely that the lessor would be able to 
claim a proportion of the lessees’ good will but in addition the lessee might 
have been forced to participate in costly court proceedings. 
The Arnold Committee accepted that lease premium could be charged, but 
only where there was a legitimate advantage to both the lessee and the 
lessor.266 It is difficult to envisage any circumstance where the charging of a 
lease premium to a lessee would be of any advantage to the lessee. 
The practice of taking a portion of the lessees’ good will upon the sale of its 
business has now been proscribed.267 Prior to retail lease legislation, the 
practice was common, the lessor reasoning that the good will of the business 
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had been built up, at least partially, by the lessors marketing efforts for the 
centre as a whole.  It is difficult to see the logic of such a proposition where 
the marketing of a centre has been paid for out of a marketing fund 
consisting of payments from lessees. In addition, the original purpose of a 
lessor taking a portion of the lessee’s good will was to prevent a lessee 
selling its business and assigning the lease within a short period after 
commencement of the lease.  It was, in fact, a disincentive to assign rather 
than an attempt to share in the lessees’ good will. However, the payment 
came to be regarded as an unwarranted bonus to the lessor.268 
 
One of the problems with a lease within a shopping complex is that the right 
to assign a lease is often heavily restricted and specifically that charging by 
the lessor of a portion of the goodwill on the sale of the lessees’ business 
was an extreme restriction.269 
 
The Cooper Inquiry found that lessees were concerned that cost and delays 
in receiving advice from lessors about consent to assignment were 
excessive.270  Most leases provided that lessees were not able to assign 
away their obligations under the lease once the assignment of the lease was 
approved. This meant that after assignment of the lease that the outgoing 
lessee would still be liable under the original lease such that if the new 
lessee should fail the lessor could sue that lessee and the outgoing lessee 
for loss of rent.  
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Lessees believed that having assigned their lease all of their connections to 
the lessor should be severed.  The Cooper Inquiry agreed that it was 
unreasonable for an assignor to remain responsible for the future 
performance of the assignee.271  
Subsequently each jurisdiction (except ACT and Tasmania) has passed 
legislation removing the liability of the original lessee upon assignment.272 
The Productivity Commission was critical of such amendments as under 
common law the outgoing lessee had an incentive to introduce an assignee 
who would be most likely to be successful.  With the removal of ongoing 
liability, the outgoing lessee now only has an incentive to find a buyer who 
will pay the most for the business thereby increasing the reluctance of the 
lessor to consent.273 
The ACT Working Party considered a draft ordinance in relation to 
commercial leases which provided that a lessee may apply to the courts for 
approval of the assignment of the lease where the lease contained a 
covenant against assignment without the lessor’s consent and such consent 
is refused or where the lessor fails to advise his consent within 60 days after 
his consent was requested.  Most submissions received by the ACT Working 
Party regarding this draft ordinance were from lessors who condemned the 
draft ordinance,274 which is understandable, as the effect of the draft 
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ordinance would have been to take the power in relation to assignment of 
leases away from lessors. 
 
The Clarke Report 1984 recommended that all disputes concerning 
assignment of lease be referred to arbitration whereas the Hill Report 1981 
did not refer to the issue at all.275 
 
The original Retail Shop Leases Act 1984 (Qld) provided that if the lessee’s 
request for assignment of the lease was not answered by the lessor within 
forty-two (42) days, the matter may be referred to a mediator and that only 
the cost reasonably incurred by the lessor in investigating the suitability of 
the assignee could be recovered from the lessee and that the amount of 
these costs could be submitted to arbitration. 
In the United Kingdom, lessees had the benefit of the Landlord and Tenant 
Act 1988 (UK) which required the lessor to respond to a request for 
assignment within a reasonable time and conditions for assignment or 
reasons for refusal must be reasonable.276 
An assignment of a lease is normally requested when a lessee is selling its 
business.  It is likely that the buyer has other opportunities available to them 
to purchase similar businesses in another location. Accordingly, the existing 
lessee/vendor is obviously concerned that the buyer does not become tired 
of waiting for a response from a lessor or that the lessor’s requirements are 
not too onerous for the buyer. 
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Lessors are required to not unreasonably withhold their consent to an 
assignment of a lease and to respond to a request for consent to an 
assignment expeditiously.277 The lessors’ obligations however, under retail 
lease legislation, differ in each jurisdiction.  For example: - 
(a) Delay - the lessor is deemed to consent to an assignment of lease if 
the lessor does not respond to a request within 28 days (in NSW)278 or 42 
days (in South Australia).279 
(b) Reasonableness of Refusal- grounds for a lessor in refusing consent 
are set out in the legislation in NSW, Victoria, ACT and Northern Territory 
but not in Queensland.  Western Australia provides that a lessee has a 
statutory right to assign a lease subject to the lessor’s right to refuse consent 
on reasonable grounds.  Those grounds are not specified.   
(c) Request for Information- the Australian Capital Territory is the only 
jurisdiction to specify what information a lessor can request before 
consenting to an assignment. 
Each of these areas represent opportunities for a lessor to interfere (for 
whatever reason) with the lessee’s ambitions of selling its business and 
realising its goodwill.  Each of these areas must be considered in any 
simplified lease legislation. 
Conclusion 
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It would appear that most lessees acknowledged that it was reasonable that 
they obtain the consent of a lessor before assigning their lease, however the 
concerns of the lessees regarding assignment were as follows: - 
(a)  Delay in obtaining consent of the lessor; 
(b) Unnecessary costs incurred by the lessor which had to be paid by the 
lessee; 
(c) Refusal to consent to the assignment of the lease for reasons other than 
the suitability of the incoming lessee.  For example, where the lessor wished 
to obtain vacant premises, or where the lessor wished to force the lessee to 
vacate the premises by regularly rejecting any potential assignee thereby 
making it clear that no assignment would be granted. 
(d)  Constructive refusal to consent whereby the lessor, although not 
refusing consent, makes the granting of consent so difficult that the 
proposed buyer of the lessee’s business abandons the transaction subject to 
the assignment of the lease.280 
(e) Payment to lessors of a portion of the goodwill of the lessees’ business 
upon sale was also objected to by most lessees on the grounds that the 
goodwill of the business had been built up by the lessees themselves. 
In summary, any potential problem regarding the assignment of the lease 
must be a cause for concern for the lessee. The potential buyer is aware that 
at some stage it will also want to sell the business and a lease that contains 
provisions making it difficult or unprofitable to assign the lease, or knowledge 
that a lessor is unco-operative regarding such assignment might cause the 
buyer to pursue other business prospects.  
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In some jurisdictions, it was also recommended that the lessor be restrained 
from unreasonably withholding 281 or delaying consent to the assignment of 
the lease.282 Obviously, in circumstances where a lessee had a limited 
period remaining in the lease term, the conduct of the lessor in delaying 
consent to the assignment (and the ongoing erosion of the lease term) could 
result in the potential purchaser of the business deciding to buy elsewhere.  
This is an easy tactic for the lessor to adopt to punish a troublesome lessee 
or to obtain vacant possession of lease premises for the lessors own 
purposes. Thus, the greater regulation of assignments became the focus of 
most retail lease legislation. 
 
2.1.3 Costly Dispute Resolution 
Prior to the advent of retail lease tribunals, the lessee’s only redress was to 
the ordinary courts. Often, the amount involved was not financially large. The 
adjudication of the dispute was comparatively of smaller moment to the 
lessor than the lessee with the lessee effectively losing the benefit of any 
determination in the payment of legal costs.283 
 
The ACT Working Party was required to consider a proposed leasing 
ordinance regarding dispute resolution.  Although a number of submissions 
were received by the ACT Working Party in favour of mediation and 
conciliation,284 the draft ordinance being considered did not include 
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mediation as a means of resolving disputes and instead proposed the 
creation of a Board which would have the power to determine rent where a 
dispute existed, determine operation costs, determine compensation and to 
vary and set lease clauses and conditions.285 
 
Most of the submissions received from lessors by the ACT Working Party 
were not in favour of the creation of a Board and suggested self-regulation 
whereas the submissions by lessees were more concerned about the 
conduct of proceedings before the Board being expensive and formal with 
delays and rigidities.  Lessees submitted that the emphasis should be on a 
mediation and conciliation with recourse to a legal tribunal only where 
mediation and conciliation failed.286 The ACT Working Party considered that 
settlement of disputes could be achieved by education of lessees and 
mediation287 and that a mediator be appointed to discuss all lease issues 
between lessors and lessees including those concerning the amount of rent 
paid.288 
A common criticism by lessees was that, if a dispute arose, the lessee could 
not afford legal representation.289 The original Report of the Queensland 
Small Business Development Corporation recommended that an arbitration 
clause should be mandatory in each lease and consideration should be 
given to the establishment of an independent board to arbitrate on all 
grievances at no charge.290  
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The Cooper Inquiry did not recommend the establishment of a tribunal 291 
and made no mention of mediation although they thought that the practice of 
having arbitration clauses in a lease was desirable 292 and they were also in 
favour of proposals by BOMA that a retail tenancy advisory body be 
established whose role was to investigate legitimate complaints from lessees 
and lessors and to provide recommendations to both parties to resolve the 
complaint.293 According to the Cooper Inquiry: - 
While the Committee hold the view that the creation of a Retail Tenancy Advisory 
Body would not in itself solve the problems currently affecting Owner/Tenant 
relationship, it feels that such a body could well have a place as part of an overall 
package of measures which could be adopted to achieve industry self-regulation and 
administration.294  
Subsequently, the Queensland Joint Committee stated that retail shop 
leases legislation should provide for the creation of the office of mediator to 
provide a low cost forum for parties to resolve disputes.295 
 
The Arnold Inquiry stated that many of the submissions received related to 
the difficulties that smaller lessees had in seeking redress for problems 
arising from their leases in that Court proceedings could be costly and time 
consuming296 and that some problems although appearing serious did not 
warrant full Court procedures.297 
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The Arnold Inquiry supported the concept of an inexpensive relatively 
informal tribunal dealing with matters in dispute and that such tribunal 
consist of two tiers.  The lower tier would consist of a one-member tribunal 
assisted by an expert with jurisdiction to hear disputes up to a certain level 
with no appeal being allowed thereby ensuring that there are no additional 
costs of the appeal.  A dispute would be heard by the higher tier (which 
would be a three-member tribunal) where the effect of any judgment would 
exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) or where the parties agreed or if 
the member on the lower tier decided that a case should be referred to the 
three-member tribunal.298 
 
The Clarke Inquiry recommended that all rental disputes be determined by 
the Valuer General and that non rental problems be referred to the Small 
Claims Tribunal, a Magistrate or a Judge and that such authority would 
attempt reconciliation, failing which either the dispute would be ruled upon or 
referred to an existing system of arbitration.299 
 
Submissions received by both the Arnold Inquiry300 and the Hill Inquiry301 
from lessees pointed out that there was no cheap alternative to going to 
court and, in this regard, the Hill Inquiry recommended the establishment of 
a specialist tribunal to resolve disputes.302 
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In summary, the primary complaint of lessees was that taking disputes to the 
traditional Courts was too expensive and that the shopping centre lessor 
could afford such expense but the lessee could not.303 Issues of dispute 
were generally widespread but issues that arose again and again concerned 
lack of repair, failure to return a security deposit, rent and outgoings 
calculation and assignment issues.304 
Lessees sought a cost effective and timely dispute resolution procedure free 
from formalities so that the lessor could not use such formalities against the 
lessee. Both lessors and lessees agreed that formal court procedures took 
too long to be resolved. 
The use of alternative dispute resolution, instead of formal court procedures, 
was favoured by many inquiries as a means to reduce expense and 
preserve the lessor-lessee relationship.305 This included not only specialist 
mediators and arbitration306 but also early intervention/informal resolution by 
an organisation such as a small business advisory service. 
Conclusion 
The drivers for reform in relation to dispute resolution were follows: - 
(a) Although the complaints listed by the various committees of enquiry 
and mentioned in Hansard in every jurisdiction were varied and widespread 
there was little in the way of case law about regarding such complaints.  It is 
likely that a lessee when faced with a business suffering from the attentions 
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of an aggressive or uncooperative lessor decided to cut his losses rather 
than insist upon his rights under the lease.   
(b) There was a need to establish a dedicated retail lease tribunal familiar 
with retail lease issues; 
(c) Dispute Resolution proceedings were too expensive and took too 
long.307 In the early years a lessee could only assert their rights through the 
courts and remedies such as mediation and low cost arbitration through 
tribunals did not exist.  The lessee was required to meet the expense of 
court proceedings at a time when the lessee’s business, because of the 
conduct of the lessor, was suffering.  In addition, the professional lessor had 
the benefit of deep pockets, experienced lawyers, real estate managers and 
exclusive access to a large amount of information both current and historical. 
Ensuring that proceedings were inexpensive and swift would include 
ensuring that neither the lessor nor lessee could drag a minor matter out by 
appealing to a higher tribunal. In this regard the 2 tier approach suggested 
by the Arnold Inquiry may be effective such that only major disputes may be 
appealed;308 
(d) Tribunal proceedings were too formal. Informal proceedings may result 
in legal representation not being required.  Again, this is to reduce expense.  
Legal representation may be prohibited unless the tribunal allows it. 
(e) Alternative Dispute Resolution was not available.  There was no 
opportunity for any attempts at mediation prior to determination by hearing to 
minimise expense and to attempt to preserve the lessee-lessor relationship. 
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As a result of the lessor’s numerous advantages in any lease dispute, giving 
the lessee access to cheap, fast and effective309 dispute resolution was seen 
as a priority in many of the jurisdictions.  Recommendations included: - 
(i) mandatory arbitration clauses;310 
(ii) establishment of an independent board;311 and 
(iii) mediation.312 
(f) No early intervention.  There was no specialist retail commissioner or 
bureau whose officers could attempt to resolve smaller matters even before 
they were referred to mediation 
 
2.1.4 Difficulties with Rent Review 
For the lessor, it was a matter of ensuring control over the tenant mix and 
thus the protection of the revenue base. Conversely, lessees wished to 
ensure a return on their investment. The two objectives were not necessarily 
congruent.  The lessees return on investment could be eroded after a rent 
review, an increase in outgoings or a decline in the attraction of their 
products or services or, indeed, in shopping habits, for example, the 
increased frequency of on line purchasing.  Probably the second most 
common areas of complaint of lessees recorded in the early inquiries were 
the lack of transparency in rent reviews and the charging of percentage 
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rents, the requirement of a lessee to provide turnover figures to the lessor 
and the methods of assessing the charges for centre outgoings.313 
A common complaint regarding rent and rent review was that lessors would 
determine the rent in the way most beneficial to the lessor with little regard to 
the lessee or the lessee’s business.  Reviews were artificially based upon full 
rent being the base rent when effective rent was much lower due to 
incentives. In the early stages the payment of key money was also identified 
as a problem. 
 
According to the Arnold Inquiry many submissions and complaints were 
about the method of determination of rental not only at the renewal of the 
lease but within the term of the lease itself.314  Although many of such 
complaints were about initial rentals negotiated upon entering the 
agreement, it was accepted that a lessee had the choice to accept or reject 
such an initial offer of rent.315 Lessees also complained that they were not 
aware of rent review provisions and rent review formulas were too 
complex.316 
Subsequent rent variation, during the lease term, however, caused 
difficulties317 as often lessees, especially first time lessees, were 
inexperienced in relation to the process or failed to notice pitfalls in the 
lease.318 
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Lessees complained that rent reviews were arbitrary319 and that the system 
of rent determination was unfair, biased in favour of the lessor and costly for 
the lessee.320 For example, the Queensland Small Business Development 
Corporation stated in its report that rent should be determined based upon a 
fixed amount per square metre.321 The Arnold Committee suggested that 
there be three different possible methods of rent review being either a 
market review, rent based on turnover or a fixed incremental increase.  
Interestingly, the Arnold Committee also stated that a rent review fixed to the 
consumer price increases be prohibited.322 
The Hill Inquiry recommended that the parties to a lease be free to negotiate 
the terms of rent and rent review323 provided that the lessee was offered a 
realistic choice of rent calculations when entering into the lease.  There was 
no guidance as to whether an upward only rent review clause underpinned 
by “ratchet clauses” would be considered realistic. 
 
The ACT Working Party also accepted that an upward only rent review 
clause was void however was prepared to accept that the new rent should 
not be less than the initial rent paid under the lease.324 This type of 
formulation mandated in a lease presumed that rents could not ever fall 
which defied economic logic. 
 
                                                             
319 ACT Report 1984, 25. 
320 Ibid. 
321 Small Business Development Corporation (Qld),  Leases by Small Tenants in Shopping Centres 
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Despite complaints received about turnover rental, the Arnold Inquiry 
believed that turnover rental had wide acceptance and therefore did not 
recommend intervention in the system.325  Specifically, it was accepted that 
the turnover rental method was fair because it allowed the rent to vary with 
the success of the business.326 
 
Although lessees’ argued that the lessor in effect became a partner in the 
lessee’s business (because the harder the lessee worked the more money 
the lessor received)327 the Arnold Inquiry took the view that, commonly, it 
wasn’t until some years after the commencement of the business that a 
turnover rental became payable however: - 
(a) Problems could arise when turnover rental became a substantial figure 
and created a dis-incentive to increase sales; and 
(b)Disclosure of turnover figures was an invasion of the lessee’s privacy.328 
 
The first problem could be resolved by giving the lessee the right to review 
the base rent to market every three (3) years329 and the second problem 
could be resolved by requiring the lessor to maintain confidentiality and that 
if this duty of confidentiality was breached, a remedy could be sought 
through a specialist tribunal.330 
                                                             
325 Ibid, 23. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Ibid, 25. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Ibid. 
97 
 
Lessors who did not use turnover rental or fixed percentage rent increases 
generally used the consumer price index to vary rental. The Arnold Inquiry 
expressed a view that although the method was definite it was not suitable 
as a rent review method because it was not related to ability to pay by the 
lessee, nor to a realistic market rental, nor was it related to the profitability of 
the business331 and therefore the method of tying rental increase to 
increases in consumer price index was unfair to lessees and should be 
prohibited. In addition, only three methods of rental review should be 
permitted (or any combination of such three) which were: - 
(a) By mutual agreement and if no agreement by recourse to a valuer; 
(b) By a set formula specifying specific monetary amounts or percentages; 
or 
(c) By a formula where a percentage of turnover forms the basis for the 
rent review.332 
 
The Queensland Small Business Development Corporation identified as a 
specific problem, rents being calculated on the basis of a minimum sum plus 
a percentage of turnover333 and recommended that rent should be based on 
a fixed amount per square metre per annum only334 Subsequently the 
Cooper Inquiry found that the provision for small lessees to pay percentage 
rents based on turnover was not a desirable practice in the form as 
appearing at the time in most leases and further that the provision of monthly 
turnover figures by small lessees to lessors was an intrusion into the 
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lessee’s right of privacy.335 Owners should either cease charging rent as a 
percentage of gross turn-over or formulate a more equitable structure of 
percentage rents.336 
 
The Cooper Inquiry also found that in practice at the time the lessors who 
used a turnover rent review clause invariably fixed the base rent at a market 
rent for the space being leased.  If the turnover rental clause provided for 
payment of a base rental, where the base rental was in fact a market rental, 
the extra amount to be paid, being a percentage of the lessee’s turnover, 
was not a method to give to the lessor a market rental but was in fact a 
method to allow the lessor to share in the profits of the lessee’s business.  
 
According to the Cooper Inquiry: - 
It became obvious to the Committee that the base rent for small traders in many 
complexes had all the appearances and substance of a market rent for the space 
rented.  There was indeed a remarkable uniformity between the rents levied as base 
rents in the various complexes and it appeared that there were more direct 
correlations between rental levels and floor areas than rental levels and the types of 
business or turnovers involved.  If the Committee’s contention is accurate then it can 
be argued that the percentage rent sought in excess of the base rent is not in 
essence a rent at all.  It could be held that it is indeed a device by which the owner 
can share in the profits of the business.  By sharing in the profits of the business the 
owner becomes a partner in the business and the tenant becomes a partner with the 
Landlord; a state of affairs which is prohibited in Federal Legislation governing the 
activities of chemists.337 
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The Cooper Inquiry had received submissions from lessees which showed 
an almost universal opposition to the levying of turnover rents338 because: - 
(a)  the lessees felt that they were being penalised for their own efforts and 
initiative;  
(b) an increase in turnover disclosed to the lessor would give the lessor 
the basis for lifting the base rent; 
(c) the percentage figure being charged of turnover was always disputed; 
and 
(d) increases of rent based on turnover took no account of the effect of 
such increases on either gross or net profit.339 
 
The Cooper Inquiry formed a view that turnover rents had been used to 
attract major lessees into shopping complexes and that the application of 
turnover rents to small traders extended this principle into areas for which it 
was never really intended.340 However, they did not form the view that 
turnover rent should be prohibited, but concluded that where a turnover 
rental method was adopted that the percentage of turnover to be paid by the 
lessee should reduce as turnover increased as a straight line method failed 
to take into account that gross profit can decline as sales and the cost of 
sales increase.341 
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The Cooper Inquiry also stated that it had received many complaints about 
provision of turnover details in that the lessees considered that the provision 
of that information was an invasion of privacy.  The lessee’s concerns were 
that: - 
(a) Information provided would be used by the lessor against them in 
future rent reviews; 
(b) Information could be used by the major retailers to improve their sales 
at the expense of the small retailer; 
(c) In provincial cities, lessees were concerned about the confidentiality of 
information supplied to Centre Managers who employed local staff.342 
 
The Cooper Inquiry believed if that percentage rents were not applicable 
then turnover figures should not be provided to the lessor.343  They accepted 
that the lessee had a basic right to be allowed the undisturbed occupancy of 
space in return for the payment of rent.344 
 
Subsequently, the Joint Parliamentary Committee in discussing the Cooper 
Report 1981 formed the view that retail shop lease legislation was required 
and stated: - 
The legislation must specifically require that: - 
1. The Tenant must be offered at least two (2) alternatives rent methods, one of 
which shall be a rent stated as a cost per square metre of leased area. 
2. The Tenant shall have the right to elect the alternative desired; 
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3.  The basis and/or the formula for calculating rent reviews shall be stated in the 
lease; 
4. In any review of rent during the currency of the lease, the method of rental 
review shall be clearly stated in the retail shop lease.  If the rent is to be 
adjusted on the basis of ‘market rent’, there must be provision for arbitration if 
agreement between the landlord and tenant cannot be reached. 
5. If the tenant elects to accept a percentage rent, the retail shop lease shall 
contain a clear formula of how it is derived.  
6. If the tenant accepts a percentage rent then the tenant has an obligation to 
provide turnover figures to the landlord.  
7. If the tenant elects to accept a rent other than a percentage rent then there 
shall be no obligation upon the tenant to provide the landlord with turnover 
figures.”345 
 
Once again the Queensland Joint Committee, consistent with the 
recommendation of the Cooper Inquiry, was not prepared to prohibit turnover 
rental clauses, however by allowing the lessee to choose the rental methods 
that would apply to the lessee to the lease, a lessee could effectively exclude 
a turnover rental clause from the lease document.  
 
In the second reading speech on the Queensland Retail Shop Leases Bill 
1984 it was stated that the new legislation was designed to regulate a 
number of specific practices that had been identified by the various 
committees and enquiries to be the most onerous on the small lessee which 
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included the charging of percentage rent and the collection of turnover 
figures by the lessor where the lessee has not requested percentage rent.346  
 
The Clarke Inquiry also did not support rent as determined by a percentage 
of turn-over unless the lessee had refused another firm method of fixing and 
reviewing rent and that a dispute concerning fair market rent should be 
determined by the Valuer General.347 Further, the Clarke Inquiry formed a 
view that a provision in the lease that provided the rent would not be reduced 
on review or shall be increased by a fixed percentage should be void but that 
rent adjustment by reference to a statistical index which had been freely 
accepted by a lessee should not be void.348 
Although some lessees were indifferent to such method of rent 
determination349 other lessees resented the intrusion into their business 
affairs and believed that turnover rent was a tax on their success,350 an 
invasion of privacy,351 a disincentive to expansion and employment352 and 
that the necessity to provide turnover figures gave the lessor a bargaining 
advantage on a renewal.353 
Delays in rent reviews were also a problem for the lessees. Once the new 
rent was determined the lessee could often not, because of the delay, afford 
to pay the retrospective amount due as from the review date.354 Time was 
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rarely the essence of a rent review and lessors often delayed 
determinations. 
 
The Hill Inquiry did not prefer one method of rent determination or review to 
another and considered that the parties should be free to negotiate the rent 
and rent reviews, provided lessees are offered a realistic choice of rent 
reviews.355 
 
The ACT Working Party was required to consider a draft ordinance in 
relation to business leases that provided that an application could be made 
to a Business Review Board in relation to rent review.356 Many of the 
submissions received by the ACT Working Party supported a method of rent 
review being by arbitration with an independent valuer although other 
submissions were to the effect that too many restrictions placed upon 
lessors regarding their right to control rental and manage their properties 
would cause a decline in investment in real estate.357 
 
Submissions received by the ACT Working Party in relation to a rent review 
were as follows: - 
(a) Fixed maximum rate per square metre should not apply differently in 
large shopping centres between large and small lessees; 
(b) Adjustment of rent should be based on the movement of the affected 
commodity group applying to the lessee’s business; 
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(c) Detrimental effects of building works and alterations should be 
accounted for in rent; 
(d) Turn-over should not be used as the basis for rental determination or 
that lessees should not be offered percentage rentals without being given a 
choice of a different method of rent review;  
(e) Method of rental calculations and basis for rent reviews should be 
clearly stated in the lease; and 
(f) Rent increases should not be arbitrary in either timing or amount.358 
 
The ACT Working Party accepted that either party to a rental dispute should 
be able to apply to the Review Board who could nominate a panel of experts 
to make a determination for both parties359 but rejected the proposal that, 
upon review, a rent could not be less than the current rent and instead 
recommended that any lease clause stipulating that reviewed rent could not 
be less than the current rent should be void.360 
The ACT Working Party also proposed that a rent calculated by reference to 
turnover should not be compulsory and the lessee should be offered an 
alternative of at least one of the following methods of fixing rent: - 
• Market Rent,   
• Agreed Base Rent subject to annual CPI adjustment, 
• Agreed Base Rent subject to annual percentage adjustment; 
• Agreed rental; 
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• Or any combination of the above.361 
 
Conclusion 
The main concerns in relation to rent and rent review therefore in the early 
stages of retail lease legislation were as follows: - 
(a) Initial rental payable pursuant to the lease was able to be negotiated 
between a lessor and a lessee and was not of concern to any of the 
inquiries; 
(b) The payment of rent based on a percentage of turn-over was of 
concern to lessees, specifically in that they were concerned about breach of 
their privacy or that the information provided could be used by their 
competitors or by the lessor to increase the base rental. In addition, turnover 
rent was a disincentive to succeed.   It was recommended that turnover 
rental be banned or that its use limited by giving the lessees the right to 
choose other methods of rent review; 
(c)   A turnover rent clause that employed a base rent plus turnover rent form 
was unfair where the base rent was already market rent.  In such a case the 
lessor was not receiving just market rent but was in fact receiving market 
rent plus a share of the lessees profits; 
(d) Lessees were concerned about the arbitrary nature of rent reviews in 
relation to the timing or amount; 
(e) Use of ratchet clauses was unfair and that instead the lessee should be 
given the choice between 2 different methods of rent review (which could 
thereby effectively preclude a turnover rent clause); 
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(f) A fairer method of turnover rent was for the turnover rent percentage to 
reduce as turnover increased rather than using a straight line method; 
(g) Rent review clauses were not sufficiently detailed within the terms of 
the lease to allow a lessee to know their potential obligations before signing 
the lease.  
Rent review provisions may be based on turnover, movement in the 
consumer price index, a market review, or a fixed amount or fixed 
percentage. None of these methods of review are per se objectionable 
although the use of ratchet clauses by a lessor to allow the lessor to choose 
the greatest rent increase is unfair. If the market review method is the most 
likely method to achieve a fair result (albeit at the cost of employing valuers) 
then a simple solution appears to be to regulate to provide that whatever 
method of rent review is used that either party may, at their cost, refer the 
matter to a valuer for determination.   
In relation to confidentiality of turnover information, although regulation can 
provide that a lessor or a valuer may not provide such information to a third 
party, this does not take away the lessors advantage in having that 
information to hand during negotiations about rental with the lessee.  A 
solution to this problem does not appear to be available however the effect 
of the lessor having that information would be greatly reduced where the 
lessee has a statutory right to have rent reviewed by a valuer as suggested 
above. 
 
2.1.5 Lack of Disclosure by Lessors. 
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Lack of disclosure of salient features of the leasing arrangement was 
another issue that caused a great deal of concern to lessees. Most retail 
leases were non-standard, long and complex documents requiring legal 
intervention to properly explain to an incoming lessee. This was a significant 
transactional cost to the small trader money and, in most cases, the lessor 
operated on a “take it or leave it” basis without being open to amendment. 
Large complex owners could afford to pay for experienced lawyers to protect 
their position. This led to information asymmetry when an increasing number 
of small traders were either not properly advised, or advised at all, about the 
obligations to which they were becoming subject either upon an assignment 
or the taking of a new lease. 
At the start of a lease, there is a vast information gap between the well 
informed lessor who may have leased the subject premises on multiple 
occasions and the new lessee who has no information regarding the 
premises they propose to let except what they are told by the lessor’s 
employed leasing manager or what they can glean from other lessees or 
advertising material.   
The terms of the lease are also unknown to them although extremely familiar 
to the lessor who prepared it.  The retail lessee, therefore, required 
information, not only to determine profitability in taking the lease (rent and 
outgoings being one of the largest expenses) but also to be certain regarding 
its obligations under the lease. 
The conditions of leases are invariably in favour of the owner, 
communication between lessors and lessees was generally poor and there 
was a great variation in the form and substance of leases. Such leases were 
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often not available prior to the lessee taking occupation and potential 
lessees, therefore, committed to an overreliance on oral representations by 
the lessor.362 
Although such difficulties could arise because of exaggerated or untruthful 
representations by the lessor or their leasing agents, they could also stem 
from the lessee not being aware of certain critical conditions existing in their 
leases.363 
 
The Queensland Small Business Development Corporation in their report of 
22nd June 1981 identified as one of the problem areas for lessees, the poor 
levels of communication between Centre Management and lessees364 and 
recommended that lessors should be required to produce a copy of the 
proposed lease before any prospective lessee gave a letter of intent or took 
up occupancy or is committed financially.365 
 
The Cooper Inquiry received a number of complaints by lessees regarding 
the failure of lessors to produce leases prior to occupation and that  
‘there is an almost unanimous opinion that the legal profession is 
entirely to blame for not reacting quickly to the needs of shopping 
complexes.’366  
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Although the more efficient lessors provided lessees with heads of 
agreement or arranged for letters of intent, in many cases, information 
provided was too complex or not sufficiently detailed to give the lessee a 
clear picture of its obligations.367 As a result, it was determined that in all 
cases, a document covering the major provisions of the lease expressed in 
layman’s terms should be exchanged between the parties368 together with 
an industry standard lease.369  
Finally, the Cooper Inquiry, in 1984, found that many problems could have 
been resolved by intelligent, flexible or understanding attitudes in responses 
by management.370 Their report suggested that the provision of a pro forma 
lease by a lessor should be encouraged or alternatively “a document 
covering in detail the major provisions of the intended lease, but expressed 
in layman’s terms, should be exchanged between lessor and lessee.”371 
However, this proposal, at that stage, proved far too inflexible a basis to 
operate a business for the lessor. 
This is the first appearance of the suggestion that what was to become a 
disclosure statement be provided by a lessor the purpose of which was to 
prevent the lessee from entering into an agreement that the lessee did not 
understand.372 
 
According to the Arnold Inquiry many misunderstandings arose because the 
lessee was not aware of certain conditions existing in their lease or because 
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of exaggerations by the lessor.373 Such exaggerations included matters such 
as estimated turnover, profitability, initial rents, rent reviews and the possible 
profitability of the business.374   
It was considered that such a problem could be resolved by the provision of 
a disclosure document375 to a proposed lessee at least three (3) days prior to 
the signing of the lease.376 
Such a suggestion concurrently also found favour with the Arnold Inquiry: - 
 
A form of documentation known as a Disclosure document which sets out matters of 
a material nature in relation to statements about the tenancy and details of the lease 
has been recommended.  The document would require both the landlord and tenant 
to attest to all disclosures which have materially influenced them to enter into the 
lease.  Facts in regard to rent payable, cost payable (outgoings in shopping 
complexes) and a number of other specified matters will also be included.  The 
Committee envisages that many of the complaints raised about lack of information 
and misrepresentation would be overcome by the introduction of the disclosure 
document. 377 
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As well as enhanced disclosure, the Inquiry recommended that a form of fair 
standard lease be prepared for common use 378 and that a lessee be given 
an option to lease the premises which would bind the lessor for seven (7) 
days after the lessee had received the disclosure statement and a copy of 
the lease and that the lessee not be able to sign the lease for the first three 
(3) days of the option period. Meanwhile, the lessor would have the right to 
reject a lessee within fourteen (14) days from the start of the option period. 
From a practical point of view this meant that the lessee would have the right 
to sign the lease towards the end of the initial seven (7) day option period 
and the lessor could then refuse to accept a lessee within the following 
seven (7) days.379 
 
The ACT Working Party did not go so far.380 It recommended that a potential 
lessee should be provided with a proposed lease, however they did not 
consider that a disclosure document was necessary because: - 
(a) The problems of a lessee being unaware of conditions in a lease could 
be solved by lessee education;381 
(b) lessees may view the disclosure document as a substitute for the 
lease; 
(c) A disclosure document would result in increased costs for lessees who 
are normally liable to pay the lessors costs of drawing up lease documents; 
(d) The remedies suggested in other jurisdictions of making a lease 
voidable if the disclosure document was not supplied would not be 
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appropriate as in most cases the lessee will have invested significant funds 
in establishing the business and the decision to avoid the lease would not be 
commercially viable.382 
(e) A more appropriate remedy would be for industry bodies to produce 
less complicated leases.383 
Although lessee education would result in lessees better equipped to lease 
premises it is unlikely that problems involving lack of disclosure could be 
solved merely by lessee education.  How and when this would be achieved 
was not stated.  Some information is solely within the knowledge of the 
lessor, for example, proposed tenant mix and other future plans for the 
centre such as redevelopment. Although the suggestion that there be less 
complicated leases has some merit, it is a totally impractical suggestion 
where there is no standardised lease and lessors and their advisors seek to 
cover as many eventualities as possible in the leasing arrangement. 
Disclosure of information seeks to enhance the bargaining power of the 
lessee and bring the power of the lessor in negotiations into greater balance 
with that of the lessee. A disclosure statement allows an unsophisticated 
lessee to more easily discern the important lessee rights and obligations of 
the lease and give some insight into the lessors’ future plans to enable the 
potential lessee to make a properly informed decision to avoid disputes at a 
later date. Standard disclosure statements contain the principal elements of 
the lease which might guide the decision making process of a lessee in 
determining whether to enter into the lease or not. 
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Conversely the Hill Inquiry recommended that lessors should be encouraged 
to increase communication with minor retail lessees and to form a voluntary 
code, but that no action be taken regarding legislation.384 
Conclusion 
In summary, lessee concerns regarding disclosure were: - 
(a) insufficient time given to peruse the terms of a lease;385 
(b) lease documents not being given at all to a lessee prior to the start of a  
lease;386 
(c) no standard industry lease;387 and 
(d) insufficient disclosure by lessors or exaggeration by lessors regarding 
the terms of the lease.388 This included misleading information regarding 
future rates or commitments under the lease389 as well as to estimated 
turnover or profitability of the shopping centre.390 
 
2.2  Later inquiries into retail leasing 
Each of the early inquiries considered that the areas of security of tenure, 
assignment, disclosure, dispute resolution rent and rent review were topics 
of concern to both lessors and lessees.  Although the reasons found for such 
concern differed between each inquiry, it was recognised that such problems 
could only be solved legislatively and not by submission to an unenforceable 
voluntary code. 
 
                                                             
384 Hill Report 1983 referred to in Arnold Report 1984, 83. 
385 Arnold Report 1984, 21. 
386 Cooper Report 1981, 32. 
387 Arnold Report 1984, 53 and Cooper Report 1981, 24. 
388 Arnold Report 1984, 20. 
389 Clarke Report 1984, 4. 
390 Arnold Report 1984, 2. 
114 
 
These five areas raised in the government Reports from the early 1980s 
have continued to be concerns for lessors and lessees to date. Whilst all of 
these issues have been raised in earlier inquiries they remain unresolved in 
the minds of lessees. 
 
2.2.1 Security of Tenure 
In 1997 the Reid Inquiry identified the major business issue raised by small 
retail lessees as being lack of security of tenure.391 This concern was raised 
again a decade later in the enquiry by the Productivity Commission,392 
whose report devoted a whole chapter to the subject.393 
In 1996 the South Australian government convened the Joint Select 
Committee on Retail Shop Tenancies which provided a Report in July of that 
year. One of the issues considered by the Joint Select Committee was the 
difficulties lessees faced in having their leases renewed without the benefit 
of an option. The Joint Select Committee recommended that the legislation 
be amended to provide that a lessor must give an existing lessee (who has 
no option to renew) the first right of refusal for a new lease subject to certain 
exceptions.  These exceptions included where the centre would benefit from 
a change of tenancy mix, where the lessee has been in breach of the lease, 
where the lessor can obtain a higher rent for the lease, where the lessor had 
plans to redevelop the centre or it can be established that the lessor would 
be disadvantaged by the granting of the right.394 The recommendation 
subsequently became Part 4A Division 3 of the Retail and Commercial 
                                                             
391 Reid Report 1997,[2.6]. 
392 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 99. 
393 Ibid, Chapter 6. 
394 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 28 November 1996, 611 (Levy). 
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Leases Act 1995 (SA).  The benefit provided to the lessee was, however, 
illusory as the provisions could be excluded if there was a simple certified 
exclusionary clause in the lease.395  
Similar preferential rights were introduced in the Australian Capital Territory 
in 2002 with the passing of the Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 
(ACT).  The ACT legislature took the view that the South Australian 
amendments should be adopted because of lack of balance between lessors 
and lessees.396 It was acknowledged that the availability of certified 
exclusionary clauses in the legislation may cause lessors to exert undue 
influence on lessees to agree to such clauses.397 
During its 2008 Inquiry, submissions were made to the Productivity 
Commission that the supposed ability of a lessee, at the end of its lease, to 
relocate from within a shopping centre to the strip outside the shopping 
centre, was an illusion and that such relocation would result in business 
failure.398 Issues regarding lease duration were also considered by the 
Senate Economics Reference Committee in 2015.399 In essence, no 
jurisdiction has devised a means of advancing the rights of a sitting tenant to 
a fresh lease. In all cases, the final decision on re-leasing the premises to 
the sitting lessee remains ultimately in the discretion of the lessor. 
 
                                                             
395 Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA), s20K.  A certified exclusionary clause is a certificate 
signed by a lawyer not acting for the lessor which states that the lawyer has explained the effect of 
the provisions to the potential lessee and the effect if such provisions were to be excluded and the 
lessee gave assurances to the lawyer that they were not acting under coercion. 
396 Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 6 March 2001, 647 
(Rugendyke). 
397 Ibid. 
398 Australian Retailers Association, Submission No 71 to Productivity Commission,  Economic 
Structure and the Performance of the Australian Retail Industry, December 2011, 71. 
399 Senate Economics Reference Committee, Need for a National Approach to Retail Leasing 
Arrangements, 18 March 2015, [3.29]. 
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2.2.2 Dispute Resolution 
In relation to dispute resolution, the Beddall Inquiry recommended that shop 
lease Tribunals be introduced in all jurisdictions to arbitrate disputes 
between lessors and lessees.400  
In New South Wales, after briefly using both voluntary and non-voluntary 
codes of practice,401 the government abandoned the use of codes when it 
became obvious that the voluntary code had failed, in particular, in relation to 
resolution of disputes.402 Subsequent legislation to meet this failure included 
the establishment of government sponsored mediation services to avoid the 
cost consequences of court proceedings.403 
The Reid Inquiry also received many submissions regarding the 
unnecessary complexity and cost of dispute resolution. That Inquiry found 
that the overarching concern of lessees was for disputes to be dealt with out 
of court.404  The Productivity Commission also considered dispute resolution 
matters in depth in 2008405 and found that all States and Territories, by that 
stage, had dispute resolution mechanisms that were low cost, accessible 
and timely.406 
 
                                                             
400 Beddall Report 1990, [4.72]. 
401 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 20 April 1994, 1548 (Mr R 
Chappell, Minister for Small Business). 
402 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly,(Second Reading Speech for 
Retail Leases Bill 1994) 13 May 1994, 2640 (Mr Chappell, Minister for Small Business). 
403 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 13 May 1994, 2640 (Mr 
Murray). 
404 Reid Report 1997, [2.43]. 
405 Ibid, Chapter 4. 
406 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 71. 
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Issues regarding delays in dispute resolution407 were raised by the ACT 
Working Party Review of Commercial and Retail Tenancy Legislation in 
1997. As a result of the recommendations of the Working Party and 
subsequent submissions by interested parties the government determined to 
transfer lease disputes from the Tenancy Tribunal to the Magistrates Court 
who would have the power to order alternative dispute resolution. In addition, 
the Registrar could convene a preliminary conference to resolve matters.408 
With all jurisdictions giving parties access to mediations and Tribunals, low 
cost dispute resolution has been achieved. 
 
2.2.3 Disclosure 
According to the Reid Inquiry gaps existed in retail leasing legislation in that 
despite earlier complaint from lessees about the lack of information 
concerning the centre, information asymmetry between the lessor and 
lessee had not been addressed.409 The Joint Select Committee on the 
Retailing Sector urged the government to re-visit the recommendation of the 
Reid Inquiry to create a retail tenancy code to deal with the information gap 
between lessor and lessee.410 Numerous submissions were received by the 
Productivity Commission in relation to disclosure requirements.411  According 
to the Productivity Commission:-  
                                                             
407 It was taking 170 days to get to a first directions hearing in the Tenancy Tribunal and 292 days 
to get to a trial. Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 
October 2000, 3170 (Chief Minister Humphries). 
408 Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 10 December 1998, 
3578 (Chief Minister Humphries). 
409 Reid Report 1997, [2.27]. 
410 Joint Select Committee on the Retailing Sector, Parliament of Australia, Fair Market or Market 
Failure, A Review of Australia’s Retailing Sector, August 1999, Recommendation 7. 
411 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), [154-170]. 
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The Commission was repeatedly told that there is an information imbalance in the 
relationship between shopping centre landlords and retail tenants.  One retailer 
association stated that retailers often find themselves in an information “vacuum” 
when negotiating or accessing their leases.  While such claims are not new (similar 
concerns were expressed to the Reid Enquiry), they are made in the context of 
extensive information disclosure requirements under current regulations, 
considerable public information available from tenancy authorities and the 
development of a lease information and advisory sector.412 
 
The Joint Select Committee on Retail Shop Tenancies (SA) also found that 
there was a shortfall in the disclosure requirements and recommended that 
lessors provide greater disclosure in relation to fit out requirements, details 
of any margin the lessor was applying to the cost of services supplied by the 
lessor, details of current tenancy mix in a retail shopping centre and any 
changes to such mix contemplated by the lessor and clarification as to 
whether there is any guarantee of exclusivity.413 
 
2.2.4 Rent Review 
The Reid Inquiry, in 1997, identified rent review as one of many gaps in retail 
tenancy legislation in Australia in that rent review clauses allow for 
unpredictable and potentially large rent increases.414   
In 1995, the South Australian Joint Select Committee determined that 
problems still persisted in relation to rent reviews and proposed that the 
                                                             
412 Ibid, [153]. 
413 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 28 November 1996, 526 (Levy).  The 
Joint Committee’s Report had been submitted in July 1996. 
414 Reid Report 1997, [2.27]. 
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Magistrates Court have jurisdiction for an application by a lessor to review 
the rent if it was harsh and unconscionable.  This submission of the Joint 
Select Committee was not taken up by the government.415 
The ACT government, in 1998, received evidence of problems regarding rent 
review and, in response, proposed an alteration of the law regarding multiple 
rent review clauses to cover clauses which allowed the lessor to dictate the 
rate of rent to apply and streamlining provisions regarding determination of 
market rent.416 
The Productivity Commission received numerous submissions in relation to 
rents and rent reviews including complaints regarding the differentiation of 
rentals being paid by small retailers and anchor tenants and submissions 
that rents and outgoings should be regulated, in particular at time of renewal. 
Such regulation was said to ensure that all lessees in a shopping centre pay 
the same rent, that limits be placed on what can be charged as outgoings 
and that rent is determined at market rent. The Productivity Commission 
believed that rent regulation would result in an inefficient market and rent 
should remain the subject of commercial negotiation.417 Many of these 
suggestions were obviously impractical especially given the degree of 
regulation already. 
2.2.5 Assignment 
The Reid Inquiry received evidence regarding assignment from lessees in 
circumstances such as: -  
                                                             
415 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 28 November 1996, 612 (Levy).   
416 Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 10 December 1998, 
3575 (Chief Minister Humphries). 
417 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 142-143. 
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• A lessee who lost his business when the lessor refused to consent to 
the assignment of the lease.  The lessor then entered into an agreement with 
the proposed purchaser to lease another shop in the same centre for a 
similar purpose; and 
• A lessee lost a sale of its business because of the delay of the lessor in 
consenting to an assignment.418 
Issues regarding the lessors conduct arising from a lessees request for 
consent to assignment were considered by the ACT government in 1998. 
Such issues included lessors unreasonably refusing consent to an 
assignment or taking too long to provide a response to a request for 
assignment. It was considered that the lessor’s grounds for refusal must be 
reasonable and that such reasonable grounds should be explicitly stated in 
the legislation.419 The lessor bore the burden of proving that any other 
ground for refusal relied upon by the lessor was reasonable.420 In addition, 
the lessor should be given only a limited time period to respond to any such 
request.421 
Complaints made to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
in the five years ended 30th June 2007 mostly included allegations of 
unconscionable conduct and the primary grounds behind such allegations 
concerned a lessor obstructing the sale of a business.422 
                                                             
418 Reid Report 1997, [2.96]. 
419 Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 10 December 1998, 
3578 (Chief Minister Humphries). Such provisions now appear in the  Leases (Commercial and Retail) 
Act 2001 (ACT), s100. 
420 Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT), s100 (3). 
421 Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT), s99 (2). 
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It was clear that lessees had some cause for grievance in relation to the 
process of assignment where the lessor’s conduct was often unbusinesslike 
and dilatory which, upon occasions, meant the loss of a sale of the business 
conducted on the leasehold premises. 
 
2.3 Recent Inquiries 
The relationship between retail lessees and lessors continues to generate 
controversy.  This has sparked further Inquiries. More recent Inquiries have 
been dominated by Commonwealth agencies and have had a national focus. 
The Senate Economics Reference Committee 2015 Report considered the 
principal issues of conflict between lessors and lessees to include: - 
(a)  security of tenure issues such as minimum lease terms and first right 
of refusal upon renewal; 
(b) disclosure issues such as the disclosure of side incentive agreements; 
(c)  turnover rent and the use of market reviews at lease commencement; 
and  
(d) The process of dispute resolution.  
 
In its submission to the Committee, the Shopping Centre Council opposed 
giving lessee’s mandatory rights to renew or a right of first refusal. The 
Council also opposed a third party setting rent upon renewal on the basis 
that such a determination might result in the lessor receiving a smaller return 
on investment which could discourage investment in the retail sector.423  
 
                                                             
423 Shopping Centre Council of Australia, Submission No 17 to Senate Economics Reference 
Committee, Need for a National Approach to Retail Leasing Arrangements, August 2014, 11. 
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In 2008, the Productivity Commission found that restrictive planning and 
zoning regulation imposed by local authorities allowed lessors to amass 
power as such regulation restricted the availability of retail space and its 
use.424 Such restriction reduced competition between shopping centre 
lessors and decreased the bargaining power of lessees by reducing their 
ability to re-locate near to the shopping centre and thereby preserve their 
business after their lease has expired. The Productivity Commission 
repeated such findings in 2011: - 
Planning and zoning constraints appear to be the root cause of many of the concerns 
in the retail tenancy market expressed to the Commission. Simply put, occupancy 
rates are extremely high in shopping centres due to strong demand for retail space in 
the face of constrained supply. This places smaller retailers — who do not have the 
bargaining power of anchor tenants or chain specialty stores — in a very tough 
bargaining situation. While it is possible for these retailers to ‘vote with their feet’ and 
move to shopping strips or other locations, the alternative sites are not always 
commercially attractive.425 
 
In a further Report in 2014, the Productivity Commission found that some 
retail lease issues such as lack of transparency, disclosure and dispute 
resolution had never been properly resolved by existing legislation and that 
many such problems could be solved by changing the existing zoning 
system.426  
 
                                                             
424 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 94. 
425 Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry 
(December 2011), xxvii. 
426 Productivity Commission, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade (September 
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It is clear that major issues have never been properly resolved by any Inquiry 
nor by legislative means.  These are security of tenure of sitting lessees, 
issues around the lessor’s interaction at lease assignment, the efficiency of 
dispute resolution, rent review and the adequacy of disclosure. For these 
reasons this thesis will examine these five major continuing areas of 
contention between lessors and lessees in greater detail with the ultimate 
aim of recommending further reform. 
 
 
3 Consideration of Voluntary Codes 
3.1 Introduction to Voluntary Codes 
Voluntary codes are codes adopted by an industry and amount to self-
regulation. They may be entirely the creation of industry bodies or formed in 
conjunction with government. In contrast, mandatory codes are codes that 
are prescribed by legislation and may be enforced by the government. 
Voluntary codes are more flexible than mandatory codes as the industry 
bodies can quickly identify any requirement for changes and no approval by 
the government of such change is required. The rules or standards are 
determined by industry members with industry knowledge and the likelihood 
of compliance with those rules is increased because of industry involvement 
in creating them.427 
The purpose of voluntary codes is varied.  They may be used: - 
(a) where failure to have a voluntary code will result in government 
regulation. For example, the Plastic Bag Code of Practice was adopted by 
                                                             
427 Nicola Howell, "Revisiting the Australian Code of Banking Practice: Is Self-Regulation Still 
Relevant for Improving Consumer Protection Standards?" [2015] UNSWLawJl 19, 20. 
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the Australian Retailers Association because of government requirements 
that the environment be protected.428 The voluntary Code for leasing 
business premises429 in the United Kingdom came about because of threats 
by the government of regulation.  
(b) By an industry as an ethical choice or to show that the industry is a 
responsible corporate citizen.430 
(c) To promote certainty within an industry.431 
 
3.2 Voluntary Leasing Codes in Australia 
The Cooper Committee referred to a voluntary code that had been drafted by 
the Building Owners and Managers Association432 in an attempt to stave off 
legislation.  The Cooper Committee believed that legislation was not required 
and that the industry should self-regulate.433  This proposal was 
subsequently rejected by the Joint Parliamentary committee who instead 
recommended legislation.434 
                                                             
428 Australian Retailers Association, Codes of Practice, (4 January 2016) 
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429 The Commercial Leases Working Group, The Code for Leasing Business Premises in England and 
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A voluntary code was introduced in NSW in 1991435 however the code failed 
because it was not used in the vast majority of transactions436 and legislation 
was introduced. A joint review of the voluntary code in 1993 by the Property 
Council of Australia and the Retail Traders Association of NSW found: - 
‘that the code had many deficiencies and was basically unworkable. 
The procedures set up to deal with disputes had failed to resolve them, 
and there was significant non-compliance with the code.’437  
The Casual Mall Leasing Code is a voluntary code in all Australian 
jurisdictions except for South Australia where it is a schedule to the Retail 
and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA).  The Code governs casual mall or 
common area leasing (of 6 months or less) in shopping centres.  It seeks to 
protect not only casual lessees but also other lessees within a shopping 
centre. It requires amongst other things that the lessor not grant a licence to 
an external competitor of an adjacent lessee.438 The Code has been 
authorised by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) which provides statutory protection from court action for conduct 
that might otherwise raise concerns under the competition provisions of the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).  
The Code was originally developed in South Australia in 2002 and has been 
successfully in operation since that time.  The ACCC renewed its 
authorisation in 2012 extending such authorisation until 2017. 
                                                             
435 Retail Tenancy Leases Code of Practice 1991.  The Code was promoted both by the Property 
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436 S Murdoch, P Rowland and N Crosby, Looking after Small Business Tenants with Voluntary Codes 
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3.3 Voluntary Leasing Codes in the United Kingdom 
In the period from 1984 to 1990 there was a huge demand for limited high 
street lease sites in the United Kingdom. As the demand increased rents 
soared such that between 1984 and1988 retail sales grew by twenty-five 
percent whereas rents increased by sixty percent.439 After a commercial 
property crash in 1990 many lessees were trapped in long leases with 
upwards only rent review provisions.440   Inevitably, they complained to the 
UK Government who identified three areas as being burdens on small 
business: - 
(a) upward only rent reviews; 
(b) outdated arbitration system; and 
(c) confidentiality agreements.441 
In particular, it was considered that the upward only rent review provisions 
were not able to reflect the market values for rent which ultimately led to 
rental aberrations and an inefficient market.442 
Although initially considering legislation to remedy the situation UK 
Government was eventually persuaded that there was some flexibility in the 
market443 and encouraged the retail leasing industry to put in place a 
voluntary code of practice.  There have now been three codes of practice, 
                                                             
439 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 10 November 1992, Volume 13 
Column 851, (A. Browning). 
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the first in 1995,444 the second in 2002445 and the third in 2007.446 The three 
leasing codes have not been a success.  They have been poorly 
disseminated, little used and have had no direct influence on leasing 
practice.447  
In contrast to the English government approach of voluntary codes, the Irish 
Government reacted to upward only rent review clauses by legislating to 
abolish such clauses in 2010.448 The Irish situation is an illustration of the 
effect that government regulation can have on an industry as opposed to 
self-regulation.  The Irish legislation was not retrospective so that any lessee 
in a long term lease existing prior to February, 2010 suffered a disadvantage 
as the lessor would, obviously, not terminate the lease and any potential 
buyer of the lessee’s business would obviously prefer a lease that did not 
have upward only rent review clauses. The result has been attempts by 
lessees to either get out of their “old leases” or have the rent review clauses 
read down.449  
Upward only rent reviews have always been an area of concern for the UK 
government however other concerns have also arisen. In the 2005 review of 
commercial leasing the UK government formed the view that another area of 
                                                             
444 The Commercial Leases Working Group, A Code of Practice for Commercial Leases in England 
and Wales (1995). 
445 The Commercial Leases Working Group, A Code of Practice for Commercial Leases in England 
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concern was inflexible leasing practices450 and, in 2009, asymmetry of 
information.451 
Unlike Australia the UK Government has not been concerned with leases of 
too short a duration.  In contrast, initially, the complaints of lessees were that 
they were trapped in leases which were long in duration but with upward only 
rent reviews. 
Concerns in relation to lease duration are dealt with by the Landlord and 
Tenant Act 1954 (UK) which gives a lessee a right to extend the lease term 
subject to certain exceptions.452 In relation to assignment of leases, the UK, 
like Australia, has legislation that requires a lessor not to unreasonably 
withhold consent to assignment of a lease453.  Additionally, UK lessors have 
a duty to respond to a request to assign a lease within a reasonable time454 
and the burden of showing that the lessor has responded within a 
reasonable time is on the lessor.455 A breach of that duty is actionable by 
way of civil proceedings456 which may include a claim for exemplary 
damages.457 
Despite the passing of 25 years since problems first arose, the UK 
Government has still not legislated in relation to retail leases.  Reasons for 
this maybe that, even though the Codes have been failures, that the 
constant threats by the government have been sufficient to secure a change 
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in leasing practices458 or, alternatively, that other legislation459 has dealt with 
major problems such that new retail leasing legislation is not required. 
 
3.4 Other Australian Voluntary Codes 
Examples of other Australian voluntary codes include the Australian Code of 
Banking Practice (“Banking Code”).  The Banking Code is a purely voluntary 
code in that there is no government sanction for breach of its rules. The first 
edition of the code appeared in 1993 and the code is now in its third 
edition.460 Despite its length of operation, the code has been criticised as a 
“toothless tiger” and much of its regulations have been superseded by 
legislation.461 It is possible that the Banking Code will become redundant as 
legislation takes its place.462 
The General Insurance Code of Practice is another completely voluntary 
code which is overseen by the Financial Ombudsman Service.  The 
Insurance Code was introduced in 1994 by the Insurance Council of 
Australia and revised in 2006.  The Code deals with issues such as service 
standards, complaints and making of claims.  Despite being introduced by 
the Insurance Council of Australia; many employees of insurance companies 
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were unaware of the Codes importance as were many consumers.  The 
Code itself was found to be generally “inherently unsatisfactory”.463 
Generally speaking, a voluntary code without some sort of sanction for non-
compliance is not an effective method to curb unacceptable behaviour.464 
 
4. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was two-fold. Firstly, to identify particular areas 
of focus being items of conflict between lessors and lessees originally 
identified as problems prior to the enactment of retail leasing legislation 
which have endured, such that these areas of conflict continue to be 
problematic to the present time.  
Secondly, to analyse the various drivers for reform in relation to such areas 
of focus. 
Common across all Australian jurisdictions, prior to the enactment of retail 
leasing legislation, was the dissatisfaction of lessees with the conduct of 
lessors.   
Lessees in both Australia and the United Kingdom had been the victims of 
change in the market place or in the economy.  In the United Kingdom it was 
the property crash in the early 1990s whereas in Australia it was the rapid 
proliferation of shopping centres that occurred from 1975 and into the early 
1980s.  While the lessees were the victims of these changes of 
circumstance, the lessors were protected from such effects by leasing 
                                                             
463 House of Representatives, Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, Parliament of 
Australia, Inquiry into the Operation of the Insurance Industry during Disaster Events, (February, 
2012), 35. 
464 “Persuasion unbacked by sanctions does not influence the worst offenders against a code of 
good practice.  That is really all that self-regulation can employ.”  
Clarke Report 1984, 7. 
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practices or by the terms of their leases such as upward only or ratchet rent 
review clauses.   
 
Although the areas of complaint were many and varied, five major issues in 
Australia centred on assignment provisions, security of tenure, rent and rent 
reviews, sufficiency of disclosure and dispute resolution. In the United 
Kingdom issues also included rent reviews,465 lack of disclosure466 and 
dispute resolution.467 
  
 
These five (5) areas of concern were considered by all of the early 
committees of inquiry in the early 1980’s, subsequently leading to retail 
leasing legislation in all Australian States and Territories.  Despite the 
recommendation of such inquiries and legislation, these five (5) areas of 
conflict continued to plague the retail leasing industry as shown by 
subsequent committees of inquiry up to the present time 
 
The drivers for reform in relation to those 5 areas of conflict were also 
documented by the numerous government inquiries held since 1981 to the 
present time and were as follows: - 
(a) Security of Tenure – lessees were unable to obtain a lease term of 
sufficient length to allow them to amortise their fitout cost, or to enjoy the 
benefits of their hard work in the business, or to have sufficient time left on 
                                                             
465 Upward only rent reviews. 
466 Confidentiality agreements and asymmetry of information. 
467 Outdated arbitration system for determination of lease disputes. 
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their lease term to make the business attractive to any buyer.  The lessee 
therefore was required to request the lessor to provide an additional lease 
term at a time when the lessee had no negotiating power. The subsequent 
power thereby given the lessor was the subject of complaint in all 
jurisdictions.   
(b) Assignment – at the time when the lessee wished to sell the business 
and assign the lease, the lessor was able to control the situation for the 
lessors’ ultimate benefit.  For example, the lessor could demand a portion of 
the good will upon sale or refuse or delay consent to the assignment of the 
lease. By frustrating the lessee’s attempts to sell their business the lessor 
could persuade the unsuccessful assignee to lease different premises within 
the same centre or allow the lessor to drive the lessee out and take over the 
good will of the lessee’s business. 
(c) Rent Review - Rent reviews were often arbitrary in relation to time or 
amount. The use of a ratchet clause in a lease was regarded as unfair. 
Turnover rent was commonly charged and this was considered a 
disincentive to succeed. The provision of turnover information was seen as a 
breach of privacy which gave the lessor an advantage when negotiating a 
new rent with the lessee. Lessees were also concerned about lack of 
confidentiality regarding turnover information and the extent to which a 
lessor may use such information in relation to other lessees. 
(d) Disclosure – Lack of a standard lease and lessor leasing practices 
meant that lessees were not given lease documents prior to a lease starting 
or were given insufficient time to peruse the lease. Disclosure by lessees 
was often incorrect or exaggerated and included information such as 
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unsupported statements as to the likely success of the lessee’s new 
business or of the shopping centre generally. 
(e) Dispute Resolution – Lessees complained that the dispute resolution 
process through normal courts was too costly or time consuming. In addition, 
the formal nature of court proceedings favoured the lessor over the lessee. 
Methods of alternative dispute resolution were sought by lessees to avoid 
cost, delay and formality and to preserve the business relationship with 
lessors.  
 
It is necessary when considering any simplified  legislation to ensure that 
such legislation addresses the drivers for reform referred to above.  Although 
legislation has been introduced in each State and Territory in relation to the 
5 areas of concern and such legislation has been amended on numerous 
occasions the 5 areas of concern continue to be problematic to the present 
day which indicates that so far regulation has not been entirely successful. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis will consider whether the various regulation imposed 
has been effective and, if so, to what extent.  Chapter 4 will consist of a 
determination of factors to allow the evaluation of any proposed new 
legislation which will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 3  
SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF LEGISLATION  
1. Introduction 
Chapter 1 outlined that the purpose of this thesis was to determine whether 
State and Territory based retail shop lease legislation should be simplified by 
analysing the benefits of this proposal  in relation to selected , significant 
areas of conflict.  
Chapter 2 considered various areas of conflict between lessors and lessees 
which have been common and enduring and in addition determined the 
various drivers for reform in relation to such areas of conflict.  
This chapter considers to what extent existing retail lease legislation has 
been a success or a failure by considering the initial purpose for establishing 
retail shop legislation, the methods adopted to achieve that purpose and, by 
examining the amendments to legislation, inquiries and journal articles since 
the introduction of retail shop lease legislation, determining whether such 
purpose has been achieved. 
Legislatures have multiple objectives, in that they not only must protect the 
weaker lessees but they must also ensure that the leasing market stays 
strong so that investment in that market continues.  If the balance is tipped 
too far in favour of lessees then investors will abandon shopping centres as 
an investment vehicle with the result that the centre will suffer and perhaps 
close, shop-owners/lessees would suffer as fewer shopping centres would 
make competition for such space (and thereby rentals) even greater.  Jobs 
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would be lost and at the end of the line the consumer would pay more for 
their goods.  It is this “balance” that governments seek in creating retail 
leasing legislation. 
Although shopping centres have been abandoned in the United States of 
America the closure of such shopping centres has not arisen because of any 
change in regulation but simply because supply exceeds demand.  The 
gross lettable area of shopping centres in the United States of America per 
100 persons in that country is 219 square metres whereas the gross lettable 
area in Australian per 100 persons is 94 square metres.468  
In addition changes in demographic has also affected shopping centres such 
that a population decline in the particular area plus a slump in wages can 
cause customers of a shopping centre to significantly and quickly decline.  
Such decline results in the shopping centre no longer being financially 
viable.469 
It is not intended to consider the situation in the United States of America in 
this thesis.  
 
2. Purpose of Legislation 
In enacting retail shop lease legislation, the principal stated intentions of the 
various legislatures were to: - 
                                                             
468 Shopping Centre Council of Australia, Key Facts (March 2016)  
<http://www.scca.org.au/industry-information/key-facts/ obtained 30th September 2016>. 
469 Amanda Kolson Hurley, Shopping Malls Aren’t Actually Dying (25 March 2015) CityLab 
< http://www.citylab.com/design/2015/03/shopping-malls-arent-actually-dying/387925/>. 
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(a) Foster the further development of small business and to promote a 
vigorous retail sector;470 
(b) Preserve the interests of consumers; 
(c) Maintain a competitive environment; 
(d) Achieve a balance between large and small businesses and thereby 
strengthen the economy;471 
(e) Establishing a regulatory framework which was fair to both lessors and 
lessees;472 
(f) Resolve problems arising from lack of awareness of lessees;473 
(g) Cause minimum interference with market forces in relation to retail 
leases;474 
(h) Ensure harmony within the retail lease Sector;475 
(i) Improved the position of lessees in retail shops while maintaining the 
essential rights of lessors.476 
(j) Ensure that the parties to the lease are fully informed.477 
                                                             
470 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8th May 1986, 1957(Fordham) (Minister 
for Industry Technology and Resource, Second reading speech of Retail Tenancy Bill)  
471 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly 21st February 1985, 184, Mr 
Brice, Minister for Small Business, Second Reading Speech of Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) 
Agreements Bill.  
472 South Australia, Parliamentary Debate, Legislative Council, 30th November 1994, 1010 (KT 
Griffin, Attorney General, Second Reading Speech of Retail Shop Leases Bill); Australian Capital 
Territory, leases (Commercial and Retail) Bill 2000 Explanatory Memorandum, 2. 
473 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly 21st February 1985, 184, Mr 
Brice, Minister for Small Business, Second Reading Speech of Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) 
Agreements Bill. 
474 Ibid. 
475 Ibid, 185. 
476 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly 28th February 1984, 1576 (MJ Ahern, 
Minister for Industry Small Business and Technology) 
477 Australian Capital Territory, Leases (Commercial and Retail) Bill 2000 Explanatory 
Memorandum, 2. 
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In order to achieve the abovementioned objectives within the context of the 
five (5) areas of dispute identified in Chapter 2 the various legislature sought 
to increase the bargaining power of lessees by: - 
1. Inserting a minimum five (5) year lease term;478 
2. Establishing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and/or 
specific retail lease tribunal;479 
3. Restricting the lessor’s methods of rent review;480 
4. Limiting the ability of the lessor to collect turnover information; 
5. Restricting the lessor’s rights in relation to assignment specifically 
requiring the lessor to answer a lessee’s request for assignment 
within a limited period;  
6. Requiring disclosure by the lessor to the lessee of features of the 
lease including a copy of the draft lease.481   
 
3. Amendments, Repeals and Alterations 
                                                             
478 Retail Tenancies Act 1986 (Vic) s21; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s16; Retail and Commercial 
Leases Act 1995 (SA) ss20B,20K; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s13; 
Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) s1; Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail 
Tenancies) Regulation 2008 (Tas) s10(3) and 10(4); Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) 
s26. 
479 Retail Tenancies Act 1986 (Vic) s81; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994(Qld) s63; Retail Leases Act 1994 
(NSW) s61; Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) Part 9; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) 
Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s16; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) Part 14; Fair Trading 
(Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulation 2008 (Tas) s39; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) 
Act 2003 (NT) ss86, 119. 
480 Retail Tenancies Act 1986 (Vic) s35; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994(Qld) s27; Retail Leases Act 1994 
(NSW) 18; Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s22; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) 
Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s11; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) ss47,50; Fair Trading 
(Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulation 2008 (Tas) s12; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) 
Act 2003 (NT) s28. 
481 Retail Tenancies Act 1986 (Vic) s17; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994(Qld) s22; Retail Leases Act 1994 
(NSW) s11; Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s12; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) 
Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s6; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) s36; Fair Trading 
(Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulation 2008 (Tas) s6; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) 
Act 2003 (NT) s19. 
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Retail lease legislation has been significantly amended since first 
commencement. For example, the Retail Shop Leases Act 1984 (Qld) was 
amended on several occasions482 until being completely replaced by the 
Retail Shop Leases Act 1994.483 That legislation itself has been significantly 
amended484 as has legislation in all other jurisdictions.485 
Drivers for amendments to legislation were that: - 
                                                             
482 Retail Shop Leases Act Amendment Act 1985(Qld); Retail Shop Leases Act Amendment Act 
1988(Qld); Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989(Qld); Retail Shop Leases Act Amendment 
Act 1989(Qld); Retail Shop Leases Act Amendment Act 1990(Qld); Statute Law (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1990(Qld); Land Tax Legislation Amendment Act 1991(Qld). 
483 The Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) commenced on the 28th October 1994. It repealed the 
Retail Shop Leases Act 1984 (Qld). The Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) has been the subject of 
further review and the Retail Shop Leases Amendment Bill 2015 is currently before parliament. 
484 Statute Law (Minor Amendments) Act (No. 2) 199; Statute Law Revision Act 1995; Retail Shop 
Leases Amendment Act 1999 ; Retail Shop Leases Amendment Act 2000 ; Duties Act 2001; Statute 
Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2003 ; South Bank Corporation and Other Acts Amendment Act 
2003 ; Legal Profession Act 2003 ; Legal Profession Act 2004 ; Revenue Legislation Amendment Act 
2005 ; Retail Shop Leases Amendment Act 2006 ; Legal Profession Act 2007 ; Justice (Fair Trading) 
Legislation Amendment Act 2008 ; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Jurisdiction 
Provisions) Amendment Act 2009 ; State Penalties Enforcement and Other Legislation Amendment 
Act 2009 No. 48 ss 1,; Fair Trading (Australian Consumer Law) Amendment Act 2010 ; Criminal Code 
and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2011; Commercial Arbitration Act 2013. 
485 Victoria. The Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) commenced 1st May 2003.  This Act repealed the 
Retail Tenancies Reform Act 1998 (Vic) which in turn had repealed the Retail Tenancies Act 1986 
(Vic).  
Tasmania. The Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulations 1998 commenced 1st 
September 1998.  No changes have occurred to the legislation despite a review occurring in 2002.   
South Australia. The Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 commenced 30th June 1995.  This Act 
repealed Part 4 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1936.   Part 4, which dealt with commercial 
tenancies, had been inserted in to the Act by the Statutes Amendment (Commercial Tenancies) 1985 
(SA) on the 14th March 1985.  
Western Australia. The Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 commenced 1st 
September 1985 followed by the Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Amendment Act 
1988 commencing 1st July 1999 and the Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreement 
Amendments Act 2011 commencing partially on 14 December 2011 and partially 1st January 2012.  
New South Wales. The Retail Leases Act 1994 commenced 1st August 1994. The Retail Leases Act 
1994 has been significantly amended in particular by Retail Lease Amendments Acts in 1997, 1998, 
2002, 2004 and 2005.  
Australian Capital Territory. The Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 commenced 1st July 2002. 
It consolidated and replaced the Tenancy Tribunal Act 1994 (ACT) and the Commercial and Retail 
Leases Code of Practice 1994 (ACT). The Code of Practice had been amended 8 times between 1997 
and 2001 whereas the Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 has been amended 13 times since 
coming into operation. 
Northern Territory. The Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 commenced 1st July 2004. It 
repealed the Commercial Tenancies Act 2002 (NT) which was an amalgam of the Tenancy Act 1979 
(NT) and numerous other pieces of amending legislation.  
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(a)  the retail leasing environment has changed thereby requiring a change 
in legislation. For example: - 
(i) The development of a retail lease advisory section to provide 
information to retail lessees.  The market and rental information 
and benchmark data about retail leases and occupancy costs 
available from such commercial lease advisory services will 
reduce the pressure for information disclosure from lessors and 
thereby reduce the demand for more detailed disclosure 
statements.486 
(ii) The rise of online shopping.  In the same way that shopping 
centres originally made shopping more convenient as customers 
were not required to visit the central business district in order to 
do their shopping, online shopping provides even greater 
convenience than that provided by regional shopping centres.487 
Although a customer may be reluctant to purchase on line items 
which are personal to the customer such as clothing or shoes, 
there is no such reluctance in purchasing impersonal items such 
as compact discs, DVDs or books.488 The capture of online sales 
in turnover rent clauses is seen as inappropriate by lessees as 
the income is distinct from the income derived from the bricks 
and mortar store.  In addition, the locational advantage enjoyed 
by a lessor, as reinforced by zoning regulations, is eroded as 
online sales increase and the sales in shopping centres 
                                                             
486 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 162.  
487 Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry 
(December 2011), 105.  
488 Ibid, xix. 
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decrease.  A decrease in sales or a shift by retailers to online 
shopping stores will result in a lesser demand for shopping 
centre space489 and the lessors bargaining power reduces 
accordingly.490   As the bargaining power gap between lessor 
and lessee closes the outcomes sought by government are 
achieved as a result of ordinary market forces491 so the need for 
further or more prescriptive legislation decreases.  
 
(b) changes in legislation or enquiries in other jurisdictions which prompted 
changes in every other jurisdiction.  For example, the findings of the 
Productivity Commission in 2008 that procedures could be made less difficult 
to apply by greater harmonisation of lease information and disclosure 
statements led to a national form of disclosure document in 2009 which was 
adopted in Queensland, Victoria and New South Wales.492 The ability to 
have a fully harmonised disclosure document and more uniform  procedure 
will however not be possible until more fully harmonised legislation has been 
                                                             
489 Red Group, Submission No 89 to Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance 
of the Australian Retail Industry (December 2011), 22. 
490 Interestingly, Professor Tarlo, writing in 1984 predicted that regional shopping centres would 
set the pattern for shopping in the future, at least until: - 
“… the computer finally takes over our lives and people become almost totally sedentary 
(and bug-eyed) in front of their video screens, selecting their purchases with a touch on the 
keyboard.”  
Professor H Tarlo, ‘The Great Shop Lease Controversy’ (1983) University of Queensland Law Journal 
13(1), 7. 
491The introduction of a voluntary code of practice in 1995 in the United Kingdom was found to 
have had negligible effect on retail leasing practices but that a poor lettings market had caused the 
changes to such practice in line with the governments objectives. N Crosby & S Murdoch, “The 
Cutting Edge 2000 – Monitoring the UK Commercial Leases Code of Practice Colin Code, What 
Code?” RICS Research Foundation, University of Reading, 1; Crosby N, “Small Business Lease Reform 
– Can the UK Learn from the Australian Experience.” (Working Papers in Real Estate and Planning 
14/06, University of Reading Business School, 2006), 2. 
<http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/20611/1/1406.pdf.> 
492 Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry 
(December 2011), 267. 
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achieved.493 Given the political realities, fully harmonised legislation,  may be 
too difficult to achieve in the short term but this does not detract from the 
hypothesis that a more unified approach to the regulation of certain 
processes would not be commercially beneficial to both parties. 
 
(c) The effect of retail lease legislation upon shopping centres generally 
and the expectation of both lessors and lessees. For example: - 
(i) allowing a lessee to obtain a market valuation of rental prior to deciding 
whether or not to exercise an option to renew a lease led to lessors no 
longer granting options to renew.  As a result, demands by lessees for 
legislation to provide extended lease terms increase. 
(ii) The existence of legislation alone results in a lessee relying upon the 
legislation to protect them rather than upon their own due diligence 
enquiries.494 
(iii) The imposition of a minimum 5 year lease term resulting in lessors only 
granting 5 year lease terms. 
 
(d)  the original legislation was ineffective and therefore required 
amendment.495 
The constant tinkering with the legislation has arisen because of demands of 
lessees and lessors but also because of the mandatory review sections 
contained within the legislation.496 The initial enactment of retail lease 
                                                             
493 Ibid. 
494 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), xxv1. 
495 Reid Report 1997, [2.24]. 
496 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 45. 
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legislation in Australia was seen as pioneering legislation497 The effect of the 
legislation upon the retail leasing market could not be predicted and so many 
jurisdictions established mandatory review clauses requiring the review of 
the legislation every 5 or 7 years498 or alternatively put in place a committee 
to constantly review the legislation.499  
Such arbitrary review periods seem likely to produce legislation for its own 
sake rather than legislation reacting to a real problem.  A better course 
would be to appoint a committee or government official to monitor any 
difficulties that may arise.  Such a body may react swiftly to such difficulties 
and provide recommendations to the government about required 
amendments to legislation. 
Conclusion 
Although some of the amendments referred to above may have been 
motivated by mandatory review provisions the constant flow of inquiries, 
reports and amendments suggest that areas of dispute between lessors and 
lessees are still very much active and that legislation has not been effective 
in fixing areas of dispute. 
 
 
                                                             
497 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly 20 December 1983, 1014 
(Honourable MJ Ahern, Minister for Industries, Small Business and Technology)  
498 Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW), s86 (Seven years); Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 
(NT), s144 (Seven years). Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), s122.  In Queensland the review period 
was initially 5 years then increased to seven (7) years.  This mandatory review provision has been 
deleted in the Retail Shop Leases Bill 2015 (Queensland).   
499 Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA), s73 – 74. 
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4. Inquiries and Developments Since Commencement of Retail 
Lease Legislation.  
4.1 Introduction 
Examining the various enquiries and other investigations in relation to Retail 
Shop Lease Legislation since the commencement of such legislation in 1984 
will reveal whether such legislation has been successful or whether there are 
shortfalls within the legislation.  If particular legislation has been successful 
in achieving its stated purpose, then such legislation may be adopted as part 
of any review of  retail lease legislation.  Conversely, if a particular method of 
dealing with a retail lease problem has been implemented and such method, 
according to such enquiries and investigations, has failed then such method 
of dealing with that problem should be excluded from such  retail lease 
legislation. It is proposed to deal with various topics considered since the 
commencement of retail lease legislation and to specifically consider the 
Reid Report as it directly relates to the failure of retail leasing legislation. 
 
4.2 Reid Report 1997. 
(a) Issues Considered by the Reid Committee. 
In 1997 the Federal Government convened the Reid Committee500 which 
was asked to, amongst other things,501 specifically consider whether the 
retail lease legislation at the time was effective. 
                                                             
500 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, Parliament 
of Australia, Finding a Balance: Towards Fair Trading in Australia, May 1997 (“Reid Report 1997”) 
501 The terms of reference of the Reid Committee were to: - 
(a)investigate and report on the major business conduct issues arising out of commercial dealings 
between firms, including, but not limited to, franchising and retail tenancy;  
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The factors leading to the formation of the Reid Committee can be 
summarised in the phrase issued by the committee:-  
‘it is war out there between the retailers and the owners and 
managers.’502 
 
The major business conduct issues raised by small lessees concerned lack 
of security of tenure, calculation of rent and review of rent to market value, 
calculation of variable outgoings, lack of disclosure or misleading information 
provided by lessors or their agents, changes in tenancy mix and exercise by 
the lessor of their discretion to redevelop shopping centres and to 
compulsorily relocate lessees.503  
The Reid Committee made various recommendations in relation to the 
abovementioned topics. In addition the Reid Committee was concerned 
about access to justice504 and education.505  
 
The concern of lessees was that the imbalance of power in favour of the 
lessor in relation to these abovementioned items would cause an unfair 
result in favour of the lessor.  In addition the lessor could use such 
provisions to oppress a lessee and to achieve a result not originally intended 
by such provisions.  For example, the use of continual relocation notices to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(b)investigate and report on the economic and social implications of the major business conduct 
issues, particularly whether certain commercial practices might lead to sub-optimal economic 
outcomes; and 
(c) examine whether the impact of the business conduct issues identified were sufficient to justify 
government intervention; and 
(d) examine options and make recommendations as to strategies. 
502 Reid Report 1997, 15. 
503 Ibid, 16.  
504 Ibid, 187-188. 
505 Ibid, 191. 
145 
 
bankrupt a lessee or the insistence of new fit out which would result in the 
business being unable to trade during such fit out causing cessation of 
income.506  
 
Lessees also expressed concern because they were not consulted nor 
compensated for changes in a shopping centre tenancy mix.  In 
circumstances where, the commencement of their lease, a lessee may have 
been the only proprietor in relation to a certain product or service then in the 
absence of an exclusivity clause in the lease the lessor may introduce any 
number of competitors to that lessee and be required to pay no 
compensation to them even where the lessor had represented that no such 
competitors would be introduced.507  
Despite mandatory disclosure in many jurisdictions incorrect information or 
gaps in such information still occurred. Such incorrect information included 
representations in relation to traffic flow, impending closure of a major store, 
tenancy mix and proportion of a centre already leased.508 Lessees were also 
concerned about outgoing charged to the lessees and their lack of control 
over such expenditure outgoings and promotions.509  Additionally there was 
concern by lessees that sitting lessees were held to ransom particularly at 
the end of a lease period.510  
 
                                                             
506 Ibid, 76. 
507 Ibid, 68. 
508 Ibid, 65-66. 
509 Ibid, 57. 
510 Ibid, 55.  
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The Reid Committee found that complaints from lessees indicated that there 
were substantial gaps in retail lease legislation in Australia.511 Such 
complaints were not about unconscionable conduct by lessors but were 
primarily about the large degree of control held by the lessor and the 
subsequent “hard bargaining stance” that such control would allow the lessor 
to adopt. For example, lessees had very little power in relation to relocation 
of the lessees premises or redevelopment512 of the shopping centre.  
There was a continued substantial imbalance of power between lessors and 
lessees at the expiration of an existing lease despite the fact that this 
problem has been identified over a decade previously.513 
Other issues identified by the Reid Committee centred around unfair rent 
review provisions, information asymmetry, lessors control over outgoings 
and unfair conditions imposed on the sale of business.514 
At the time of the hearing of the Reid Committee the issues referred to 
above were causing a great deal of concern not only for lessees but for 
lessors. The Committee concluded from the fact that these issues were still 
prevalent that retail lease legislation to that time had not been effective515 
although there had been some result in increasing the bargaining position of 
lessees such as the minimum five (5) year lease terms and low cost dispute 
resolution mechanisms such as mediation or low cost retail lease tribunals. 
                                                             
511 Ibid, 23. 
512 Ibid, 22. 
513 Ibid, 23 and 55. 
514 Ibid, 40. 
515 Ibid, 23. 
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Problems which had existed prior to the retail lease legislation still existed 
and had not been remedied by that legislation. 
Reasons for the failure of retail lease legislation, as identified by the Reid 
Committee were: - 
(i) A recession in Australia in the early 1990’s which led to a downturn in 
business for both lessors and lessees;516 
(ii) Subsequently lessors sought to maximise their return on investment by 
taking every opportunity to increase revenue at the expense of lessees;517 
(iii)Disparity in bargaining strength between lessors and lessees which was 
identified in the early inquiries and which was never properly dealt with.  
Specifically, the problem of the sitting tenant had never been addressed518 
such that the lessee at the end of the lease remained an “economic captive” 
of the lessor.519 
Additionally, the bargaining power of the lessor allowed it to adjust the terms 
of the lease depending on whether the lessee was a small speciality lessee 
or a large anchor tenant. Normally, anchor lessees are offered leases with 
turnover rent where there is no minimum rent to be paid so that as turnover 
decreases so does the anchor tenants rent.520 In contrast, smaller lessees 
who have turnover clauses in their lease have a minimum rental provision 
such that the rent can never reduce below a certain amount. The obligation 
for a lessee to pay turnover rent on top of a minimum amount where that 
                                                             
516 Ibid, 20. 
517 Ibid. 
518 Ibid, 23. 
519 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 102. 
520 Reid Report 1997, 49. 
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minimum is in fact market rent was the subject of criticism in the early 
inquiries521 and may in fact be unconscionable.522 By paying an amount 
above market rental the lessor is in effect sharing in the good will of the 
business itself.523 
(iv) The inability of lessees to have their disputes dealt with outside of the 
formal court system in order to limit legal costs.  Litigation through the courts 
was too expensive and took too long.  In addition, if the lessor had rights of 
appeal then the matter could be protracted and the lessor would win the 
case by attrition;524 
(v) Retail leasing legislation was not drafted well enough to prevent lessors 
from exploiting loop holes.  For example, lessees being put on temporary 
leases that were not subject to retail lease legislation.525 
(vi) Retail leasing legislation was not drafted well enough to protect lessees 
from themselves. For example, legislation giving a lessee a right (such as a 
right to a minimum 5 year lease term) which could be waived by the lessee 
would result in the lessor advising that they will not provide a lease to the 
lessee unless the lessee waives that right thereby rendering that legislation 
worthless.526 
(vii) Unavailability of rental information to lessees thereby increasing the 
information asymmetry at time of lease renewal and rent negotiation.527 
 
                                                             
521 Cooper Report 1981, 24. 
522 Webb E, “Unconscionable Conduct and the Retail Shop Wars – The Lessees Strike Back” (2000) 8 
Australian Property Law Journal, 12. 
523 Cooper Report 1981, 24. 
524 Ibid, 27. 
525 Ibid, 32. 
526 Ibid. 
527 Ibid, 47. 
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As a result of the Reid Report the Federal Government enacted legislation 
to: - 
(i) Protect small businesses against unconscionable conduct by the 
enactment of Section 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) in July 
1998.  The Federal Government rejected the recommendation that it prohibit 
unfair conduct adopting instead unconscionable conduct which is a higher 
standard than unfair conduct;528 
(ii) Allow Industry–Designed codes of practice to be legally underpinned 
and to be made mandatory under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and 
also enforced by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. 
The subsequent 1999 report of the Joint Select Committee on the Retailing 
Sector proposed the drafting of a retail industry code of conduct by the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.529 No such industry 
code was implemented, however, as the Federal Government disagreed with 
such a proposal preferring self-regulation;530 and 
(iii) Allowing the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to 
take representative actions on behalf of small businesses for misuse of 
market power. Representative actions by the ACCC in the retail leasing area 
have been scarce probably because such proceedings are difficult and 
expensive to run and the ACCC has limited financial resources.531 Such an 
                                                             
528 Webb E, “Almost a Decade On – A (Reid) Report Card on Retail Leasing” (2006) 13 Australian 
Property Law Journal 240, 242. 
529 Joint Select Committee on the Retailing Sector, Parliament of Australia, Fair Market or Market 
Failure, A Review of Australia’s Retailing Sector, August 1999, Recommendation 5. 
530 Webb E, “Almost a Decade On – A (Reid) Report Card on Retail Leasing” (2006) 13 Australian 
Property Law Journal 240, 244. 
531 Associate Professor Frank Zumbo, Submission No 20 to Senate Economics Committee, 
Parliament of Australia,  Inquiry into the Provisions of the Trade Practices Amendment (Small 
Business Protection) Bill 2007, 5 September 2007, 2. 
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action was however successfully completed in ACCC v Dukemaster532 which 
is the first finding by the Federal Court of unconscionable conduct by a 
lessor for the purposes of s51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The 
ability of the ACCC to bring representative actions on behalf of multiple 
lessees is important as current retail lease legislation does not appear to 
allow lessees to bring their own representative or class action against a 
common lessor through a low cost tribunal and instead any such proceeding 
must be taken only through the Federal Court.533  
(b) Conclusions 
The Reid Report makes it very clear that as of 1997 there were still 
substantial areas of dispute between lessors and lessees. Numerous 
complaints were received regarding the conduct of lessors in seeking to 
maximise their return from their investment by taking every opportunity to 
wring the last dollar from lessees. Issues surrounding security of tenure had 
not been solved by existing legislation and the sitting tenant534 problem 
remained.  
Although the Reid Inquiry found that there had been some headway made in 
relation to giving lessees more bargaining power because of the low cost 
dispute resolution procedures and 5 year minimum lease terms granted in 
most state legislation there had otherwise been little gain.  Criticism may be 
levelled against the Reid Inquiry for their emotive view of the lessee-lessor 
relationship nevertheless at the time of the report New South Wales had 
enacted retail lease legislation and both Queensland and South Australia 
                                                             
532 [2009] ATPR 42-290. 
533 W D Duncan and S Christensen, “Safety in Numbers? Not Really; Limits of Joint Action by Retail 
Lessees against a Common Lessor” (2001) 8 Australian Property Law Journal 1, 14. 
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had repealed and replaced their previous legislation.  Such changes 
obviously had had little effect in improving the lot of lessees.   
Despite legislation restricting the bases for a lessor in refusing consent to 
assignment, lessors and their managing agents were still able to act unfairly 
or unreasonably. 535 Similarly, the Reid Inquiry found that there were 
ongoing problems with rent review provisions and in particular that lack of 
access to information by valuers skewed any market rent review536 and that 
secrecy clauses in leases in relation to rental made it difficult for a lessee to 
properly negotiate the terms of their lease.537 The existence of secrecy or 
confidentiality clauses in leases prohibiting a lessee form disclosing the rent 
they pay for their premises may result in a finding that a lessor has acted 
unconscionably where the rent paid by a particular lessee is exorbitant or 
much more than other lessees within the same complex are paying.538 
 
4.3 Industry Wide Standard. 
The 1990 report of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Industry Science and Technology (“Beddall Committee”) considered the 
situation regarding shopping centre leases and found there was a disparity in 
bargaining power between lessees and lessors which could result in the 
lessor abusing its position including imposing unfair conditions in the lease. 
The Beddall Committee suggested that there should be an Industry wide 
standard from which negotiations could begin to protect the rights of both 
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lessors and lessees539 however the terms of that industry wide standard 
were not stated by the Beddall Committee. The suggestion of an “industry 
wide standard” is a suggestion repeated in the federal inquiries that were to 
follow. For example, the Reid Committee would recommend a uniform 
tenancy code which would draw together all the effective elements of 
existing State and Territory legislation.540  The Productivity Commission 
recommended that the more prescriptive elements of retail lease legislation 
be removed and that there only be a voluntary code of conduct which would:  
…include provisions for standards of fair trading, standards of transparency, 
lodgement of leases, information provision and dispute resolution; and avoid 
intrusions on normal commercial decision making in matters such as minimum lease 
terms, rent levels, and availability of a new lease.541 
 
So far there has been no industry wide standard nor any national code, 
voluntary or otherwise.  The benefits of such a document to multi-
jurisdictional lessors or lessees is obvious, in that, the obligation of such 
parties to be able to deal with different legislation in each Australian 
jurisdiction would disappear.  This would only be achieved where such 
national code or standard was not merely an overlay of ongoing state 
legislation.542 
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4.4 Assignment 
(a) Initial Complaints 
Prior to the enactment of retail leasing legislation lessees complained of the 
problems caused by lessors in providing consent to an assignment of 
lease.543 A lessee, in order to realise the good will of its business, must sell 
the business and assign the lease to the buyer as the goodwill of the 
business is intrinsically bound to its location. Frustration of the assignment of 
the lease will result in frustration of the sale of the business itself thereby 
causing economic harm to the lessee.  
Ongoing issues in relation to assignment of leases revolved around the 
inability of lessees to have a lessor’s refusal to consent to an assignment of 
lease reviewed quickly and cheaply, the delay of lessors in responding to 
requests for consent to assignment,544 onerous conditions imposed as part 
of the lessor’s consent to assignment and the ongoing liability of lessees 
after the lease had been assigned to new lessees.  It is proposed to consider 
each of these complaints. 
 
(b) Remedies 
Current retail lease legislation controls most of the assignment process 
including review of the lessor’s refusal to consent to assignment and any 
delay in responding to such a request. 
(i) Lessors Refusal to Consent to Assignment. 
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As part of determining whether to consent to a request from a lessee for the 
lessor to consent to an assignment of a lease, a lessor may request 
information reasonably required to make a commercial decision (such as 
proposals by the assignee to change the use of the premises545 or details as 
to the lessees financial or business standing)546 and as a result of that 
information the lessor may determine to refuse their consent to an 
assignment or sub-letting for relevant grounds. Current retail lease 
legislation provisions provide that the lessor may not unreasonably withhold 
consent to an assignment.547 A breach of these provisions gives the lessee 
the right to claim compensation from the lessor. 
 
(ii) Limitation on Lessors Discretion to Refuse Consent. 
The Reid Committee believed that a fair balance between lessors and 
lessees could be achieved by legislative guidance as to what circumstances 
would allow the lessor to refuse consent.548 Legislation in multiple Australian 
jurisdictions549 now provide that the lessor is only entitled to withhold consent 
in limited circumstances such as: - 
1. Where the assignee proposes a change of use;550 
                                                             
545 Ibid. 
546 W Duncan, “The Regulation of Commercial Tenancies – Heading for the Sunset”, (1990) 2 Bond 
Law Review, 34. 
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2. Where the assignees financial resources or retailing skills is 
inferior to the existing lessee; 
3. Relevant leasing procedures have not been complied with; 
4. The proposed assignee does not enter into a written agreement 
with the lessor;551 or 
5. The existing lessee has not provided sufficient disclosure to the 
assignee.552 
 
The difficulty with such highly prescriptive regulation is that by prescribing 
what factual conditions must exist for the lessor to be allowed to refuse to 
consent, other grounds for refusal of consent are excluded even when such 
grounds for consent may be reasonable. 
 
Additionally, the ability of a lessor to refuse consent where the assignee has 
financial resources or retailing skills inferior to the existing lessee is deficient 
as it allows a lessor to form a subjective opinion regarding the assignee.  
The lessor may arbitrarily decide that an assignee has retailing skills inferior 
to the existing lessee.553 
 
(iii) Review of Lessors Decision to Refuse Consent to Assignment 
Where the lessors consent was refused there was, prior to retail leasing 
legislation, no simple low cost mechanism to give to the lessee a remedy 
where the lessor’s reasons for refusal are, according to the lessee, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Leases Act 1995 (SA) s43; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW)  s39; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 
2001(ACT) s100. 
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unreasonable or a condition imposed upon assignment or sub-lease was 
unjust.554 Any such remedy had to be pursued through the traditional courts 
system. 
 
Current retail lease legislation provides that where the lessee has given the 
lessor full particulars of a proposed assignment and the lessor has refused 
consent then such refusal may be referred, after mediation is attempted or 
considered, for resolution to a tribunal555 or court.556  
The availability of low costs dispute resolution is perhaps one of the success 
stories of retail lease legislation in Australia as it allows the lessee to have 
the lessor’s decision regarding refusal of consent reviewed quickly and 
cheaply. The question of the speed of such resolution is also highly relevant 
where the lessee has a contract for the sale of its business dependent upon 
the lessor’s consent to assignment. 
 
(iv) Onerous Conditions Imposed as Part of Lessors Consent. 
In Queensland, legislation557 provides that a retail tenancy dispute exists 
where a lessor, in granting consent to an assignment imposes on the 
assignee an obligation not imposed on the lessee, or seeks to remove a right 
                                                             
554 Department of Justice and Industrial Relations (Tas), Review of the Fair Trading (Code of Practice 
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from the assignee conferred on the lessee. Such a provision appears to be 
unnecessary as such rights exist already at common law.558 
 
(v) Lessors Delay in Providing or Refusing Consent. 
Where the lessor delays in providing a response to a request for consent to 
an assignment of lease current retail lease legislation provides that a retail 
tenancy dispute arises that may be referred to a tribunal for determination559 
or that after a certain period the lessor shall be deemed to have consented 
to the assignment.560 Where consent is deemed to be granted there is 
however no guidance regarding on what terms the assignment is granted 
and the lessee is uncertain as to such matters until the lessee applies to the 
courts or tribunal for a determination.561   
 
(vi) Release of Lessee from Liability Upon Assignment. 
Prior to retail lease legislation, lessees complained that upon assignment of 
their lease they remained liable under the lease and if the incoming lessee 
was to default that they could be sued as a result of such default.  Current 
retail lease legislation now provides that the liability of outgoing lessees is, 
subject to complying with certain disclosure requirements, extinguished upon 
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assignment.562  In South Australia however such liability is only extinguished 
on the earliest of the following dates: - 
1. 2 years after assignment; 
2. The date the lease expires; or 
3. The date the lease is renewed or extended after assignment.563 
 
Privity of contract meant that the lessors and lessees interests to a certain 
extent were aligned as the existing lessee had a financial interest in ensuring 
that a lessor received a good new lessee. The lessee would therefore have 
to make their own assessment as to the suitability of the incoming lessee 
before presenting them to the lessor for approval.  
The removal of ongoing liability of outgoing lessees has the ability to 
damage the retail leasing market as without privity of contract the outgoing 
lessee has no incentive to choose an assignee who will be likely to be a 
good ongoing lessee.  The outgoing lessee will therefore choose a potential 
buyer simply based upon how much the buyer is willing to pay. This mis-
alignment of the lessors and lessee’s interests will result in lessors being 
warier about incoming lessees and more reluctant to consent to 
assignments.564   
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In the United Kingdom where original lessee liability has also been 
removed565 lessors are still able to require that the outgoing lessee 
guarantee the performance of the incoming lessee by requiring the existing 
lessee (and the existing lessee’s guarantor)566  to guarantee the 
performance of the incoming lessee.567 
Providing for a lessee to be released from liability upon assignment and then 
allowing lessors to demand that the outgoing lessee guarantees the 
performance of the incoming lessee seems pointless.  Allowing lessees, 
however, to simply walk away from their contractual obligations after 
saddling the lessor with an optimistic lessee who has paid too much to the 
outgoing lessee for the business does not seem fair to the lessors. A fairer 
solution would appear to be a provision whereby the outgoing lessor’s 
liability is not wholly extinguished but merely reduced such that the outgoing 
lessee still has an interest in ensuring that the incoming lessee is suitable. 
 
(c) Conclusions 
 
Retail lease provisions that provide that the lessors consent to an 
assignment must not be withheld are redundant as similar provisions appear 
in pre-existing legislation.  Similarly, a provision that a lessor must not, as 
part of the lessor’s consent to an assignment impose conditions on or 
remove benefits from the incoming lessee are also redundant as the courts 
have already determined that such a practice amounts to unreasonably 
withholding consent.  
                                                             
565 Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 (UK) s5.  
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Providing for deemed consent where the lessor takes too long opens up 
other problems such as lack of documentation evidencing such deemed 
consent. 
 
Releasing a lessee upon assignment of a lease from any further liability 
under the lease will result in lessors being more suspicious regarding any 
incoming lessee and more likely to refuse consent. 
 
Prescribing the grounds upon which the lessor may refuse consent seems 
unfair to lessors. The ability to have the lessor’s decision reviewed through 
low cost tribunals, however, is reasonable and is an effective tool for the 
lessee. 
 
4.5 Lack of Security of Tenure 
(a) Initial Complaints 
Prior to the enactment of retail leasing legislation lessee’s problems with lack 
of security of tenure were: - 
(i) a lease of short duration would not allow them sufficient time to 
amortise capital outlays such as fitout costs;568 
(ii) a lessee could not afford to lose its lease and move its business as it 
would also lose any site goodwill developed during the trading period.  This 
meant that the lessee was at the lessor’s mercy in relation to negotiation of a 
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rental for a new lease period569 or alternatively the lessor could deny a new 
lease and effectively acquire the lessee’s goodwill for nothing by opening the 
same type of business570 
(iii) without security of tenure a lessee could not obtain the reward for its 
efforts in establishing the business and operating the business through its 
early years.571 Such rewards could either be the ongoing enjoyment of a 
successful business or the ability to sell a successful business to a 
purchaser. Any such purchaser would of course consider the amount of time 
left on a lease term before agreeing to purchase a business.  
 
Lessors objected to the automatic renewal of leases because such 
automatic renewal gave the lessee’s a tenancy at will, thereby negating the 
certainty of the lease572 and that lessors must be able to change lessee mix 
to suit customer demand573 and it was unreasonable to expect the lessors to 
be forced to accept a lessee who was having a detrimental effect upon the 
shopping centre or other lessees574 
 
(b) Remedies 
The Clark Committee believed that in the absence of good reasons for 
refusing a renewal that a satisfactory sitting tenant should enjoy some prior 
claim to remain575 and that in this regard two remedies were available: - 
(i) That the lessee have first right of refusal to renew the lease; and 
                                                             
569 Preece A, Legislative Regulation of Leases of Business Premises (1985) 1 QIT Law Journal, 140. 
570 ACT Report 1984, 211.  
571 Ibid, 46.  
572 Ibid, 214.  
573 Ibid, 216.  
574 Ibid, 216.  
575 Clark Report 1984, 27. 
162 
 
(ii) That a lessor refusing to renew a lease would have to justify such a 
refusal before an Arbitrator and that such refusal must be on prescribed 
grounds such as structure alterations, the existing lessee failing to comply 
with the lease provisions or that the premises were reasonably required for 
the lessor’s purposes.576 
In order to satisfy the complaints raised by lessee’s legislation has been 
enacted in every jurisdiction of Australia which provides as follows: - 
(i) Term of the lease must be at least five (5) years.577  
A five year minimum lease term is now common throughout all Australian 
jurisdictions except Queensland. A five-year minimum lease term was 
originally contained in the Retail Shop Leases Act 1984 (Qld),578 however, 
such a provision was subsequently removed because: - 
…such a provision would be too prescriptive and would not necessarily advantage all 
tenants. In fact, many tenants prefer to negotiate shorter lease terms, depending on 
the circumstances of the retail shopping centre, their own personal situation or their 
assessment of the market opportunities available to them.579 
 
The section was flawed in any event as it provided that the right to a five-
year lease did not apply where the lease was a sublease which meant that a 
shopping centre lessor could escape the effect of the clause by subleasing 
the entire centre to a nominee corporation.580 
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The minimum lease term of five (5) years does not apply if the lessee 
obtained a certificate from a Government Official (such as a Small Business 
Commissioner),581 or from the lessee’s solicitor verifying that legal advice 
has been given to the lessee about the effect of a reduced lease period.582 
Alternatively, a lessee could obtain an order from a Tribunal that the 
minimum lease term does not apply.583 
 
The advantage of a minimum lease term is that its application is simple.  
Lessors are required to provide such a minimum term in their lease and if 
they fail to do so such a term is implied into the lease.  The problems with a 
minimum lease term are: - 
1. The minimum term is an arbitrary period and may or may not allow the 
lessee to effectively amortise the costs of fitout;584 
2. A five year term may not be sufficient to allow a lessee to realise its 
goodwill upon the sale of the business if the remaining lease term is 
insufficient to attract a buyer. The lessee therefore is still at the mercy of the 
lessor as the lessor can determine whether or not to grant an extension of 
the lease.585 
3.  A finite term (of any duration) does not solve the “captive tenant” 
problem at the end of the lease term in that the lessor may demand 
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whatever rent or other conditions the lessor wishes if the lessee wishes to 
remain in the premises.586 The provision of a five-year minimum lease term 
is a: - 
‘poor substitute for the far greater security of tenure required by tenants 
who may build up their businesses over a total term of five years and 
then be at the mercy of their landlords.’ 587 
 
(ii)  Lessors Notice of Intention 
Section 46AA of the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) provides that if there 
is no option for renewal in a lease, the lessor must, by written notice, offer 
the lessee an extension of the lease on terms as stated in the notice or tell 
the lessee that the lessor does not intend to renew the lease.  Other 
jurisdictions have similar provisions, however, such other jurisdictions also 
have minimum lease terms588 
The notice must be given: 
(i) Between three (3) months and six (6) months before the lease expires 
for a lease term of not more than one (1) year or; 
(ii) Between six (6) months and one (1) year before the lease expires for a 
lease term of more than one (1) year.589 
If the lessor fails to give the notice, the lease term is extended until six (6) 
months after the notice is given. 
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On the face of it, it would appear that the provision causes a reduction in the 
lessor’s bargaining power in that the lessor is required to notify the lessee at 
a prescribed time as to whether or not the lease will be renewed.  The 
perceived benefit to the lessee is that the lessee will have certainty as to 
whether or not the lease will be extended and then can start making plans 
accordingly to either remain or to move.   
The bargaining power lost by the lessor is the ability to keep the lessee “on 
the hook” while the lessor negotiates with other potential lessees resulting in 
the lessee and the potential lessees entering into a bidding war by agreeing 
to a greater rental for the premises.590 
In reality, the section provides no disruption to the lessor’s power in that 
there is nothing in the legislation to prevent a lessor from giving a notice to a 
lessee that the lessor does not intend to extend the term of the lease eleven 
(11) months before the conclusion of the lease term and then to later notify 
the lessee that the lessor is willing to contemplate an extension of the lease.  
As a result of this process, the lessor is able to maintain its bargaining power 
as there is no real effect on the bargaining positions of the parties. In 
addition, as part of market forces negotiations between the parties in the 
final year of a lease would occur in any event.591 From a cost perspective 
however the parties have had to comply with meaningless legislation. 
 
(iii) Request to Advise 
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In the last twelve (12) months of a lease term the lessee may request the 
lessor to advise whether or not the lessor proposes to renew the lease and 
the lessor must provide a response within thirty (30) days.592 
There is only a marginal benefit to a lessee in making such a request in that 
although the lessee may become aware of the lessors plans earlier than at 
the end of the lease itself however a prudent lessee would approach a lessor 
about possible renewals in any event.  To legislate for such an event to 
occur is unnecessary.593 
 
(iv) Reminder to Exercise Option. 
Lessors are now required to remind lessees as to when their option to renew 
a lease shall expire.594 The purpose of such a provision is to protect the 
lessee where the lessee fails to or incorrectly exercises its option to 
renew. 595 This shifting of onus from the lessee to the lessor significantly 
increases the lessees bargaining power.596 
Although it may be thought that the lessee should take responsibility for its 
own options to renew a lease the provisions are appropriate because: - 
1. The loss of an option by a lessee through inadvertence would be 
devastating to the lessee and its business; 
                                                             
592 Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s13B;  Leases (Commercial and 
Retail) Act 2001(ACT), s107. 
593 Commercial and Property Law Research Centre, Queensland University of Technology, 
Submission No 12 to Senate Economics Reference Committee, Need for a National Approach to 
Retail Leasing Arrangements, 18 March 2015, 18. 
594 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic), s28; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 
(WA), s13C; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s46. 
595 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 2011, 144, Troy Buswell, 
Minister for Commerce, Second Reading Speech of Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements 
Amendments Bill 2011.  
596 R Loiacono, The Effect of Amendments to the Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements 
Acts Act 1985 on the Balance of Power between Landlords and Tenants, (2013) 22 Australian 
Property Law Journal 134. 
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2. The lessor, who is likely to be a leasing professional, is more likely to 
have appreciated the value of such option and diarised the exercise of option 
dates; and 
3. The lessor, in agreeing to the option to renew in the first place, loses 
nothing in making sure that the lessee is aware of its rights. 
 
(v) Preferential Rights 
In South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory an existing lessee of a 
shopping centre has a preferential right to extend the term of the lease 
except where the lease contains an exclusionary clause (Lawyer’s 
Certificate). Such preferential right will also not be given where the lessor 
requires a change in tenancy mix, the lessee is guilty of substantial or 
persistent breach of the lease, the lessor requires vacant possession for the 
purpose of demolition etc., the lessor does not propose to re-let the premises 
within six (6) months from end of lease term, or renewal of the lease would 
substantially disadvantage the lessor;597 
If a lessee in a Shopping Centre does not have a right of preference the 
lessor, must at least six (6) months but not twelve (12) months before the 
end of the lease notifies the lessee of this fact and state why there is no right 
of preference.598 
 
In theory the provision of a preferential right to renew granted to an existing 
lessee would appear to give a significant advantage to such a lessee.  In 
                                                             
597 Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s20D; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 
2001(ACT), s108. 
598 Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s20F. 
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practice however, the current legislation in both South Australia and the 
Australian Capital Territory provide illusory rights in that the lessor has many 
methods available in which to avoid such provisions.  In particular, the lessor 
is able to inform a lessee that the lessor will not grant the initial lease to the 
lessee unless the lessee provides a Solicitors Certificate which will exclude 
the preferential rights.599 
 
Even if the preferential rights provisions were made mandatory, (i.e.; that 
they could not be excluded) difficulties would remain as: - 
(i) Government intervention reduces the parties’ ability to negotiate a 
mutually beneficial outcome;  
(ii) Additional regulation to enhance security of tenure for lessees create 
additional complexity and frustrates negotiations; 
(iii) Limiting rent increases on a subsequent lease would reduce the 
efficient operation of the market by maintaining underperforming lessees; 
and 
(iv) Preferential right provisions would cause inefficiencies in the market 
that would raise costs for lessors and lessees and lower benefits to 
consumers and constrain the efficient operation of the market through 
reduced flexibility in allocating retail space to its best possible use.600 
(c) Conclusion 
Legislation which requires the lessor or the lessee to negotiate with the other 
party are redundant as normal market forces would result in the parties 
                                                             
599 Senate Economics Reference Committee, Need for a National Approach to Retail Leasing 
Arrangements, 18 March 2015, 18.  
600 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 124-125. 
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carrying out such negotiations in any event.  Regulations therefore that 
require the lessee to request details of the lessor’s intention or where the 
lessor is required to advise the lessee of its intention are unnecessary.  
Minimum lease terms are also ineffective in that they provide only arbitrary 
lease periods and although may partially solve the problem of the Lessee 
being unable to amortise its fit-out costs such minimum lease terms do not 
solve the other problems which is that the Lessee wishes to be able to sell 
its business for a profit and will be unable to do so unless the incoming 
lessee receives an additional lease term and also the problem at end of 
lease where the lessee is completely at the mercy of the lessor.  
Additionally, the imposition of legislation in relation to minimum lease terms 
has resulted in such minimum lease terms becoming the standard lease 
term granted by lessors.601 
A minimum lease term of five (5) years would only be effective where the 
lessee’s business is such that where the lessee intends that there be no 
goodwill attached to the business.  
Preferential rights of renewal in their current form in South Australia and 
Australian Capital Territory are flawed in that they contain multiple ways for a 
lessor to escape the operation of those provisions.  If those provisions were 
to be made mandatory however they would have a significant effect upon the 
efficiency of the market and would result in additional costs to lessors, 
lessees and customers.  
 
 
                                                             
601 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 100. 
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4.6 Disclosure 
(a) Initial Complaints 
Prior to retail leasing legislation complaints by lessees about lack of 
disclosure were: - 
(i) Lessors or their agents would provide false or exaggerated 
information602  to a potential lessee about the likely prospects of the 
business the lessee intended to operate or about the prospects of the 
shopping centre generally;603 
(ii) Information about the lessor’s future intentions for the shopping centre 
was not disclosed to the lessee;604 
(iii) An information asymmetry existed between the lessor and lessee in 
that the lessor had a lot of information about the shopping centre and the 
premises generally whereas the lessee had virtually nothing.  Where the 
lessor commonly used turnover rent clause the lessor also knew what rents 
were being paid by other lessees in the shopping centre. 
(iv) Lessees were often not provided with a copy of the lease until after 
they had taken possession.605 If they were given copies of a draft lease they 
did not have sufficient time to peruse it.606 
 
(b) Remedies initially proposed to solve these problems included lessee 
education so that they could understand the lease and their obligations 607 
and that lessees be provided with a draft lease before becoming bound as 
                                                             
602 Arnold Report 1984, 20. 
603 Cooper Report 1981, 5; Arnold Report 1984, 20. 
604 Arnold Report 1984, 2. 
605 Small Business Development Corporation (Qld),  Leases by Small Tenants in Shopping Centres 
referred to in Cooper Report 1981, Appendix 2; Cooper Report 1981, 32. 
606 Arnold Report 1984, 21. 
607 ACT Report 1984, 19; Hill Report 1983 (referred to in ACT Report 1984. 64). 
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well as a disclosure statement to include a summary of the lease as well as 
future proposals for building works and tenant mix and a warning statement 
to obtain legal and financial advice.608 
 
Legislation in all Australian jurisdictions now makes provision for disclosure 
as follows: - 
(i) The lessor must provide the lessee with a copy of a proposed lease 
during the negotiation phase;609 
(ii) The lessor must provide a lessee with a disclosure statement 
commonly 7 days before a lease commences;610 
(iii) The lessee may terminate the lease (commonly within 6 months from 
commencement of lease) if the disclosure statement is incomplete or has 
false or misleading information;611 
(iv) The lessee must provide a disclosure statement to the lessor prior to 
the start of the lease;612 
                                                             
608 Cooper Report 1981, 33; Arnold Report 1984, 20. 
609 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic), s15; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985  
(WA), s6; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001(ACT), s28; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 
2003 (NT), s17; Fair Trading (Code of Practice) Retail Tenancies Regulations 1998 (Tas), s5; Retail 
Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), s22; Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA), s11; Retail Leases Act 
1994 (NSW), s9. 
610 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic), s17; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985  
(WA), s6; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001(ACT), s30; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 
2003 (NT), s19; Fair Trading (Code of Practice) Retail Tenancies Regulations 1998 (Tas), s6; Retail 
Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), s22; Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA), s12; Retail Leases Act 
1994 (NSW), s11. 
611Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic), s17; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985  
(WA), s6; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT), s20; Fair Trading (Code of Practice) Retail 
Tenancies Regulations 1998 (Tas), s7; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), s22; Retail and Commercial 
Leases Act 1995 (SA), s12; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW), s11.  
612Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT), s21; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), s22A; 
Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW), s11A. 
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(v) The lessee may seek compensation for pre-lease 
misrepresentations.613 In New South Wales, the misrepresentation must be 
made with the knowledge that it was false and misleading.614  
 
Despite the existence of retail leasing legislation and the obligation to 
provide disclosure statements and copies of proposed leases to a lessee, 
problems with disclosure issues continued to arise615 resulting in further 
tinkering with the legislation. For example: -   
(i) Compensation for Misrepresentations 
In Queensland significant amendments occurred in 2006616 after the 
appointment of an Industry working group.617 These amendments provided, 
amongst other things, for new compensation provisions because of false or 
misleading information contained in Disclosure Statements;618 
(ii) Termination Periods 
Under existing legislation, if the lessor did not provide a disclosure statement 
at least 7 days before entering into the lease, or if it contained false or 
misleading information, the lessee could terminate the lease within sixty 
days after the lease was entered into. Subsequently that termination period 
was expanded to 6 months as lessees often did not receive the disclosure 
                                                             
613 Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985  (WA), s6; Leases (Commercial and 
Retail) Act 2001(ACT), s37; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT), s18; Fair Trading (Code 
of Practice) Retail Tenancies Regulations 1998 (Tas), s5; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), s43; 
Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA), s12; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW), s10. 
614 Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW), s10(1). 
615 Reid Report 1997, [2.27]; Joint Select Committee on the Retailing Sector, Parliament of 
Australia, Fair Market or Market Failure, A Review of Australia’s Retailing Sector, August 1999, 
Recommendation 7. 
616 Retail Shop Leases Amendment Act 2006 (Qld). 
617 W Dixon, 2006 Amendments to 1994 Retail Shop Leases Act, 27 Queensland Lawyer 2006, 5. 
618 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), s 43A. 
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statement until after the sixty-day period had expired.619  Such a proposal 
seems unfair as a lessor could lose its lease simply because of an oversight 
by the lessor in circumstances where the lessee may have simply changed 
its mind about the lease. Rather than allowing the lessee to terminate the 
agreement a better course would appear to be to have the lessee’s 
obligations to pay rent suspended until the lessor has complied with its 
disclosure obligations. 
 
(iii)    Additional Information 
The amount of information required to be disclosed and the types of 
disclosure increased. For example, disclosure statements were required to 
include: - 
1. Details on the deadlines and method for exercise of any option to 
renew the lease; 
2. Specification of costs borne by the lessor and those to be borne by the 
lessee; 
3. Identification of the location of common areas and kiosks on a floor 
plan to be attached to the disclosure statement; 
4. Details of any proposed changes to the current lessee mix; and 
5. Details as to whether the premises met all current zoning requirements 
for the proposed use. 
                                                             
619 Findlaw, Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act Review (25 November 2015) 
<http://www.findlaw.com.au/articles/1587/commercial-tenancy-retail-shops-agreements-act-
rev.aspx>. 
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6. A marketing plan detailing the lessor’s proposed 
advertising/promotional expenditure;620 
7. Details of any current or previous arrears/breaches and rent abatement 
in favour of the assignor. 
 
(iv) The circumstances when disclosure was to be provided also increased 
for example: - 
1. An obligation for the lessor to give any proposed assignee the original 
disclosure statement and a copy of the lease;621 
2. An obligation for the lessee to give a disclosure statement to the lessor 
at lease commencement and another disclosure statement to any potential 
assignee; 
3. Additional lessor disclosure on renewal of an existing lease under an 
option;622 
4. A potential assignee who is not a major lessee may waive or shorten 
the disclosure period by giving the lessor written notice of such waiver and 
legal and financial advice reports; 
5. A franchisor must give to a franchisee a copy of any disclosure 
statement provided to the franchisor by the lessor and any changes which 
the franchisor could be expected to be aware of that effects that information 
contained in the disclosure statement;623 
                                                             
620 Ibid, 5. 
621 Findlaw, Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act Review (WA) (25 November 2015) 
<http://www.findlaw.com.au/articles/1587/commercial-tenancy-retail-shops-agreements-act-
rev.aspx>. 
622 Department of Justice and Attorney General (Qld), Report on Statutory Review of the Retail 
Shop Leases Act 1994, November 2014, 6. 
623 Ibid, Attachment 3, Part 2, 7. 
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6. Amending the required Legal Advice report to provide that the lawyer 
has given advice about requirements in the lease for indemnification of the 
lessor and brought to the lessee’s attention the need to obtain advice from 
an Insurance Broker about the lessee’s insurance obligations.  
 
(c) Despite legislative efforts information gaps continued to plague the 
leasing relationship widening the information asymmetry between lessors 
and lessee.624  Attempts to provide a lessee with information by way of 
disclosure documents had simply led to longer and more complicated 
documents which did not improve the lessee’s understanding of the lease.625 
 
Additional methods of disclosure were proposed such as the public 
disclosure of lease information by requiring mandatory registration of all 
leases626 in the Titles Office or by the establishment of a separate lease 
registry.627 A separate lease registry would allow a potential lessee to obtain 
information about potential lease sites and, more importantly, would allow 
valuers to obtain detailed information regarding leases which would allow 
them to carry out more effective valuations not only for lessors and lessees 
but also for lenders and potential purchasers of the lessee’s business or the 
                                                             
624 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), xxx; Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian 
Retail Industry (December 2011), 262. 
625 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 157. 
626 Ibid, 175. 
627 Department of State and Regional Development (NSW),” Discussion Paper on Issues Affecting 
the Retail Leasing Industry in NSW”, April 2008, 10; Senate Economics Reference Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Need for a National Approach to Retail Leasing Arrangements, 18th March 
2015, 22. 
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lessors building.628 The proposal for a separate lease information registry 
was heavily resisted by lessors629 although mandatory registration of leases 
was not opposed.630 
 
Even though leases could currently be registered at the Titles Office, 
registration of leases will not be effective as an information tool as the lease 
documents fail to include any incentive agreements and are therefore 
misleading.631 Lessors do not object to mandatory registration of leases but 
do object to a dedicated registry of all lease information, as they wish to 
conceal information regarding side deals.  A separate lease register where 
all lease information would be recorded632 would be difficult to enforce and 
give rise to onerous prescriptive requirements.633 It would involve an 
administrative burden to Government and a cost to lessors,634 however 
without access to information regarding incentive agreements or side deals 
market reviews may not reflect true market value.  
 
The issue of disclosure obviously remains a relevant topic between lessors 
and lessees. The proposed obligation upon a lessee/assignor635 to give 
details of rent abatement to a potential assignee is a partial solution of the 
                                                             
628 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), xxx. 
629 Shopping Centre Council of Australia, Submission in Response to the Discussion Paper on Issues 
Affecting the Retail Leasing Industry in NSW, May 2008, [3.4]. 
630 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia, Report No. 43 (31 
March 2008, 175. 
631 Ibid, 23. 
632 Ibid, 23. 
633 Law Society of New South Wales, Submission 9 to Productivity Commission, The Market for 
Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia, Report No. 43 (31 March 2008), 26. 
634 Ibid, 24. 
635 Department of Justice and Attorney General (Qld), Report on Statutory Review of the Retail 
Shop Leases Act 1994, November 2014, Attachment 3, Part 2, 7. 
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“Incentive Agreement” problem referred to previously; i.e. the terms of a 
lease document alone do not adequately set out the relationship between 
the lessor and lessee where any side agreements or incentive agreements 
are not disclosed.  Rent abatement, however, is only one way in which a 
lessor can provide an incentive to a lessee.  For example, the lessor may, 
instead of providing rent abatement choose to either pay for or carry out the 
fitout of the lessee’s premises.  The alteration would be more effectively 
drafted if the lessee / assignor was required to provide details to any 
assignee of any benefit provided to the lessee / assignor which is not 
referred to in the lease.  
Taking a broader view, if lessors were required to disclose all side deals then 
it is likely that side deals would cease to exist. Consider this scenario: - 
Lessee A is struggling because of a change of law in relation to his business.  
The lessor acknowledges that the lessee’s situation is not of the lessees 
fault and grants concessional rent for a 6-month period to allow the lessee to 
afford the expenditure required to comply with such new law. This 
agreement is documented in a side agreement containing a confidentiality 
clause.   
If the other lessees were to discover the terms of that side agreement, then 
they would demand similar concessions from the lessor.  If the lessor was 
required to disclose all side deals in a public registry, then it is likely that the 
lessor would simply not grant side deals so that the lessee would not have to 
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deal with suggestions of favouritism and possible disputes with other 
lessees.636 
  
 
4.7 Rent Reviews 
(a) Initial Complaints 
Prior to enactment of retail lease legislation problems identified in relation to 
rent review were as follows: - 
(i) A lack of transparency in rent reviews in that the lessor had much more 
information as to rent than the lessee.  Where the lessor employed turnover 
rent clauses, that information not only included the lessees own rent and 
turnover but also the rent and turnover of all other lessees within the 
shopping centre; 
(ii) The requirement of a lessee to provide turnover figures to the lessor.637 
Such rent review clauses were seen as an intrusion into the lessee’s 
business638 and gave the lessor a bargaining advantage.639 In addition, 
when using a turnover rent clause the lessor would fix the base rent at a 
market rent with the result that any extra amount paid above that, being a 
percentage of the lessee’s turnover, was not a method to provide the 
lessor’s market rent but was in fact a method to allow the lessor to share in 
the lessee’s profits;640 
                                                             
636 QUT Property Law and Research Centre, Submission No 12  to Senate Economics Reference 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Need for a National Approach to Retail Leasing Arrangements, 
18th March 2015, 12. 
637 Cooper Report 1981, 22. 
638 Clarke Report 1984, 11; Arnold Report 1983, 25, Cooper Report 1981, 4. 
639 Clarke Report 1984, 14. 
640 Cooper Report 1981, 24. 
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(iii) The use of “ratchet” clauses where by the lessor could determine the 
rent in the way most beneficial to the lessor;641 
(iv) Rent reviews were arbitrary and costly for a lessee;642 
(v) Delays in rent reviews were also a cause for concern as when the rent 
was finally reviewed the lessee could not afford to pay the retrospective 
amount due as from the review date.643 
 
Lessors countered the complaint by lessees by stating that too many 
restrictions placed upon the lessor’s right to control rental would cause a 
decline in real estate investment.644 
(b) Remedies 
Suggested solutions to the abovementioned problems were: - 
(i) That a Court have jurisdiction for an application by a lessee to review 
rent if it was harsh or unconscionable.645   The Productivity Commission also 
received submissions from lessees that rents and outgoings should be 
regulated, in particular, at time of renewal, however the Productivity 
Commission believed that rent regulation will result in an inefficient market 
and rent should remain the subject of commercial negotiation.646 A system of 
arbitration for the adjudication of fair rents was a radical interference with the 
rights of both lessor and lessee and inappropriate for commercial leases.647 
                                                             
641 ACT Report 1984, 30. 
642 ACT Report 1984, 25. 
643 Clarke Report 1984, 18. 
644 ACT Report 1984, 25. 
645 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 1986, 612 (Levy).  
646 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 142-143.  
647 Professor H Tarlo, “The Great Shop Lease Controversy” (1983) University of Queensland Law 
Journal 13 (1), 26. 
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(ii) If a turnover rent clause was to be used, then the percentage of 
turnover to be paid by the lessee should reduce as the turnover increased as 
a straight line method failed to take into account that gross profit can decline 
as sales and the cost of sales increased.648 
(iii) A reverse “ratchet” clause such that a lessee be offered at least two (2) 
alternative rent methods, to be chosen by the lessee, one of which shall be 
rent stated as a cost per square metre. The flaw with this method is that it 
would allow a lessor to offer to a lessee the rent alternative that the lessor 
preferred and another rent review method that was completely unacceptable 
to the lessee thereby effectively depriving the lessee of any freedom of 
choice.649 
(iv) The basis and/or formula for calculating rent reviews should be stated 
in the lease and if rent is to be adjusted to “market” there must be a provision 
for Arbitration if the lessor and lessee cannot agree.650 
(v) That the lease should not contain a provision that rent would not be 
reduced upon market review.651 
 
Solutions to the rent reviews problems adopted in various retail lease 
legislation throughout Australia were as follows: - 
(i) Limiting the arbitrary nature of rent reviews by requiring that the 
method and timing of such reviews be set out in the lease,652 limiting the 
                                                             
648 Cooper Report 1981, 25.  
649 Professor H Tarlo, “The Great Shop Lease Controversy” (1983) University of Queensland Law 
Journal 13 (1), 26. 
650 Queensland Joint Committee Report 1983, 4-5.  
651 Clarke Report 1984, 38; ACT Report 1984, 26. 
652 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s35; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001(ACT) s50; Business 
Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) s28(1); Fair Trading (Code of Practice) Retail Tenancies 
Regulations 1998 (Tas) s12; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994(Qld) s27. 
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amount of times a review may occur,653 specifying what matters could be 
taken into account or not in relation to market reviews654 or turnover rent 
clauses,655 and prescribing the method of rent review656 and rent review 
formulae.657  
(ii) Proscribing the use of ratchet clauses.658 A rent review provision is 
void to the extent that it reserves to a party a discretion as to which of two or 
more methods calculating a change of base rent is to apply.659 
(iii) Providing that a rent review clause that does not specify how the 
review is to be made is void and the rent, failing agreement, shall be 
determined by a Valuer appointed by a Government Body (In Victoria this is 
the Small Business Commissioner and in the Northern Territory this is the 
Commissioner of Business Tenancies).660 
                                                             
653 Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001(ACT) s47; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994(Qld) s27(2); 
Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s22; Fair Trading (Code of Practice) Retail Tenancies 
Regulations 1998 (Tas) s12(5); Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s47. 
654 Retail Leases Act 2003(Vic) s37; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) ss28, 29; Fair Trading (Code of 
Practice) Retail Tenancies Regulations 1998 (Tas) ss13,14; Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 
(SA) s23; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s11; Retail Leases Act 1994 
(NSW) s19(1); Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001(ACT) s52; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) 
Act 2003 (NT) s29(1)(c). 
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656 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s35(2); Retail Shop Leases Act 1994(Qld) s27(5); Fair Trading (Code 
of Practice) Retail Tenancies Regulations 1998 (Tas) s12(2); Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 
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658 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s35(3); Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s36A; Fair Trading (Code of 
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660 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) ss35(7) 35(a); Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) ss 
28(7), 28(8). 
182 
 
(iv) Limiting any delay of rent reviews.661 
 
(c) Conclusions 
Despite retail lease legislation, problems with rent reviews continue.  Lessors 
were still able to impose turnover rent clauses in leases which allowed them 
access to information about the lessee’s business which became useful to 
the lessor when it was time to re-negotiate rents or to make decisions about 
tenant mix and underperforming lessees. Although the purpose of a turnover 
rent clause is to set the lessors expectations for rental in line with the profit 
the lessee obtained from its business, in fact lessors often set turnover rent 
thresholds high such that turnover rent is never paid.  The lessor simply 
wishes to have access to information about the lessee’s business.662 
According to the Australian Retailers Association: - 
The figures are used to gouge additional rent out of a sitting tenant at the end of 
lease term based on the landlord’s knowledge of these figures and the vulnerability of 
an economic captive who has his investment, goodwill and livelihood tied up in the 
business at the end of the lease term.663  
 
The reality is that lessors require turnover information not only for rent review 
but also to effectively manage their shopping centre. Turnover information 
allows them to determine what lessees are underperforming, the 
performance of the centre as a whole and optimal lessee mix.664 
                                                             
661 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s35(5); Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) s28(5).  
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Rent review clauses remain inflexible.  For example, the introduction of a 
competitor into a shopping centre does not result in any reduction of rent in 
favour of the existing lessee.665 Rent reviews remain skewed666 because 
valuers are unable to access all information about leases within a centre.667 
 
 
4.8 Dispute Resolution 
(a) Initial Complaints 
Prior to Retail Leasing Legislation a common complaint of lessees was that if 
a dispute arose that the lessee could not afford legal representation668 and 
that such dispute resolution took too long.669 
 
(b) Remedies 
Various solutions were proposed by Inquiries over the years such as: - 
(i) that there be an arbitration clause inserted into every lease and that 
there be established an independent board to arbitrate on all grievances at 
no charge.670 
(ii) the creation of a Retail Tenancy Advisory Body to investigate legitimate 
complaints from either lessees or lessors. 671  
                                                             
665 Department of State and Regional Development (NSW),” Discussion Paper on Issues Affecting 
the Retail Leasing Industry in NSW”, April 2008, 14.  
666 QUT Property Law and Research Centre, Submission No 12  to  Senate Economics Reference 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Need for a National Approach to Retail Leasing Arrangements, 
18th March 2015, 12. 
667 Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry 
(December 2011), Appendix B, 2. 
668 Clarke Report 1984, 14. 
669 N Mumford, The Retail Shop Leases Act 1984-1989- Does the Act Achieve the Purposes 
Identified in the Cooper Report 1981 (1992) QLSJ, 91, 106; Australian Capital Territory, 
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18.10.2000, 3170 (Chief Minister Humphries).  
670 Cooper Report 1981, Appendix 2, 3.  
671 Ibid, 40. 
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(iii) the establishment of an Office of Mediator672 or alternatively that 
disputes be resolved by government councillors who would resolve minor 
questions of concern.673 It was hoped that the use of alternative dispute 
resolution instead of formal court procedures would not only reduce expense 
and delay674 but also preserve the lessor – lessee relationship.675 
(iv) that settlement of disputes could be achieved by combined education 
of lessees and mediation.676 
(v) an informal tribunal could hear disputes which did not warrant full court 
procedures.677 
(vi) a tribunal be introduced in all jurisdictions to arbitrate disputes between 
lessors and lessees.678  The Reid Committee received many submissions 
regarding the unnecessary complexity and cost of dispute resolution and 
found that the overarching concern of lessees was for disputes to be dealt 
with out of the formal court processes.679  
 
The Arnold Committee supported the concept of an informal tribunal 
consisting of two tiers with the lower tier consisting of one-member tribunal 
assisted by an expert with jurisdiction to hear disputes up to a certain level 
                                                             
672 Queensland Joint Committee Report, 6. 
673 Hill Report 1983 (Referred to in ACT Report 1984, 64). 
674 According to Tarlo: - 
“The most interesting parts of the Act [Retail Shop Leases Act 1984 (Qld)] are the 
establishment of the Mediation Panel and Tribunals to provide an inexpensive two-tier 
method for the resolution of disputes.  In fact, perhaps the true rationale of the legislation is 
the attempt to contain legal costs. It is unfortunately true that small business men are 
increasingly loath to resort to the courts to assert their rights, and thus for them the possible 
legal remedies may not even be said to exist.”  
Professor H Tarlo, Pioneering in the Deep North: Tinkering with Shop Leases, (1987) 8 Qld Lawyer 
67, 90. 
675 ACT Report 1984, 66; Clarke Report 1984, 33; Queensland Joint Committee Report 1983,3.  
676 ACT Report 1984, 65.  
677 Arnold Report 1984, 30.  
678 Beddall Report 1990 [4.72].  
679 Reid Report 1997, [2.43]. 
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with no appeal being allowed thereby ensuring that there be no additional 
costs of appeal.  The higher tier which would consist of a three-member 
tribunal where the effects of any judgement would exceed $10,000.00 or 
where the parties agreed or the member on the lower tier decided that the 
case should be referred to the higher tier.680 
 
(c) Subsequently legislation was enacted in all jurisdictions regulating 
each step of the dispute resolution process as follows: - 
(i) Early Intervention in Disputes 
Four Australian jurisdictions681 have introduced Small Business 
Commissioners who, amongst other duties, attempt to resolve retail leasing 
disputes in a timely fashion. The South Australian Small Business 
Commissioner reports that 80% of all disputes are resolved by the 
commission even before they are sent to mediation.682 
(ii) Mediation 
All Australian jurisdictions now provide for initial mediation of lease disputes.  
Either the parties are unable to proceed to court unless a Government 
Official has certified that mediation or some other form of alternate dispute 
resolution has failed;683 or after lodging a dispute with the relevant body the 
matter is referred to mediation.684 Alternatively, a Government Official may 
                                                             
680 Arnold Report 1984, 29.  
681 New South Wales, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. 
682 Senate Economics Reference Committee, Parliament of Australia, Need for a National Approach 
to Retail Leasing Arrangements, 18th March 2015, 28. 
683 Retail Leases Act 1984 (NSW) s68; Retail Leases Act 2003 (VIC), Part 10; Commercial Tenancy 
(Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s25D; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) 
Part 11. 
684 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (QLD) s55 
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be asked to investigate or negotiate and/or mediate a dispute685 Mediation 
has been very successful in determining disputes.686 
(iii) Court or Tribunal? 
After failure of mediation or intervention by a Government Official the matter 
is then referred for determination by a Tribunal687 or a Court.688 In the 
Northern Territory where the parties fail to resolve the dispute through 
conciliation and the amount is less than $10,000.00 the matter proceeds to 
an inquiry before the Commissioner of Business Tenancies.689 
 
(iv) Limits On Jurisdictions of Tribunals 
The jurisdictions of all tribunals throughout Australia differ. In New South 
Wales, the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal has a 
monetary jurisdiction of $400,000.00690 and generally has a time limit for 
lodgement of claims of 3 years.691 In Queensland the monetary limit for 
matters to be heard by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal is 
$750,000.00.692 
Other examples include: - 
                                                             
685 Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) ss63-69; Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail 
Tenancies) Regulations 1998 (Tas) s39.  
686 In NSW, mediation success rates are 94% and in Victoria, mediation success rates are 80%. See 
Senate Economics Reference Committee, Parliament of Australia, Need for a National Approach to 
Retail Leasing Arrangements, 18th March 2015, 28. 
687 Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) ss70, 71, 71B; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s64; Retail Leases 
Act 2003 (Vic),  ss89-92; Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995(SA), ss63-69; Commercial Tenancy 
(Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1995 (WA) Part 3; Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) 
Regulations 1998 (Tas), s39.  
688 Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) Part 14; Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail 
Tenancies) Regulations 1998 (Tas), s39; Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) ss63-69. 
689 Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) Division 4, Part 11.  
690 Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s73. 
691 Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s71 – 71A. 
692 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s103(c). 
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1. In Queensland, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
(QCAT) does not have jurisdiction to hear a dispute regarding arrears of rent 
unless the dispute is also about the payment of compensation by the lessor.  
It also has no jurisdiction in relation to the amount of rent or outgoings 
payable.693 
2. In Victoria, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) has 
no jurisdiction in relation to an application for relief against forfeiture or 
claims in relation to unconscionable conduct.694 Unconscionable conduct 
claims are also excluded from tenancy dispute provisions in the Northern 
Territory.695 In contrast the New South Wales Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear applications about unconscionable 
conduct.696 
3. In Western Australia the State Administrative Tribunal of Western 
Australia (WASAT) has jurisdiction to hear an application for relief against 
forfeiture697 and, in addition, can hear applications for a compensation order 
and unconscionable conduct claims or misleading and deceptive conduct 
claims, if at the time no civil procedures have been commenced.698 
4. Lease disputes are heard in formal courts such as the Magistrates 
Court in the Australian Capital Territory.699 
5. In Tasmania parties to a lease must attempt to resolve a dispute by 
negotiation and if this fails the matter may be referred to the Office of 
                                                             
693 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s64.  
694 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) ss89-92. 
695 Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) Part 11.  
696  Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s71A. 
697 Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s3(3). 
698 Ibid. 
699 Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) s144; Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail 
Tenancies) Regulations 1998 (Tas) s39; Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) ss63-69. 
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Consumer Affairs to negotiate a solution.  If the dispute remains unresolved 
then either party may refer the dispute to the Retail Tenancies Code of 
Practice Monitoring Committee for conciliation and if this also fails then 
either party may refer the dispute to a court.700  
6. In South Australia either party may refer a dispute to the Small 
Business Commissioner for mediation701 and if this fails the matter may be 
determined by the Magistrates for claims up to $100,000.00.702  On claims 
over $100,000.00 the Magistrates Court must on the application of either 
party refer the matter to the District Court.703  
 
There seems to be no reason why lease disputes cannot be heard in 
tribunals rather than courts except that some larger or more complex matters 
may require a more formal approach than others.  Such matters may 
however be identified early by a tribunal at the first return date and then 
referred to a formal court. Differences in the jurisdiction of each State and 
Territory only add to the costs of compliance of multi-jurisdictional parties. 
 
(v) Appeals 
The ability to appeal a decision is one way that a financially superior party 
can prolong dispute proceedings and thereby win the dispute by attrition. 704  
The ability of the financially stronger lessor must be limited in appropriate 
                                                             
700 Fair trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulations 1998 (TAS) s39. 
701 Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s64. 
702 Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s68. 
703 Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s69. 
704 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 68. 
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cases to reduce costs and to allow matters to be conclusively determined on 
their merits. Appeals are conducted differently in each jurisdiction: - 
1. Differentiating an appeal depending on whether the decision appealed 
from is an appeal from a judicial or a non-judicial member;705   
2. Allowing an appeal on a question of law and fact706 or on a question of 
law alone if leave is given.707   
3. Allowing matters to be transferred to a higher court depending on the 
nature of the matter. For example, in New South Wales a claim for 
unconscionable conduct may be transferred from the Tribunal to the 
Supreme Court.708 
There is some merit in allowing complicated legal disputes to be appealed to 
a formal court. Many disputes will not contain such matters and any appeal 
could be safely contained with the bounds of the tribunal process such that 
any appeal is to an appeal panel of the tribunal itself. 
(vi) Unconscionability Provisions 
The unconscionable conduct provisions of the Australian Consumer Law 
have been drawn down into the retail lease legislation of each Australian 
State and Territory709 with the exception of South Australia.  The purpose of 
drawing down such legislation was to allow the unconscionability provisions 
                                                             
705 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s150.  
706 Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) s155.  
707 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s148. 
708 Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s76A.  
709 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) Part 9; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985  
(WA) Part IIA; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001(ACT) s22; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) 
Act 2003 (NT) Part 10; Fair Trading (Code of Practice) Retail Tenancies Regulations 1998 (Tas) s3; 
Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s46A; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) Part 7A and ss62A, 62B. 
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to be heard in state courts and tribunals rather than be dealt with in Federal 
Courts and to be tailored to retail lease circumstances.710  
 
The Reid Report, in its recommendations, suggested that the appropriate 
test should be one of “unfairness” rather than “unconscionability” as the Reid 
Committee thought that the remedy should be more widely available then if it 
was just limited to unconscionability.711 The government, however, when 
legislating, opted for “unconscionability” to allows courts to draw upon the 
considerable body of case law regarding unconscionability712 and because 
the use of “unfairness” would introduce too much uncertainty into the 
contractual arrangements between the parties.713 
 
The unconscionability provisions do not seem to be working well as there 
has been very few successful cases brought relying on such provisions.714 
The reasons for the non-existence of such successful litigation maybe that, 
the parties being aware of such provisions, such matters are settled rather 
than litigated.715 More likely however is the fact that the threshold to prove 
unconscionability is too high.716 If that is the case, then the usefulness of the 
unconscionability provisions at both federal level and in the various regional 
retail leasing legislation analogues is highly questionable. 
                                                             
710 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 76. 
711 Reid Report 1997, [6.57]. 
712 Ibid, 283. 
713 Senate Economics Committee, Parliament of Australia, The Effectiveness of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 in Protecting Small Business, March 2004, Canberra, 35. 
714 E Webb, “Almost a Decade On – A (Reid) Report Card on Retail Leasing” (2006) 13 Australian 
Property Law Journal 240,285 
715 Ibid, 287. 
716 Ibid. 
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(vii) Dearth of Precedents 
The ongoing use of tribunals to resolve disputes means that fewer decisions 
are being heard in formal courts such that fewer valuable precedents717 
become available which results in uncertainty in legal advice being given.  
The very nature of tribunals, with their emphasis on speed, informality, not 
being bound by the rules of evidence and the absence of the involvement of 
legally qualified persons result in decisions which are of limited precedent 
value.718  
 
(viii) Conclusions 
In 2008 the Productivity Commission found that all Australian jurisdictions 
had dispute resolution mechanisms in place that appeared to be low cost, 
accessible and timely.719 In contrast, in 2014 the Productivity Commission 
found that the area of dispute resolution was a key area requiring further 
reform.720 
 
The dispute resolution provisions contained in retail lease legislation are 
working well.721 Lessees and lessors have access to low cost, accessible 
and timely mediation or dispute resolution however some jurisdictions still 
                                                             
717 E Webb, “Almost a Decade On – A (Reid) Report Card on Retail Leasing” (2006) 13 Australian 
Property Law Journal 240,283 
718 S Young, “Re-Examining the Bricks and Mortar: Case Law, the Doctrine of Precedent and 
Contemporary Legal Education” (1996) 12 QUTLJ, 141. 
719 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 71. 
720 Productivity Commission, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade (September 
2014), 138.  
721 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 183. 
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require disputes to be heard by formal courts rather than tribunals which 
causes cost and delay. In addition, matters may still be prolonged by 
appeals.  
There is a substantial difference in the pathways for dispute resolution 
between each jurisdiction with resulting uncertainty for multi-jurisdictional 
parties and substantial inconsistency between tribunals in each jurisdiction. 
Unconscionability legislation is of limited use and the unconscionability 
provisions should be expanded.  In contrast, Small Business Commissioners 
seem to be successful in resolving disputes and the expansion of such a 
scheme to all States and Territories should be considered. 
Finally, the trend to having retail lease disputes resolved in tribunals rather 
than courts has led to a reduction in the number of valuable precedents 
making legal advice more difficult to provide. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Retail lease legislation commenced in 1984 in Queensland.  Multiple retail 
leasing acts followed.  All of the legislation was put in place only after several 
years of consideration and review.  In 1990, six years after the 
commencement of retail leasing legislation, the Beddall Committee found 
that lessees were still complaining about disparity of bargaining power and 
how lessors were taking advantage of them.  The situation seems to become 
progressively worse from there resulting in the Reid Enquiry in 1997 stating 
that there was a war between lessors and lessees and that lessees had lost 
most battles to date.722 The Reid Committee found that issues regarding the 
                                                             
722 Reid Report 1997, [2.1] – [2.2]. 
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sitting tenant continued to be a problem and that lessees who had counted 
on their business being their ongoing livelihood, if not their retirement, had to 
choose, upon lease expiry, between receiving nothing for their business or 
agreeing to the lessor’s demands.723 
Although the Productivity Commission in their 2008 and 2011 reports stated 
that the retail lease market was performing fairly well this comment must be 
viewed against the backdrop of the over-riding consideration of the 
Commission which is that there are no inefficiencies in the market.  Issues 
regarding equity or fairness are not within the remit of the Commission 
except where such issues may impact upon economic efficiency. 
The Productivity Commission is the sole inquiry that believes the market is 
performing well with all other inquiries receiving numerous complaints from 
lessees and making recommendations to amend legislation.  Even so the 
Commission believes that improvements can be made in relation to 
disclosure, transparency and dispute resolution.724 
The sitting tenant issue remains an unsolved problem almost 35 years after 
the problem was first identified in 1981.  Five year lease terms had been, 
with the exception of Queensland, the norm across all states and territories 
however minimum terms will not solve the sitting tenant problem as 
eventually all leases must end.  The statutory right of first refusal provisions 
enjoyed by shopping centre lessees in South Australia and the Australian 
Capital Territory are ineffective as the lessor can demand that a lessee 
obtain an exclusionary certificate prior to the lease commencing. In any 
                                                             
723 See, for example, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty 
Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 51. 
724 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 250. 
194 
 
event, giving a sitting tenant the automatic right of renewal means that new 
lessees are unable to enter the market which will result in the inefficient 
operation of the market. 
 
Dispute resolution provisions seem to have been effective in increasing the 
bargaining position of lessees where such dispute resolution is low cost and 
time effective.  In addition, the ability of either party to protract the dispute by 
appeal to higher tribunals must be curtailed not only to save time and cost 
but also to reflect the fact that although the lessor will be the lessor as long 
as the lessor chooses, the lessee’s role as lessee in limited by the lease 
term.  The advent of small business commissioners in four states seems to 
have been effective as they adopt a proactive approach to resolving 
disputes. 
 
Although retail leasing legislation requires lessors to deal with requests for 
assignments expeditiously, lessors still have power to delay assignments by 
requesting more and more information from assignees.  Legislation also sets 
out the factors that the lessor may consider in determining whether to 
approve a new lessee however where the lessor, after considering such 
information, rejects an assignee; the lessee has limited options to challenge 
the lessor’s decision. As assignment of the lease and presumably sale of the 
lessee’s business is the only way the lessee can release the goodwill in its 
business it is likely that issues regarding assignment are likely to continue to 
be a problem.  Provisions that allow for the release from all liability after 
assignment to a new lessee make the lessee less selective when they 
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propose a new lessee. A lessee may be more selective if their liability under 
the lease was to continue after assignment but only for a limited period.725 
 
Rent reviews, and in particular market rent reviews, remain problematic.  In 
circumstances where much information is concealed by a shopping centre 
lessor pursuant to confidentiality clauses within their leases then it seems 
impossible for any valuer to carry out an effective valuation, which means 
any market rent review must be suspect.  Provision of turnover information 
also seems to increase the lessors bargaining power at the expense of the 
lessee.  Lack of controls as to how such information is used by a lessor 
means that the information can be used in lease negotiations with other 
lessees, not only for other premises within the shopping centre but also for 
the lessee’s own premises with the result that at the end of a lease, a lessee 
may be bidding against a new lessee for the premises where such new 
lessee has been sought by the lessor and been provided with the sitting 
tenants turnover information.  The new lessee knows that if they are 
successful in obtaining the premises then they will also receive, in effect, the 
sitting tenant’s business without the expense of any fitout as the premises 
have already been fitted out by the sitting tenant.  This will allow the new 
lessee to bid more to lease the premises which the sitting tenant must match 
or risk losing the lease, their business and their livelihood. 
Disclosure, and the ability of such disclosure to reduce the information 
imbalance between the parties, has been successful to a certain extent.  The 
amount of such disclosure required by legislation continues to increase.  In 
                                                             
725 Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s45A. 
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addition, outgoing lessees are required to provide disclosure statement to 
both the assignee and the lessor.  Such a step is to protect the assignee 
from misrepresentations or incorrect statements made by the lessee in its 
haste to sell its business. Disclosure by a lessee to an assignee of any rent 
abatement during the term of the lease goes someway to redressing the 
problems of side deals in leases as it would allow the assignee to obtain a 
more accurate valuation of the business. This “snowballing” of disclosure, 
however, results in increased delay and cost for all parties especially when 
legal and financial certificates are also required. The volume of information 
being provided may be counterproductive in that they do not necessarily 
improve a potential lessee’s understanding of the leasing transaction or, 
alternatively, a lessee may believe that only reading of the disclosure 
statement is required and not the reading of the lease itself. Disclosure 
requirements have been an issue with all of the above inquiries including the 
Productivity Commission.  It is questionable whether disclosure of data by a 
lessor in a disclosure statement which is already in the lease has much 
value and may be redundant. Perhaps disclosure should only be limited to 
matters which are not contained in the lease such as the lessor’s plans for 
the centre and tenancy mix. 
In summary, all 5 areas of dispute between lessors and lessees remain in 
dispute to the present day.  Dispute resolution provisions have had some 
success in increasing a lessee’s bargaining power but the other provisions 
have had only limited success.  
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 CHAPTER 4 
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF CURRENT RETAIL LEASE 
LEGISLATION 
 
1. Introduction 
In determining whether there should be a national review  retail leasing 
legislation across all jurisdictions, it is necessary to have an understanding of 
the current retail leasing environment as the form of retail leasing legislation 
in the future will be shaped by that environment. In this regard it is necessary 
to consider the nature of leases, the relationship between lessor and lessee 
and the nature of the retail leasing market as a whole.  The consideration of 
these subjects will define how any simplified retail leasing legislation should 
be framed. 
It is also necessary to consider the form that such revised legislation should 
take.  For example, the uniform retail leasing disclosure statement recently 
adopted by New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria was an improved 
form of disclosure which was better than the previous disclosure statements 
of all three jurisdictions726 in that the uniform disclosure statement required 
the lessor to provide more information to the lessee than was required by the 
disclosure statements of the three jurisdictions thereby allowing the lessee to 
make more informed decisions. Additionally, lessors active in all three 
                                                             
726 The change was achieved by alterations to retail leasing regulations in all three jurisdictions.  
See Retail Shop Leases and Another Regulation Amendment Regulation (No 1) 2010 (Qld), the Retail 
Leases Amendment Regulations 2010 (Vic) and the Retail Leases Amendment 
Regulation 2010 (NSW)  
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jurisdictions would only have to be familiar with one form of disclosure 
statement. 
To effect simplification, the current retail leasing legislation in each 
jurisdiction within the areas of focus727 identified previously must be 
analysed to determine whether such legislation has been effective or not so 
as to determine whether legislation from one jurisdiction is less complex (but 
still effective) to legislation in another jurisdiction and therefore worthy of 
adoption.  Alternatively, it may be that none of the current legislation is 
effective,728 to the extent that any  legislation should be drafted anew or that 
some amalgam of the existing legislation is required.  
It is proposed that a comparison of the legislation in each jurisdiction should 
be undertaken using benchmarks that are not arbitrarily determined but 
based upon settled practices of lessors and lessees in each jurisdiction.  It is 
necessary, therefore, to identify and benchmarks these practices and 
illustrate how these benchmarks are central to all leasing processes, if not to 
the leasing industry as a whole. 
The benchmarks will be determined by considering common problems that 
occur within Australian States and Territories and by analysing relevant case 
law, reports and studies regarding retail lease law in Australia, as well the 
situation in the United Kingdom including the UK leasing codes.  In addition, 
consideration will be given to recently enacted uniform commercial 
legislation and the reform to work health and safety law in Australia to 
                                                             
727 Such areas of focus being the issues of security of tenure, assignment of leases, disclosure, rent 
review and dispute resolution. 
728 It is arguable that retail tenancy legislation is better in some states than in others but that there 
are weaknesses generally. See House of Representative, Standing Committee on Industry Science 
and Technology, Parliament of Australia, Finding a Balance: Towards Fair Trading in Australia, 
(1997), 2. (“Reid Report 1997”). 
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provide an insight as to what considerations of principle proved important in 
leading to reform of such legislation. 
 
2. Drivers for Retail Lease Legislation in Australia 
2.1 Introduction 
Subjects that are important to both lessors and lessees have been 
exhaustively examined over the years by various committees of enquiry and 
have been considered in case law and journals.729 These underlying 
principles are as follows: 
• The Reduction of Transactional Costs - the cost of lease and 
associated documentation and cost caused by leasing procedures is 
a significant concern for any business.  Such cost is increased by 
complexity of requirements and time taken to comply with the retail 
lease legislation by the parties taking into account the terms of the 
lease itself; 
• Transactional Timeliness – delay by either party due to compliance 
with retail leasing processes results in continued uncertainty for both 
parties desiring to finalise the transaction; 
                                                             
729 For example W D Duncan, ‘The Retail Shop Leases Act Amendment Act 1988 - A Sledgehammer 
to Crack a Nut’ (1988) Queensland Law Society Journal 385; W D Duncan, “The Regulation of 
Commercial Tenancies – Heading for the Sunset”, (1990) 2 Bond Law Review, 34; K Galloway, 
“Statutory Modification of Contract Law in Queensland: A New Equilibrium or Entrenching the Old 
Power Order?” [2008] James Cook University Law Review, 4; K Gibbings, “From the Cooper Report to 
Retail Shop Leases Act 1994: Prescription or Placebo?” (1996) 26(5) Queensland Law Society Journal 
1996; K Lewison, “Commercial Property – Are Leases Different?”  (1989) The Law Society Gazette, 
86.45(23); R Loiacono, “The Effect of Amendments to the Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) 
Agreements Acts Act 1985 on the Balance of Power between Landlords and Tenants” (2013) 22 
Australian Property Law Journal 134; N Mumford, “The Retail Shop Leases Act 1984-1989- Does the 
Act Achieve the Purposes Identified in the Cooper Report 1981” (1992) QLSJ, 91.  
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• Redundancy – legislation that repeats rights already available either 
at common law (such as the right to quiet enjoyment)730 or pursuant to 
another statute (such as the unconscionable conduct provisions of the 
Australian Consumer Law)731 unnecessarily adds to the red tape 
burden of business owners with increased cost and complexity. This 
is partly due to the party’s access to low cost tribunals created 
pursuant to the legislation, and rights to compensation sometimes 
superior to the common law. These Tribunals are now used more 
widely in respect of ancillary disputes not directly the subject of a 
statutory dispute thus avoiding the costs of commencing proceedings 
in a superior court. For example, the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 
(Qld) provides that all “retail tenancy disputes” may ultimately be 
heard by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT).732 
The definition of “retail tenancy dispute” is “any dispute under or about 
a retail shop lease, or about the use or occupation of a leased shop 
under a retail shop lease, regardless of when the lease was entered 
into.”733 A dispute about a retail shop may be heard by QCAT even if 
such dispute arises pursuant to the Australian Consumer Law or other 
legislation. The need to properly balance both parties’ interests – it is 
                                                             
730 Rights of quiet enjoyment are specified in retail leasing legislation as follows: - Retail Leases Act 
2003 (Vic) s54; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s14; Leases 
(Commercial and Retail) Act 2001(ACT) ss81,82; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) 
s47; Fair Trading (Code of Practice) Retail Tenancies Regulations 1998 (Tas) s23; Retail Shop Leases 
Act 1994 (Qld) ss 42-44; Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s38; Retail Leases Act 1994 
(NSW) s34. 
731 The unconscionability provisions of Part 2-2 of the Australian Consumer Law now appears in 
every jurisdiction in Australia except South Australia. Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) Part 9; Commercial 
Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985  (WA) Part IIA; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 
2001(ACT) s22; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) Part 10; Fair Trading (Code of 
Practice) Retail Tenancies Regulations 1998 (Tas) s3; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s46A; Retail 
Leases Act 1994 (NSW) Part 7A and ss62A, 62B.. 
732 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) Part 8, Division 3. 
733 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) Schedule. 
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this area which causes the most difficulty for the various legislatures.  
The constant adjusting of law regarding retail leases and prelease 
negotiations demonstrates the difficulty of the legislature in finding a 
fair balance. As the bargaining power in the lessor/lessee relationship 
is heavily in favour of the lessor, protections built into retail leasing 
legislation lean heavily in favour of the lessee.734 It is classic 
“consumer protection” legislation.735  More cynically, it could be said 
that the constant change to the retail leasing landscape is a case of 
one jurisdiction “leapfrogging” another in order to secure the support 
of small business.736  
 
Retail leasing legislation often has a five year review provision built 
into the legislation. Thus, reviews are automatically triggered whether 
they are needed or not. This results in a constant demand for change 
to existing retail leasing legislation, building upon the existing 
legislation. Changes in retail leasing legislation in one jurisdiction 
normally results in improved conditions or additional benefits for, 
primarily, lessees.  As a result, lessees in other jurisdictions lobby 
their government for similar if not greater concessions or benefits 
together with any further innovations. Once this has been achieved 
the lessees in other jurisdictions begin the cycle afresh. The most 
                                                             
734 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 222. 
735 Professor H Tarlo, ‘The Great Shop Lease Controversy’ (1983) University of Queensland Law 
Journal 13(1), 38. 
736 M Cameron and J Blom, ‘The Case for National Retail Tenancies Laws’, (2004) 19(1) Australian 
Property Law Bulletin 1, 2. See also Commercial and Property Law Research Centre, Queensland 
University of Technology, Submission No 12 to Senate Economics Reference Committee, Parliament 
of Australia, Need for a National Approach to Retail Leasing Arrangements, 18 March 2015, [4.4]. 
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obvious example of this is the minimum lease term of 5 years which 
originally started in Queensland and was then copied in every other 
Australian jurisdiction.  
• Protection of the retail leasing market - although protection of the 
retail leasing market may not be high on the agenda of smallest 
business owners, if the market failed such that there would be a 
reduction in retail leasing venues, businesses as a whole will suffer as 
a result of even greater demand for floor space driving up rents.737  
  
The reasons for selecting these factors for the analysis of the retail leasing 
legislation in each jurisdiction are set out below. 
 
2.2 Reducing Transactional Costs 
One of the important, if not the most important issue for both lessors and 
lessees is the issue of transactional cost.  In the leasing environment costs 
can increase for either the lessor or lessee by any of the following: - 
(a) Delay in finalising transaction.   
For example, a delay by a lessor in confirming a request for an extension of 
a lease may result in the lessee putting refurbishment plans on hold thereby 
resulting in loss of business. Lessors may also incur costs because of delay. 
According to the Real Estate Institute of Australia 
Landlords can now find it exceedingly difficult to remove problem tenants without 
detailed explanation, multiple notifications, lengthy tribunal hearings (or court 
                                                             
737 Reid Report 1997, 44. 
203 
 
hearings), orders to assist the tenants in their business activities and significant costs 
arising from these delays.738  
 
Any delay in determination of a dispute between the parties will increase the 
amount of costs payable.739 
 
(b) Costs of dispute resolution.  
The costs of dispute resolution are even more prohibitive for the lessees who 
are often small businesses and cannot afford the costs of litigation in court 
or, perhaps, even the lesser costs of having a dispute resolved through 
mediation or a low cost tribunal established pursuant to the retail leasing 
legislation.740 
 
(c) Costs arising from lack of certainty. 
Both parties require certainty in their relationship.  The intention of the 
legislature in introducing retail lease legislation was to provide certainty to 
                                                             
738 Real Estate Institute of Australia, Submission No 111 to Productivity Commission, The Market 
For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st March 2008), 15. 
739 R H Burton, Chairman, Commercial Tribunal of Western Australia. Report to the Attorney- 
General for the year ended 30 June 1996, 14. 
‘As to dispute resolution, while there are workable provisions in all state and territory lease 
legislation for mediation conciliation, more needs to be done to make this avenue of dispute 
resolution more accessible, more consistent and to ensure that it continues to be affordable, 
particularly for the speciality retailers.’ Evidence to the Reid Enquiry, Canberra ACT, 24 
February 1997, 778 (Property Council of Australia). 
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both parties741 in relation to their rights and their obligations to the other 
party.742  
 
Standardised legislative rights are able to provide more certainty to the 
parties than customised contracts agreed to between the parties because 
the common exposure of industry participants to such legislative provisions 
means that the provisions are more easily understood than contractual 
clauses drafted from scratch.743  In addition, such legislation is more likely to 
have accumulated a body of case law (although mainly in tribunals) 
regarding such provisions which can aid in the interpretation of such 
legislation. The use of standard legislation rather than bespoke contracts is 
more likely to protect small businesses who cannot afford the cost of legal 
advice for such contracts.744 
  
For a lessee, because of the long term relational nature of the lease 
agreement many factors of importance to the lessee can change over the 
course of the lease, particularly tenant mix, the prospect of re-location and 
centre re-development. These factors are beyond the control of the lessee 
                                                             
741 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 March 1984, 1579 (Retail 
Shop Leases Bill Second Reading by Mr M Ahern). 
‘What is now before members is a clearer and more certain piece of legislation. It will do the 
job it is intended to do. As I said in introducing the Bill to the House in December last, it will 
establish the ground rules upon which leases in future will be drafted, and it will provide the 
hard-working tenant and the landlord with recourse to a form of low-cost resolution of 
disputes.’   
742 Reid Report 1997, 215. 
743 Ibid, 26. 
744 Attorney General Department, Commonwealth of Australia, Improving Australia’s Law and 
Justice Framework A Discussion Paper to Explore the Scope for Reforming Australian Contract Law 
(2012) 5. 
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and sometimes, for example, a new centre starting nearby, beyond the 
control of the lessor. 
Prior to the enactment of retail leasing legislation, leases were governed 
solely by the law of contract which had developed at common law over 
centuries and the principles of which were widely accepted and generally 
understood. Standard clauses were used in all commercial leases. It has 
been argued that any legislation, including retail leasing legislation, which 
interferes with such long accepted principles must by its very existence 
increase uncertainty in the negotiating process and in the interpretation of 
the lease contract itself.  The converse argument is that standardising leases 
and leasing processes would actually create certainty for the lessee.745 
The period of uncertainty and, therefore increase in costs, can be limited by 
ensuring the early determination of issues arising from lease and by a timely 
and effective dispute resolution process.  For example, when a lease is due 
to be renewed pursuant to an option to renew, the lessee will want to know 
as soon as possible (and before they commit to a new term) the amount of 
                                                             
745 Duncan WD and Christensen S, ‘Section 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974: An Exocet in 
Retail Shop Leasing’, (1999) 27 (4) Australian Business Law Review, 282. 
Large corporations and business associations have continually argued that any further 
inroads made by legislation into the contracting process would undermine the certainty of 
commercial relationships and the contracts that underpin them. This unbending position is, 
however, met with equal resistance by the argument that a provision regulating fair dealing 
in contracts would actually create certainty for the weaker party. At the moment, the weaker 
party to a commercial transaction has no guarantee of the environment in which the activity 
is to take place.  For instance, a small tenant in a large shopping centre may be subjected to:- 
Relocation of the tenant at the whim of the landlord; 
The introduction of a competitor of the lessee in a more favourable position; 
An inflexible negotiating stance by the lessor where the lessee has no choice but to 
accept a new lease on commercially unviable terms. 
On close scrutiny, it becomes evident that there may be no commercial certainty at all in 
some contractual relationships where one party holds all the bargaining chips.  
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the new rent746 whereas the lessor will want to ensure that the lessee is 
bound to renew the lease before the rent is determined.747 These rights are 
given to retail lessees by Statute.  No lessor would voluntarily regulate this 
aspect of the transaction. 
Similarly, a lessor will want to be certain that a lessee is at all times bound to 
the terms of the lease.  Uncertainty can be introduced by legislation by such 
legislation failing to provide exclusive remedies.  Where legislation does not 
provide an exclusive or complete remedy, for as many common disputes as 
possible, costly resort to the ordinary courts would be required.  However, 
some statutory rights given a retail lessee are arguably unnecessary and 
unfair to the lessor.  
For example, retail lease legislation in each State and Territory provides that 
if a lessor fails to provide a disclosure statement to the lessee or the 
disclosure statement is defective, the lessee may terminate the Lease by 
written notice within a certain period of time.748 The lessee’s ability to 
terminate the lease seems unnecessarily harsh for the lessor in 
circumstances where the lessor may have forgotten to include some 
information and the lessee has simply changed its mind and seeks to rely 
upon technical grounds to escape the lease. 
                                                             
746 Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s32; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s27A; Commercial Tenancy 
(Retail Shops) Agreements Act1985 (WA) s11; Retail & Commercial Leases Act1994 (SA) s 36; 
Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT), s30. 
747 Department of Justice and Industrial Relations Consumer Affairs (TAS), Review of the Fair 
Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulation 1998 Final Report, March 2002, 48. 
748 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s17; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s11; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 
(Qld) s22; Retail & Commercial Leases Act1994 (SA) s12; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) 
Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s6; Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulations 1998 
(Tas) s7; Leases (Commercial & Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) ss117, 118; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) 
Act 2003 (NT) s20. 
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Nevertheless, the parties are entitled to expect that, in the event of some 
failure to comply with the legislation (i.e. failure to provide full disclosure) that 
the lessee would have the remedies available to it pursuant to such 
legislation and nothing more. Such was the case in Corbett Court Pty Limited 
v Samaha,749  where the lessee alleged that certain representations had 
been made by the lessor’s agent regarding the centre750 none of which 
appeared in the lessor’s disclosure statement and, more importantly, the 
lessee did not refer to any such representations in the lessee’s disclosure 
statement. 
The court found that as the lessee did not specify any such representation in 
its own disclosure statement, the lessee was estopped from asserting that 
they relied upon such representations.751 
Such a decision is of comfort to lessors in that only those representations as 
disclosed by the lessor or as stated by the lessee in the lessee’s disclosure 
statement may give grounds for a lessee to terminate on the grounds that 
the  
disclosure statement provided was defective. However, the parties had to 
adjudicate in a superior court to achieve this outcome. A lessee’s failure to 
insert a lessor’s representation into a disclosure statement results in a 
finding that the lessee did not rely upon such representation.752  
The lessor is therefore able to rely upon the provisions of the legislation and 
conduct business accordingly. 
                                                             
749 [2006] NSWSC 1441. 
750 The representations were to the effect that the centre would be fully occupied upon opening, 
the tenancy mix of the centre, the possible closure of a nearby competitor and that the shopping 
centre would become the “hub” of the region. 
751 Ibid, [71]. 
752 Andrew Lang, CCH, Lang’s Commercial Leasing in Australia (at 28 November 2012) [85-281]. 
208 
 
In Armstrong Jones Management Pty Limited v Saies-Bond & Associates Pty 
Limited753 the appeal panel decided that contrary to Corbett Court Pty 
Limited v Samaha,754 an evidentiary presumption arising because of an 
omission of a statement from the lessee’s disclosure statement could be 
overcome by other evidence755  and the lessee could be excused from 
omitting to include representations in its disclosure statement. 
The effect of this decision is that irrespective of whether or not 
representations by the lessor are recorded by the lessee in their disclosure 
statement the lessee will still be able to rely upon such representations 
provided they can prove them in some other fashion.  This unfortunately 
means that the lessor cannot rely upon the contents of the lessee’s 
disclosure statement as providing the lessor with any degree of certainty or 
security756 which tends to defeat the purpose of the statutory exercise to 
provide certainty to parties in respect of reliance upon representations. 
The lessor would prefer that in circumstances where the lessee fails, with the 
benefit of legal advice, to insert representations that the lessee has relied 
upon in entering the lease into the lessees’ disclosure statement that the 
lessee is estopped from the date that such lessee disclosure statement is 
provided.757 Such a result provides both parties and, especially the lessor 
with greater certainty than the result where the lessee fails to insert 
representations but is allowed to lead other evidence regarding 
representations made.758 
                                                             
753 [2007] NSW ADTAP (RLD) 47 (6 September 2007). 
754 [2006] NSWSC 1441. 
755 Ibid, [21]. 
756 Spuds Surf Chatswood Pty Ltd v PT Ltd (No 2) (RLD) [2012] NSWADTAP 35, [89] – [91]. 
757 Xin v Zakos [2000] NSWADT 189, [51]. 
758 See, e.g. Gizah Pty Ltd v AXA Trustees Ltd [2001] NSWADT 116. 
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Certainty is also a factor in the resolution of lease disputes, in that, the 
resolution process needs to not only be timely and effective, but the 
decisions of the dispute resolution tribunals need to be consistent so that the 
parties can rely upon those decisions in framing their future conduct.759 
Consistent decision making process will allow the parties to be confident that 
their commercial dealings are within the guidelines as established by 
legislation.  
Tribunal decisions themselves, by their very nature, can contribute to 
uncertainty because of their limited value as precedents. As a tribunal is not 
required to follow the laws of evidence and is not bound by precedent of 
other tribunal decisions, every decision turns on the particular facts of the 
case. Inconsistent decision making in the same jurisdiction by such tribunals 
result in a perception of arbitrariness760 that makes it difficult for legal 
advisers. Some greater certainty might be achieved by national retail lease 
legislation although the tribunal decisions would still not be binding. Cases in 
superior courts of other jurisdictions on the same subject would have greater 
persuasive value. 
Costs of complying with different retail leasing legislation across different 
jurisdictions761  with different requirements adds to complexity and adversely 
affect national lessors.762   
Reviews of legislation in each jurisdiction rarely lead to a cost benefit 
analysis. Legislatures are very reluctant to remove what they perceive as 
                                                             
759 Evidence to the Reid Enquiry, Canberra ACT, 24 February 1997, 778 (Property Council of 
Australia). 
760 Drake No 2 (1979) 2 ALD 634, 639. 
761 M Cameron  and J Blom, ‘The Case for National Retail Tenancies Law’ Australian Property Law 
Bulletin, 19(1) 1, 1. 
762 Westfield, Submission No 85 to Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases 
in Australia - Report No.43 (31st March 2008).  
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benefits to a lessee once the benefit has been given regardless of the 
evidence of complexity and cost.  
For example, a lessee can be required to provide to a lessor a disclosure 
statement, legal advice certificate and financial advice certificate.  Putting 
aside any question as to the merits of such documents, the requirement to 
provide them means that a lessee must involve a solicitor and an accountant 
in the transaction and incur these costs. The issue for government is to 
ensure that there is a balance between such costs and the benefits of 
legislation763 especially where costs are caused by complex legislation 
without delivering obvious reduction in costs.764 
Governments regularly claim to reduce the burden of “red tape” but their 
efforts often have the opposite effect.  This is because governments consider 
regulation to be the principal method to protect its citizens765. Such “red tape” 
burden includes financial costs such as filing fees, licencing fees and audit 
fees etc. and costs of compliance such as staff training, configuring 
equipment and documents and regulation induced delays such as form 
completion, form lodgement and waiting for approvals.766 The result is that 
consumers are disadvantaged because of less competition between retailers 
and because, ultimately, additional compliance costs are added to the sale 
price of items.767 Some of the measures that had been introduced in the retail 
                                                             
763 Government of Victoria, Regulatory Impact Statement on the Proposed Retail Leases Regulation, 
March 2003. 
764 Eileen Webb “The Productivity Commission Enquiry Report: The Market for Retail Tenancy 
Leases in Australia” (2009) 16 Australian Property Law Journal 219, 220. 
765 Government of Western Australia, Reducing the Burden – Report of the Red Tape Reduction 
Group (2009), 23. 
766 Government of South Australia, Reducing Red Tape for Business in South Australia (2010/2011), 
5. 
767 Government of Western Australia, Reducing the Burden – Report of the Red Take Reduction 
Group (2009), 23. 
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leasing legislation over the years have not achieved a significant benefit to 
either party and simply raised costs of compliance.768     
Poorly drafted regulation may contain unclear or questionable objectives 
and/or a failure to sufficiently target a perceived problem.769 For example, a 
move by the Western Australian government to prohibit the recovery of 
management fees as an outgoing encouraged many lessors to alter their 
leases to move from a net rent plus outlays position to a gross rent position 
which would allow them to recover the management fees by incorporating 
those fees into the gross rent. The lessees incurred costs in altering their 
leases and the result of the change was that accountability and transparency 
in relation to the component of cost was lost.  
In addition to such compliance costs, poorly drafted regulation can impose 
costs on government and damage the marketplace as additional compliance 
costs make it more expensive for new businesses to enter the market with 
the result that there will be less new business entering the market and 
therefore less competition with existing businesses.770 It is in the interests of 
both the lessor and the lessee that legal processes and business practices 
be as simple as possible to allow: 
(i) easy entry and exit771 from a lease and flexibility regarding lease term; 
                                                             
768 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 249. 
769 Australian Government, Rethinking Regulation – Report of the Task Force on Reducing 
Regulatory Burdens on Business (January 2006), [2.2]. 
770 Government of Western Australia, Reducing the Burden – Report of the Red Tape Reduction 
Group (2009), 23. 
771 For example, when assigning a lease, prior to retail lease legislation, a lessee only had to obtain 
the consent of the lessor. Pursuant to retail lease legislation a lessee now has to ensure that 
additional steps occur such as the lessee providing formal disclosure documents to the assignee, 
obtaining formal disclosure and certificates from the assignee and ensuring additional disclosure 
from the lessor to the assignee.  Such steps increase the complexity of “exiting” a lease. 
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(ii) a full understanding of the terms of the lease and the leasing 
relationship;772 
(iii) a full and effective due diligence process to be carried out by both the 
lessor and the lessee prior to any formal relationship being entered into; 
(iv) an improvement of the understanding by individuals entering into small 
business about their commitments under the lease to reduce the perception 
that a lessor or its agent is misleading or deceiving the lessee during 
negotiation.773 
Leases and the leasing process can be made more understandable by the 
use of simple language, simplification of lease charges and simplified and 
concise disclosure of key clauses.774 This can be achieved by the lessor 
providing a simpler document than the typical lengthy disclosure statement.  
 
Alternatively, legislation could provide for a standard lease document where 
certain basic lease terms are provided.  The UK Voluntary Lease Code 2007 
contains within it a Model Heads of Terms of the lease containing basic 
details such as property details, party details, lease term, initial works, 
security requirement, use, assignment and subletting provisions, service 
charges, insurance and whether the lease has a mandatory right of renewal 
under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (UK).  
This is particularly pertinent as section 21 of the Australian Consumer Law 
(“ACL”)775 provides that in determining whether a person has engaged in 
                                                             
772 N Crosby, C Hughes and S Murdoch, ‘Flexible Leasing and the Small Business Tenant’ (Paper 
presented at the Pacific Rim Real Estate Society, Auckland, January 2006) [6.2]. 
773 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 171. 
774 Ibid. 
775 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Schedule 2 (“Australian Consumer Law”). 
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conduct which is unconscionable a court can take into account whether a 
customer was able to understand a document relating to the supply of goods 
and services.776 
These suggestions are not new.  In 1997 the Reid Committee formed the 
view that it was fundamental that small retailers be given documentation and 
information that they could understand777 while the Victorian Small Business 
Development Corporation in its report of October 1982 stated that most of 
the abuses by lessors arose from the language the lease and the lessee’s 
lack of understanding of that language.778 Many lessees were very reluctant 
to obtain independent advice thus compounding the problem. Lessees and 
lessors would often only be looking at their lease after a dispute arose many 
seeing the relevant clause for the first time. 
Courts have always been willing to overturn contracts because of the 
unconscionable conduct of one party to the contract in circumstances where 
such conduct involves exploiting a special disadvantage of the other party.779 
 
Such special disadvantage includes situations such as illness or impaired 
faculties and circumstances where the complexity of a document is an issue 
in cases involving ignorance and inexperience,780 lack of legal advice, 781 
                                                             
776 Australian Consumer Law, s22(i)(c). 
777 Reid Report 1997, 66. 
778 Referred to in the Retail Tenancies Advisory Committee (Vic), Report of the Retail Tenancies 
Advisory Committee, Victoria, (February 1984), 1. (“Arnold Report 1984”). 
779 Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
780 Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362, 415 (Kitto J). 
781 Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 158 ALR 66, [41]. 
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lack of education 782 or “lack of assistance or explanation where assistance 
or explanation is necessary.”783 
Where a lessee has a sound understanding of the terms of a lease, through 
access to independent advice, it becomes more difficult for that lessee to 
later claim that the lessor has behaved unconscionably in insisting upon the 
terms of the document784 especially where both parties bargained on an 
equal footing.785  
The introduction of a requirement for the provision of disclosure statements 
to prospective lessees to simplify the leasing process was a common 
recommendation of several enquiries.786 A lease consists of many pages of 
legalese and it is impossible to “anticipate the ingenuity of lawyers or the 
stipulations which may be required in leases by some landlords.”787 
Disclosure statements were not initially part of retail lease legislation 
however they are now required in each Australian jurisdiction.788 The amount 
of information required in disclosure statements has gradually increased 
over the years.789 In 2008, the Productivity Commission found that further 
improvements could be made in relation to disclosure790 and that a uniform 
                                                             
782 Wilton v Farnworth (1948)76 CLR 646, 655 (Rich J). 
783 Blomely v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362, 406 (Fullagar J). 
784 Golden Harvest (Aust) Pty Ltd v Paing Pty Ltd [2002] NSWADT 102, [42]. 
785 Ull v Adwell Holdings [2009] NSW ADT 246. 
786 Retail Liaison Committee (WA), Report of the Inquiry into Commercial Tenancy Agreements 
(February 1984), 29. (“Clarke Report 1984”). 
787 Ibid, 29 -30. 
788 Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s11; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s22; Retail Leases Act 2003 
(Vic) s17; Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s12 Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) 
Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s6; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001(ACT) s30; Fair Trading (Code 
of Practice) Retail Tenancies Regulations 1998 (Tas) s6; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 
(NT) s19. 
789 E Webb, “Almost a Decade On – A (Reid) Report Card on Retail Leasing” (2006) 13 Australian 
Property Law Journal 240,276. 
790 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), xxvi. 
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disclosure statement, with uniform terminology, would be preferable.791 In 
2010, a uniform disclosure statement was agreed to for New South Wales, 
Victoria and Queensland792 which required even greater disclosure then the 
previous disclosure statements in the individual states.793 
The purpose of the uniform disclosure statement was to reduce the 
regulatory burden on multi-jurisdictional lessors and to improve information 
flow to lessees.794 
Lease regulation, the leasing process and the typical retail lease itself are 
still too complex for a normal lessee to understand without assistance.  Such 
assistance currently includes the supply of disclosure statements795 and the 
requirement that a lessee obtain professional advice evidenced by 
certificates796 Although detailed disclosure requirements may reduce the 
information asymmetry between lessors and lessees the extent of such 
information disclosure or the size of the disclosure statement is currently too 
                                                             
791 Ibid, xxxi. 
792 Senate Economics Reference Committee, Parliament of Australia, Need for a National Approach 
to Retail Leasing Arrangements, 18th March 2015, 36. 
793 Such as attaching any plans of the premises, providing details of  incentives the lessor is 
providing to the lessee, setting out the lessor's requirements on the quality and standard of the 
lessee's fitout, listing any alteration works required to the premises or to be made to the building or 
the centre, including to the surrounding roads, providing details of the shopping centre's annual 
estimated turnover and the annual estimated turnover by the specialty retail shops on a per square 
metre basis, providing details of the anchor lessees, providing assurance to the lessee that the 
current tenancy mix in this shopping centre will not be altered by the introduction of direct 
competitors to the lessee, disclosing current legal proceedings, warning lessees that they have some 
remedies if the information provided in the disclosure statement is misleading or false or materially 
incomplete.  See Newton G, “Update On Retail Leasing, Cases, Disclosure Statement and Legislation” 
(Paper presented at Australian Institute of Conveyancers NSW Regional Day, Coffs Harbour, 
Saturday 18 June 2011) 9. 
794 G Newton, “Update On Retail Leasing, Cases, Disclosure Statement and Legislation” (Paper 
presented at Australian Institute of Conveyancers NSW Regional Day, Coffs Harbour, Saturday 18 
June 2011) 8. 
795 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s 17(1)(a); Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s 22; Fair Trading (Code 
of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulations 1998 (Tas) cl 12; Retail & Commercial Leases Act 1995 
(SA) s 12; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s 6; Retail Leases Act 1994 
(NSW) s 11; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) s 30; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) 
Act 2003 (NT) s 19. 
796 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s 22D (1). 
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great for the lessee to absorb such that legal advice is virtually essential.797  
The effect of such disclosure is that the lessee, in attempting to understand 
the disclosure statement, incurs costs in receiving such advice   
Instead of legal advice, the lessees understanding of documents (both 
leases and disclosure statements) may be improved by lessee education. 
Education of prospective lessees has also been considered by various 
committees of enquiry. However, this desire, while laudatory, also has 
pitfalls. 
The ACT Working Party received numerous submissions to the effect that 
the problems of the retail leasing industry could be solved by increased 
lessee education.798 In fact, the ACT Working Party, although acknowledging 
that lease documents are complex,799 believed that disclosure statements 
were not necessary because the same result could be achieved by lessee 
education.800 Education programs for lessees are provided in all jurisdictions 
by state and territory governments and federally, by the ACCC801 Increased 
education would, logically, increase the understanding by the lessees of the 
lease transaction and the actions of the lessor thereby leading to lesser 
disputes.802 However, prospective lessees cannot be forced to access these 
services and cannot be sanctioned if they do not. Community education is 
often seen as a panacea for the problems of modern governments. 
                                                             
797 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 157. 
798 ACT Report 1984, 3.  
799 Ibid, 20 
800 Ibid, 20. 
801 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 60. 
802 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 184. 
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Avoidance of complexity is identified as a common goal in the discussions of 
the various committees of enquiry803 as a method of protecting the interests 
of the lessee and to reduce costs. The main beneficiaries of any simplified 
retail leasing legislation throughout Australia are national lessors and 
lessees whose situation is simplified leading to definite cost reduction.  
 
Conclusion 
Both lessees and lessors can be subjected to additional cost burdens arising 
out delay, lack of certainty or the costs of resolution of disputes. In addition, 
transactional costs are increased because of complexity of different and 
constantly changing retail lease legislation, lease documentation, or the 
leasing process.  Such costs can be minimised by the drafting of simple 
regulation, the use of standardised lease terms and procedures, ensuring 
that legislation provides certainty to all parties, reducing delay and 
eliminating procedures that increase costs but provide minimal benefit to the 
parties. It is understood that this objective would require an unusual degree 
of co-operation between all jurisdictions. 
                                                                                                                                          
2.3 Delay 
Justice delayed is justice denied.804 In particular, where the parties to a 
dispute differ greatly in the availability of resources, such denial of justice is 
magnified.  Most commonly in a retail tenancy dispute, there is a vast 
                                                             
803 Reid Report 1997, 64; Arnold Report 1984, 26; Clarke Report 1984, 30; ACT Report 1984, 20. 
804 Sir Garfield Barwick, ’The Australian Judicial System: The Proposed New Federal Superior Court 
[1964] Federal Law Review 1, 20.  See also Jaygo v District Court of New South Wales [1989] HCA 46, 
[20], Townsville City Council and Anor v Department of Main Roads [2006] 1 Qd R 77. See also 
Martin Luther King, “Letter from Bermingham Jail” 6.  
<http://okra.stanford.edu/transcription/document_images/undecided/630416-019.pdf.>  
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difference in the financial resources of the lessor and the lessee.  Delay is 
often a tactic adopted by the wealthier party because they can afford the 
expense involved that such delaying tactics will incur.805   Delay is a useful 
tool to a lessor as the lessee has only a limited period under the lease to 
enjoy occupation of the leased premises and late into a lease term a 
disgruntled lessee would be unlikely to take action against a lessor because 
of that reason.806 Where a lessee has a lease term of only three (3) years, a 
delay of even six (6) months in obtaining resolution of a problem, can cause 
irreparable damage to both the lessee’s business and to the relationship 
between the lessee and the lessor. 
Delay by a lessor could include delaying consent to an assignment,807 delay 
in effecting repairs,808 or a delay in providing information to a lessee 
regarding rent review809 or delay caused by instituting tribunal proceedings 
to seek a remedy.810 Delay has been identified as a tool used by lessors to 
limit the availability of lease information by the refusal to return executed 
lease documents.811 Lessors can also delay responding to a request for 
lease renewal until the last minute, thereby increasing pressure upon the 
lessee to accept the lessor’s proposal.812 
Retail lease legislation that allows either party to benefit from delay is 
ineffective and self-defeating. Delay alone may result in a party losing their 
                                                             
805 Small Business Development Corporation (WA) Submission No DR 240 to 
Productivity Commission, Access to Justice Arrangements, Report No 72, 5 September 2014, 12. 
806 ACCC v Dukemaster [2009] ATPR 42-290. 
807 Cooper Report 1981, 4. 
808 Arnold Report 1984, 43. 
809 ACCC v LeeLee (2000) ATPR 41-742. See also Hill Report 1983. 
810 Worlds Best Holding Ltd v Sarker [2010] 14 BPR 27,549. 
811 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 204.   
812 Clarke Report 1984, 25. 
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rights merely by passage of time. For example, delay by a lessor in 
responding to a request to assign a lease may cause an impatient buyer to 
elect not to proceed with the purchase of the lessee’s business.813 
One of the key factors reducing the effectiveness of dispute resolution 
procedures is the delay inherent in getting before a tribunal or awaiting the 
resolution of an appeal to the Court.814 Dispute resolution procedures can be 
frustrated by delaying tactics adopted by lessors815 because the lack of 
limitation of the right to appeal from decisions of low cost tribunals resulting 
in lessors often appealing an unsuccessful result to a higher court causing 
further delay.816 The Reid Committee received evidence of one particular 
matter which was determined in a tribunal in favour of the lessee and then 
immediately appealed to the District Court and later the Supreme Court.817 
In Worlds Best Holding Ltd v Sarker818 the lessor was found to have 
behaved unconscionably in that its actions were not undertaken in good faith 
and were calculated to wear down the lessee by delaying the resumption of 
trading and exhausting resources by forcing the lessee to defend 
unmeritorious litigation.819 The lessor attempted to use delay as a weapon 
against the lessee knowing that the lessee had limited financial resources 
                                                             
813 Reid Report 1997, 40. 
814 Ibid, 27. 
815 Ibid, 28. 
816 Evidence to the Reid Enquiry, Perth, 11 November 1996, 406 (Len Rathmann of Western 
Australian Council of Retail Associations). 
It becomes a situation where lawyers can joust and be expensive in their whole approach 
such that the smaller retailer has no way whatsoever of being able to sustain the financial 
pressures that are imposed on them.  The owners and the centre managers know this only 
too well – they are only too happy to admit it to people like me – so that this is exactly the 
way in which they will conduct proceedings because they can last longer than those tenants 
can. 
817 Reid Report 1997, 35. 
818 [2010] 14 BPR 27,549. 
819 Ibid, [91]. 
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and that, by protracting the litigation, those resources were further 
diminished.  
Delay is not just the tool of the lessor.  In the right circumstances, a lessee 
can use delay to its advantage by making unreasonable demands and using 
obstructive methods to hinder a lessor.  For example, a lessor on the point of 
sale of premises may find it advantageous to have proper leases in place 
prior to such sale and to have all disputes with lessees resolved.  In such 
circumstances, the lessees may delay dealing with the increasingly 
desperate lessor so as to secure the best terms for themselves.820  
Most lessees and many lessors are unwilling to start court proceedings due 
to the cost of legal representation and the time delays in determining cases 
and uncertainty of result.821 Litigation naturally causes all disputes to 
become protracted822 and time consuming.823 Mandatory dispute resolution 
provisions of the retail lease legislation through compulsory first stage 
mediation attempts to resolve disputes in a timely fashion which theoretically 
allows the parties to return to a proper working relationship.824 As part of its 
2008 inquiry, however, the Productivity Commission received submissions to 
the effect that although acknowledging the ability to refer complaints to a 
dispute resolution process through the Small Business Commissioner was 
generally useful, such process was too slow in that the complainant lessee 
                                                             
820 Bond University v Limgold [1997] QSC 227.  
821 Arnold Report 1984, 2. 
822 Arnold Report 1984, 14. 
823 Ibid, 28. 
824 P Prindable, ‘Is Mediation an Alternative in Commercial Lease Dispute Resolution’ (1994) 5 
Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 99, 102. 
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required the early intervention of the Commissioner so that the lessor 
became aware of independent third party intervention.825   
 
Conclusion 
Delay is an effective tool of the lessor to achieve its objective, whether such 
an objective is to wear the other party down in litigation, or to limit the 
availability of lease information or to frustrate a lessee’s desire to assign its 
lease. Any  retail lease legislation must include provisions limiting the ability 
of either party, but particularly the lessor, to cause delay by, for example, 
restricting the parties right to appeal to certain time limits and grounds.  
In circumstances where the issue of delay is so prevalent in each of the 
various enquiries, it is submitted that the reduction of delay is an appropriate 
benchmark to be used in assessing the effectiveness of retail leasing 
legislation. 
 
2.4  Redundancy 
Particularly detailed legislative requirements in a commercial transaction can 
cause a significant burden upon both parties but particularly upon small 
businesses not equipped to deal with red tape or with complicated 
procedures. 
Where other legislation outside retail leases deals with the same problem 
more simply than retail lease legislation, the latter must impose another 
pointless layer of compliance leading to delay and increased costs. 
                                                             
807 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 185. (Evidence provided by NewsXpress Pty Ltd, Transcripts, 498.) 
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For example, section 22 of the now repealed Retail Tenancies Reform Act 
1998 (Vic) provided that the lessor must not unreasonably withhold consent 
to an assignment and if the lessee does unreasonably withhold consent the 
assignment may proceed without consent.  This is simply a re-statement of 
the common law and is unnecessary.826 Another example relates to 
assignments.  In 1988, a new section 13(3) was added into the Retail Shop 
Leases Act (Qld) 1984 which governed the situation where a lessee had no 
option to renew.  The section put in place the following procedure: - 
(a) Not less than 4 months prior to lease termination the lessee could 
request the lessor to renew the Lease; 
(b) Not less than 3 months prior to lease termination the lessor must 
advise whether a new term would be granted and the lease conditions; 
(c) Not less than 2 months before lease termination, if the lessor confirms 
that a new lease term will be available, the lessee must give notice of 
acceptance to the lessor; 
(d) If the lessor fails to respond in the appropriate time frame, then the 
lessee becomes automatically entitled to a three month extension on its 
lease. 
 
Putting aside any consideration as to whether a lessor would have sufficient 
time to consider its position and later prepare the necessary lease terms 
within one month, it would seem that this provision only formalises a 
                                                             
826 Massart v Blight (1951)82 CLR 423, 440; Dufaur v Keneally (1908)28 NZLR 269. 
223 
 
procedure that a reasonably diligent lessee and lessor would adopt in any 
event.827 
Furthermore, the imposition of a three month extension to the lease does not 
appear to be of any significant benefit to the lessee. It would seem that the 
imposition of this extension is to give the lessee time to make other leasing 
arrangements.828   
A three month extension does not, however, seem to be of sufficient 
detriment to cause a lessor to alter its’ conduct. Although the procedure may 
make a tardy lessor act more swiftly, it is more likely to cause a lessor to 
adopt the path of least resistance and simply state under step (b) above that 
no new lease term will be granted.  Having disposed of its statutory 
obligation under Section 13(3) the lessor could then, in its own time, 
approach the lessee and advise that a new lease term may be available 
provided the lessee meets the lessor’s terms.829 This could even prove more 
counter-productive to the lessee in future negotiations with the lessor. 
The equivalent provision to section 13(3) under the Retail Shop Leases Act 
(Qld) 1994 is Section 46AA.  That section alters the timeframes somewhat 
from section 13(3) however the basic premise remains which is that if the 
                                                             
827 W D Duncan, ‘The Retail Shop Leases Act Amendment Act 1988 - A Sledgehammer to Crack a 
Nut’ (1988) Queensland Law Society Journal 385, 389. 
One would have thought that this subsection is hardly necessary. If the existing tenant who 
must be aware that he does not have an option to renew, desires to take a new lease, then 
he could approach the landlord some months before the expiration of the lease and seek 
advice as to whether or not a new lease would be offered to him and upon what terms. 
What the subsection does in relation to those leases to which it applies, is to put the onus 
upon the landlord after receiving notice from the tenant to make up his mind whether or not 
he will offer the tenant the option to take a new lease and upon what terms. 
828 White v Downes [2012] QCAT450. 
829 Colin Anderson, (1992) ‘The Retail Shop Leases Act 1984 (Qld): Does It Remedy a Mischief?’ 
(1992) 4 (1) Bond Law Review 73, 87-88. 
It is difficult to see any significant advantage to a tenant in gaining a mere three months in 
such circumstances. Also no justification for imposing such a duty on a landlord is apparent 
given that the lease contains no option to renew and therefore it would seem open to the 
landlord to refuse to grant such a renewal. 
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lessee gives notice to the lessor prior to the end of the lease, the lessor must 
respond within a certain timeframe (which is different depending on the term 
of the lease) otherwise the lessee may be granted six month extension to the 
lease term which may be ended by the lessee upon giving one months’ 
notice. 
The effect of both section 13(3) and section 46AA, therefore, is to provide to 
a lessee almost exactly the same rights as the lessee would have at 
common law.830  It is only if the lessor ignores the initial notice from the 
lessee that the lessee gains a small advantage by way of an extra period 
added to the lease term. It also presumes that the lessee benefits from not 
seeking to regularise its own position by initiating action before the end of 
the lease term which would evidence poor business practice. 
 
Redundancies arise not only where the legislation grants rights already 
available at common law but also where rights are already available 
pursuant to other legislation.831 Such overlap should not occur unless there 
is a benefit to the parties.832 
                                                             
830 The writer has located no cases that deal with s13(3) Retail Shop Leases Act 1984 (Qld) and only 
two cases that deal with s46AA of the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld). In White v Downes [2012] 
QCAT 450 the tribunal found that the lessee was entitled to a six-month extension pursuant to 
s46AA while in Topbeach Pty Ltd v Seafarers Investments Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 459 the court found 
that s46AA did not apply as the lessee had not requested an extension of the lease prior to the lease 
expiring as required by s46AA(4A). 
831Westfield, Submission no. 85 to Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases 
in Australia - Report No.43 (31st March 2008), 16. 
  … there is, uniquely within Australia, excessive regulation of the retail tenancy lease 
market through the operation of State and Territory retail tenancy laws which are, in the 
main, designed to protect retail tenants as a class. Those laws regulate all aspects of the 
landlord and tenant relationship. In addition, they are supplemented by Commonwealth 
law principally in the form of the TPA … State and Territory Retail Tenancy and 
associated legislation, such as Fair Trading Laws, also provide remedies for 
unconscionable conduct and misleading and deceptive conduct. It is apparent that the 
existence of this regulatory framework embeds a significant level of cost within the 
market for retail tenancies. This cost includes not only the cost of compliance, 
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For example, Section 121(1) (a) (i) of the Property Law Act (Qld) 1974 
provides that a lessor may not unreasonably withhold consent to an 
assignment of lease.  A delay by the lessor in providing such consent would 
amount to a “refusal” for the purposes of the section.  Despite this section 
11(1) of the Retail Shop Leases Act (Qld) 1984 provided that where a lessee 
requests an assignment and provides adequate particulars, the failure of the 
lessor to answer in thirty days created a dispute referrable to a mediator. 
Similarly, under Section 50(1) of the Retail Shop Leases Act (Qld) 1994 a 
retail tenancy dispute was deemed to exist if the lessor had not provided its 
answer within one month.  Any “retail tenancy dispute” may be referred to 
mediation pursuant to section 55 of the Retail Shop Leases Act (Qld) 1994. 
Neither the 1984 nor the 1994 provision significantly increased the rights of 
the parties over and above what was already available under Section 
121(1)(a)(1) of the Property Law Act (Qld) 1974.  A dispute under Section 
121(1) (a) (1) would be sufficient to amount to a “retail tenancy dispute” 833 
for the purposes of referral to mediation under the Retail Shop Leases Act 
1994 (Qld)834 or determination by tribunal.835 A re-statement of the law within 
the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) would only be necessary where such 
re-statement was required to give jurisdiction to the tribunal, however, the 
definition of “retail tenancy dispute” is sufficiently wide enough to allow the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
principally borne by landlords, but also the cost to the taxpayer of the bureaucracy and 
administrative infrastructure required to oversee and administer these laws. 
832 Ibid, 96. 
833 The Dictionary to the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) provides: - 
‘retail tenancy dispute means any dispute under or about a retail shop lease, or about the 
use or occupation of a leased shop under a retail shop lease, regardless of when the lease 
was entered into.’ 
834 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s55. 
835 Ibid, s64. 
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tribunal to hear a dispute arising from the application of other legislation 
provided the dispute is about a retail shop lease. 
 
Similarly, any breach of the common law right of quiet possession would 
amount to a “retail tenancy dispute” for the purposes of the dispute 
provisions of the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) and, as such, provisions 
within the Act836 giving the lessee the right to make a claim for compensation 
for disturbance are unnecessary. If nothing is added to the rights of either 
party except complexity it seems unnecessary for the legislation to be 
enacted.837 
 
Finally, it must be remembered that the Retail Shop Lease Act 1984 (Qld) 
came into being in Queensland over thirty years ago.  Since that time, there 
have been significant amendments to the Australian Consumer Law which 
have enhanced the protection afforded to parties like lessees.  Retail lease 
legislation may be redundant not because of any particular section of the 
legislation but because the result sought to be achieved by passing the 
legislation has now been achieved through the amendments to the another 
Act covering the field.838 
                                                             
836 Ibid, Part 6, Division 7. 
837 WD Duncan, “The Regulation of Commercial Tenancies – Heading for the Sunset?” (1990) 2 
Bond Law Review 28, 33 referring to Section 11 of the Retail Shop Leases Act (Qld) 1984 
It is submitted that this provision in all jurisdictions adds little to the law as it stood, which 
provided, by statute, that in all leases containing a covenant against assigning or subletting 
without licence or consent, that particular covenant shall be deemed to be subject to a 
provision that the licence or consent is not to be unreasonably withheld. 
… The provisions of the retail tenancies legislation merely, and somewhat unnecessarily, 
provide an overlay to the already existing provisions of the statutes which were adequate to 
meet the particular contingencies to which this legislation was directed. 
838 Colin Anderson,  ‘The Retail Shop Leases Act 1984 (Qld): Does It Remedy a Mischief?’ (1992) 4(1) 
Bond Law Review 73, 93. 
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Redundancy is an appropriate benchmark in assessing the efficacy of 
existing legislation and should be particularly avoided where it impacts in any 
way upon the conduct of small business.   
 
2.5 Balanced Protection 
Retail Leasing legislation throughout the country is undeniably of a 
“consumer protection”839 nature enacted to mainly protect the interests of the 
small business at the expense of large business i.e. lessors 840 as it appears 
to be accepted that where the lessor has the superior bargaining position the 
lessee requires similar statutory protection as that given to a consumer. 841 
Retail leasing legislation was first introduced in Queensland in 1984 because 
of the complaints received by the government from lessees concerning 
overbearing conduct of lessors.  According to Duncan: - 
‘At the foundation of these complaints was the fact that the lessees 
effectively had no bargaining power in relation to terms and conditions 
of their leases and were entirely at the mercy of the complex 
owners.’842 
It was the perception of the lessors as all powerful and the lessees as 
powerless that led to various governments initially passing retail leasing 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
…the Trade Practices Act is now supplemented by the Fair Trading Act (Qld) 1989. It can 
therefore be suggested that the Act ought to be reviewed. Serious consideration needs to be 
given to the proposition that other legislation may adequately cover the problems raised in 
the Cooper Report. Many of the more extreme provisions require greater justification for 
their continued existence. In the present economic climate, the reduction of unnecessary 
regulation and the encouragement of investment would seem preferable goals if tenants 
could be adequately protected by other legislation.  
839 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 30 March 1990, 1085 (Retail Shop Lease Amendment Bill 
Second Reading by Mr Connor). 
840 Vesco Nominees Pty Ltd v Stefan Hair Fashions Pty Ltd [2002] ANZ Conv R 23, [55]. 
841 A Bradbrook, The New Era of Tenancy Protection, (1987) 61 Australian Law Journal 593, 614. 
842 WD Duncan, “The Regulation of Commercial Tenancies – Heading for the Sunset?” (1990) 2 
Bond Law Review 28, 28. 
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legislation.843 The need to favour the interests of lessees over the interests 
of lessors arises because of the nature of the leasing market.844 In turn, this 
allows the lessors to specifically exert power over individual lessees by 
insisting that lessees enter into leases that favour lessors on a “take it or 
leave it” basis.845 There is little new here as most lessors contract 
substantially on these terms except with large public companies. 
The imbalance of bargaining power between lessor and lessee846 
recognised in the Reid Report,847 led to the enactment of s51AC of the 
Trade Practices Act 848 in an attempt to restore the balance between the 
parties.849  
 
A lessee’s power increases or decreases depending upon circumstances.  A 
lessee offering to lease premises where demand for space is high has less 
bargaining power then when demand is low.  This position is exacerbated 
where the lessee is attempting to renew its lease at the conclusion of a lease 
term where there are no options to renew which is usually the case.850 
Although at a disadvantage a lessee in such a position is not suffering from a 
special disadvantage and the remedies for unconscionable conduct are not 
                                                             
843 L Davies, “Final Report on Consultancy Study of Common National Commercial and Retail 
Tenancy Issues, 1991, Report for the Department of Primary Industry, Technology and Commerce, 
Australian Government, Canberra, 3. 
844 Reid Report 1997 [2.27]. 
845 P Prindable, ‘Is Mediation an Alternative in Commercial Lease Dispute Resolution’ (1994) 5 
Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 99, 102. 
846 Minister for Workplace Relations and Small Business, Trade Practices Amendment (Fair Trading) 
Bill 1997, Second Reading Speech, House of Representatives, 30 September 1997.  
847 Reid Report 1997, 17. 
848 Now replaced by Competition and Consumer Act Schedule 2, s22. 
849 I Villiers and E Webb, ‘Using Relational Contract Principles to Construe the Landlord-Tenant 
Relationship: Some Preliminary Observations’ (2011) 1 Property Law Review 21, 25. 
850 Ibid, 36. 
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available to them.851 The conduct of the lessor, in using the lessee’s lack of 
security of tenure to extract concessions, may be viewed as unfair, however 
acting “unfairly” is not acting unconscionably.852 
According to the Beddall Report, the bargaining power held by lessors could 
lead to abuse of that power. To prevent this, it recommends an “industry 
wide standard” setting out the rights of the lessor and lessee.853 
Putting aside any “industry wide standard” it is clear that the Beddall Report 
emphasised the need to protect the rights of both the lessors and lessee.  
However, it was the need to protect the interests of the lessee as small 
business owners that led to the enactment of retail leasing legislation in the 
first place.854   
The purpose of retail lease legislation is theoretically to balance the rights of 
the lessor and the lessee855 by providing a regulatory framework which is fair 
to both lessor and lessee.856 Attempting to find the perfect position for the 
legislation such that it will balance the position of both the lessor and the 
lessee is one factor that causes retail leasing legislation to be in a constant 
state of flux.  For example, soon after the Productivity Commission issued its 
draft report on leasing law in Australia in 2007,857 the NSW Government 
                                                             
851 ACCC v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 51, [15]. 
852 ACCC v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 189 ALR 76, [50]. 
853 Beddall Report 1990, 104. 
854 W D Duncan WD, Commercial and Retail Leases in Australia, (Thomsen Reuters, 7th edition, 
2012 [Qld 3.20]. 
855 Epworth Group Holdings Pty Ltd v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2011] SASFC32, [43]. 
856 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 30 November 2011, 1010-1011 
(Second Reading Speech of Attorney General for Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995). 
857 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia Draft Report, 
(2007). 
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announced yet another review into retail leasing law and released a 
discussion paper in April 2008.858 
The various government committees set up over the years all acknowledge 
that the law should be altered to provide greater power to lessees and 
thereby balanced bargaining positions, but not so as to put the lessee in a 
more advantageous position than the lessor.859 
The lessee must be able to maximise the full potential of its business but not 
at the expense of the lessor.860  The lessor must still be able to realise the 
full value of their investments without violating the rights of the lessee.861 
Enacting retail lease legislation is, therefore, for the purpose of: - 
(a) adjusting the legal position of a party such that its bargaining position is 
more balanced; 
(b) ensuring that once the legal position of the lessee is modified that the 
positions of the lessor and lessee are balanced or fair. 
It is submitted that any  retail leasing legislation must follow this pattern.  It is 
appropriate to assess the various State and Territory retail lease legislation 
to determine whether the protection provided to both parties in their new 
bargaining positions is balanced. 
 
 
                                                             
858 Department of State and Regional Development (NSW), Issues Affecting the Retail Leasing 
Industry in NSW, (2008). 
859 Department of Justice and Industrial Relations Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading (TAS), Fair 
Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulation 1998 Issues Paper, (1999), 11; Productivity 
Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st March 2008),, 
xxi; Reid Report 1997, 41; Hill Report 1983 (referred to in the ACT Report 1984, 46); Cooper Report 
1981, 30; Arnold Report 1984, 32; Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in 
Australia - Report No.43 (31st March 2008), xxi. 
860 ACCC Commissioner John Martin, “The ACCC and the Property Sector” Speech to Property 
Council of Australia Western Australian Division, 25 October 2005, Perth, 8. 
861 Ibid. 
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2.6  Protection of the Retail Leasing Market 
The retail leasing market can be defined as a market that  
‘exists to provide space for the provision of all manner of final goods 
and services in a retail format to the general public, including individual 
household and business customers.’862 
Any legislation must be drafted such that the retail leasing marketplace itself 
is not adversely affected.  Legislation or regulation of the leasing market can 
only be justified where such intervention results in a net benefit to the 
community and that it does not adversely affect competition in the market 
place.863 Regulation cannot help but affect the retail leasing market as it 
requires both the lessor and lessee to act in a way that is not necessarily in 
the best interests of either one.  For example, the lessors’ disclosure 
statement under the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) is mainly a summary 
of the terms of the proposed lease. However, it additionally requires the 
lessor to disclose its future plans regarding the centre.864 Information 
imbalances between lessor and lessee can result in impaired market 
efficiency as the effective decision making ability of the lessee is reduced 
because of lack of information.  Additionally, the lessee will incur extra costs 
                                                             
862 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 11. 
863 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 7. 
864 Paragraph 17 of the Lessor Disclosure Statement. 
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and delay in obtaining information from outside sources865 which may or may 
not be available or accurate. 
Power, including market power, is finite.  For lessees to gain additional 
power because of retail leasing legislation means that lessors must have 
their power restrained.866 
Any change to the law involving a market place will affect the key players in 
that marketplace.  Not only may it affect the returns that the parties could 
expect to receive on their investments but it may affect the conduct of the 
parties within the market place.   Any regulatory interference by Government 
in the affairs of private parties viz., retail lessors and lessees, may have 
widespread effects over the whole range of commercial and industrial 
leasing activities.867 Poorly designed legislation can result in modification in 
the behaviour of the parties and thereby cause perverse economic 
outcome.868 
 
A good example of such effect is in relation to lease assignments.  
Legislation in some jurisdictions of Australia869 provides that where a lease 
states that any assignment of the lease must be with the lessor’s consent, 
any consent to assignment of a lease shall not be “unreasonably withheld”.  
To ensure control of the lessee, a lessor could choose to simply state in the 
                                                             
865 A Terry and Y Zhang, The Power and Information imbalance in Franchising: The Role of Prior 
Disclosure under the Franchising Code of Conduct, 39 Australian Business Law Review 245, 248. 
866 “The enactment of laws almost invariably circumscribes the rights of individuals. The legislation 
under review limits the freedom to contract.” K Gibbings, “From the Cooper Report to Retail Shop 
Leases Act 1994: Prescription or Placebo?” (1996) 26(5) Queensland Law Society Journal 1996, 409. 
867 Cooper Report 1981, 3. 
868 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), 86. 
869 Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 121(1)(a)(i); Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) s144(1); Property Law 
Act 1969 (WA) s80(1)  and Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s133B. 
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lease that assignment of the lease is strictly forbidden, thereby precluding 
such provisions from operating. 
 
The intention of the legislature was to ensure that lessors could not 
unreasonably withhold consent to an assignment of the lease which without 
the provision they could have done.  The effect of the legislation is, however, 
quite different i.e. lessors alter how they conduct their business by removing 
any right to assign at all except subject to conditions not consent.  Such 
alteration of conduct is not to meet the organic demands of the marketplace 
but simply to circumvent the legislation.  Without the existence of the 
legislation the lessor is likely to have allowed the lessee to assign the lease 
upon more favourable terms. Now, because of the legislation that right is 
often lost.  
 
Another example of such effect is in relation to extensions of lease term. The 
practice of having rent determined before a lessee decides to exercise its 
option to renew resulted in lessors rarely granting options to renew in retail 
leases.870 
Regulation may not only affect the conduct of the parties directly involved in 
the market but also related parties.  Most lessors are corporations or 
investment/superannuation trusts who must answer to their shareholders or 
unit holders.871 
                                                             
870 Department of Justice and Industrial Relations Consumer Affairs (TAS), ‘Review of the Fair 
Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulation 1998 Final Report’ March 2002, 46. 
871 W D Duncan and S Christensen, “Section 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974: An Exocet in 
Retail Shop Leasing”, (1999) 27(4), Australian Business Law Review, 282. 
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A perceived empowerment of lessees may make investing in retail lease 
premises such as shopping centres, in their view, a less attractive option 
because of the possibility of less investment return. For example, a 
submission by Lend Lease to the Reid Committee regarding the possibility of 
rent being assessed purely on a turnover basis, without any base rent, 
stated that unless the investor could obtain surety of income (and this should 
include base rent) investment would not occur.872 
Regulation, when required, must ensure that it does only what is necessary 
to ensure fairness without damaging the market.  The parties are still entitled 
to pursue their legitimate self-interests provided they act within the 
boundaries of “fairness” as determined by the legislature.  According to 
Martin: - 
‘While the ACCC and other regulators have an important role in 
ensuring “the rules of the game are followed fairly”, they must take care 
to avoid impeding reasonable commercial practice, or hindering ‘robust 
competitive behaviour’.873 
The difficult task is, as always, to define the “boundaries of fairness” beyond 
which the result is only unnecessary interference with the rights of the 
parties and subsequent damage to the market place.874  
It is appropriate therefore to consider to what extent legislation to date 
achieves this result and whether legislation can adopt a version of legislation 
already employed in different jurisdictions.   
                                                             
872 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, Parliament 
of Australia, Finding a Balance: Towards Fair Trading in Australia, May 1997; Evidence to Reid 
Enquiry, Canberra ACT, 24 Feb 1997, 807 (Lend Lease). 
873  ACCC Commissioner John Martin, ‘Unconscionable Conduct in Retail Leasing - How to Identify 
and Avoid it’, Speech to the Property Council of Australia, 7 October 2003, 1. 
874 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 March 1990, 1085 (Retail 
Shop Lease Amendment Bill Second Reading by Mr Connor). 
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3.  Enactment of Other Harmonised Legislation in Australia. 
3.1 Introduction. 
In considering a national approach to  retail leasing law, it is appropriate to 
consider the principles driving the need for transactional simplicity  in other 
areas of commercial law that have been the subject of reform or proposed 
reform.  Such drivers assist in the development of benchmarks to assess the 
efficacy of differential retail lease legislation in the various jurisdictions. 
It is proposed to consider three areas of commercial law.  Two of which 
(Personal Property Securities and Consumer Law) have been substantially 
reformed and are the subject on national legislation.  The third area is the 
reform of Work Health and Safety law which has stalled somewhat with the 
Victorian Government deciding not to implement such reforms.875 
 
3.2 The State of Legislation Prior to Reform 
Prior to the enactment of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) 
(“PPSA”) there were numerous statutes dealing with the registration of 
security over personal property in both Federal and State jurisdictions, 
covering many different types of property.876 For example, the registration of 
                                                             
875 Website of Worksafe Victoria as at 23 November 2012. 
http://www.worksafe.vic.gov.au/laws-and-regulations/occupational-health-and-safety/national-
work-health-and-safety-reform 
876 Australian Attorney Generals Department “Review of the Law on Personal Property Securities 
Option Paper”, (11 April 2006), [5]. 
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personal property security in Queensland was controlled by ten (10) different 
pieces of legislation.877 Similar multiple legislation appeared in other State, 
Territory and Federal jurisdictions.878  
 
There were substantial differences in registration arrangements for securities 
in each jurisdiction.879 Securities would have to be registered in more than 
one jurisdiction which caused difficulty where the secured property moved 
between jurisdictions.880  
 
Buyers of goods and lenders would be required to make enquiries in multiple 
jurisdictions regarding secured property.881 Multiple registries increased the 
need for businesses and consumers to deal with different registration rules 
for different kinds of property.882 Lenders were unable to precisely assess 
borrowers for suitability.883  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
The present law of personal property securities is characterised by more than 70 Acts under 
which registration and search vary according to jurisdiction, the nature of the collateral, the 
kind of security interest or whether the debtor is a natural person or a company.  Some 
interests are required to be registered on more than one register to gain protection whilst 
for others there is no available register at all. 
877 Bills of Sale and Other Instruments Act 1995, Consumer Credit Code - Part 5, Cooperatives Act 
1997 s262; Credit (Real Finance) Act 1996, Factors Act 1892, Financial Intermediaries Act 1996, 
Goods Act 1896, Hire Purchase Act 1959, Liens on Crops of Sugarcane Act 1931 and Motor Vehicles 
and Boats Securities Act 1986. 
878 Corporations Act 2001, Designs Act 2003, Patents Act 1990, Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 1994, 
Shipping Registration Act 1981 and Trade Marks Act 1995. See also Australian Attorney Generals 
Department “Review of the Law on Personal Property Securities Option Paper”, (11 April 2006), 
Schedule D. 
879 Australian Attorney Generals Department “Review of the Law on Personal Property Securities  
Option Paper”, (11 April 2006), [57]. 
880 Ibid, [58]. 
881 Ibid, Schedule E, E3. 
882 Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, ‘Review of the Law on Personal Property Securities – 
Discussion Paper No. 1 Registration and Search Issues’ (November 2006), [53] – [54]. 
883 NSW Law Reform Commission, [1992] NSWLRCDP 28, [2.34]. 
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It was only possible to register security over some but not all classes of 
property.884 The registration system was outdated requiring lodgement of 
paper documents rather than electronic lodgement.  In addition registration 
was outdated in terms of type of forms and amount of information 
required.885 In summary, the law for registration of securities was outdated 
and differed greatly between jurisdictions and did not allow security to be 
granted over all assets. 
 
The PPSA came into effect on 30 January 2012 with the underlying purpose 
of streamlining the law and making it more accessible.886 
 
The Australian Consumer Law which appears as Schedule 2 to the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) is, substantially, the re-branded 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (“TPA”) as it copies many of the provisions of 
the TPA. The consumer provisions of the TPA had been added to over the 
years and those provisions had been copied into the various state-based 
Fair Trading Acts.  This has resulted in the TPA and its state-based 
analogues being a mish-mash of legislation compiled by different 
governments with different policy objectives.   
 
The development and application of consumer policy was shared between 
federal and state governments.887 Legislation was, therefore, complex which 
                                                             
884 David E. Allan, “Uniform Personal Property Security Legislation for Australia”, [2002] Bond Law 
Review 1, [4]. 
885 Access Economics Pty Limited, The Costs and Benefits of Personal Property Securities (PPS) 
Reform – A Report for the Australian Attorneys-General’s Department (6 July 2006), 9. 
886 Website of the Personal Property Securities Register as at 30 May 2012. 
http://www.ppsr.gov.au/AbouttheRegister/AboutPPSreform/Pages/default.aspx 
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led to complex contracts.888  Mandatory disclosure requirements resulted in 
confusing more than informing consumers.889  
Remedies available to consumers were also complex and redundant.  For 
example there were over 100 consumer regulators across Australia with 
more than 20 consumer ombudsman offices.890  
 
Work Health and Safety Law throughout Australia consisted of different 
legislation in each jurisdiction and suffered from over-regulation resulting in 
inefficient focus on detailed controls,891 uncertain legal rights892 and 
unnecessary duplication of legislation resulting in too many specialised 
statutes where the principle Work Health and Safety legislation was capable 
of regulating all hazards.893 Complexity undermined consistency and eroded 
protection to employees894 which was contributed to by the divergence 
between state and territory jurisdictions regarding the approach to be taken 
to ensure occupational health and safety.895  In addition, the objects of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
887 Productivity Commission, ‘Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework’ Report No. 45 
(30th April 2008), 49. 
888 F Zumbo, ‘Are Australia’s Consumer Laws Fit for Purpose’ (2007)15 Trade Practices Law Journal 
227, 227. 
889 Senate Standing Committee for Economics, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Trade  
Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill 2009 (2009), [1.19]. 
890 Senate Standing Committee for Economics, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Trade  
Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill 2009 (2009), [2.3]. 
891 For example, Regulation 7 of the Occupational Health and Safety (First Aid) Regulations 1987 
(Vic) prescribed every item to be placed into every first aid kit including the size of the bags to be 
used to contain amputated body parts. 
892 Industry Commission Inquiry Report, An Inquiry into Occupational Health and Safety, Report No 
47, 42 – 44 (1995) http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/6994/47workhev1.pdf as at 
12 November 2012, 41-42. 
893 Ibid, 47. 
894 Ibid, 66. 
895 Australian Government “National Review and to Model Occupational Health & Safety Laws 
Issues Paper” May 2008 [1.1]. 
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various occupational health and safety legislation in each state and territory 
varied considerably.896   
Within each jurisdiction there was a fragmentation of laws with such laws 
being enforced by various agencies within that jurisdiction.897  For example 
New South Wales had a general occupational health and safety act covering 
all industries including mining but separate acts applying to coal mining.  
Queensland and Western Australia had industry specific laws covering the 
mining industry which were exempt from the general occupational health and 
safety law.   
Occupational health and safety legalisation applied only to the traditional 
employment relationship and did not cover contractors, franchisors and 
labour hire companies nor did it recognise the growth in casual jobs and part 
time jobs, outsourcing, job-sharing, labour hire, migrant workers and home 
works.898  
 
 
3.3 Drivers for Reform 
In each area of reform similar concerns arose resulting in the need for fresh 
legislation.  Complex, defective or redundant legislation resulted in 
compliance being difficult or the rights of the parties being uncertain thereby 
causing greater costs, delay and imbalance in the rights of relevant parties 
concerned to the ultimate detriment to the market as a whole. 
3.3.1 Costs 
                                                             
896 Ibid, [1.2]. 
897 Ibid, [2.1]. 
898 Ibid, [2.3]. 
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(a) Costs arising from Complex, Redundant or Defective Legislation 
The previous legislation was unnecessarily complex and was not cost 
effective in that the cost of compliance outweighed the benefit to society that 
the legislation was supposed to deliver. 
Compliance with different legislation across multiple jurisdictions imposed 
additional costs899 on all parties to a transaction.900 
Such complexity also added unnecessary legal costs in that the parties 
would have to be legally advised separately in each jurisdiction regarding the 
legislation not only in relation to the transaction but also where the party’s 
documentation met the requirement of that particular jurisdictions’ 
legislation.901 
 
Additional costs were also incurred by multi-jurisdictional parties in 
complying because of the inability to centralise functions902 e.g. the need to 
maintain regional offices or to retain different lawyers in each State or 
Territory where local knowledge of leasing practices and the application of 
the local statute might be essential because of the complexity of the 
legislation. 
                                                             
899 Australian Attorney Generals Department “Review of the Law on Personal Property Securities 
Option Paper”, (11 April 2006), [57].  
900 For example, the need to register a security in more than one jurisdiction imposed additional 
and unnecessary costs particularly where the borrower’s property moved between jurisdictions 
Significant differences in occupational health and safety requirements placed considerable 
compliance burden and cost on multi-state employers.  In addition, mobile workers were affected as 
they were required to be familiar with multiple occupational health and safety regimes. See 
Productivity Commission Report, National Workers Compensation and Occupational Health and 
Safety Frameworks, Report No. 27, Australian Government Canberra 2004, XXII.; Access Economics 
Pty Limited, The Costs and Benefits of Personal Property Securities (PPS) Reform – A Report for the 
Australian Attorneys-General’s Department (6 July 2006), 9. 
901 Ibid, 228. 
902 Productivity Commission, ‘Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework’, Report No. 45 
(30th April 2008), 17. 
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Deficient regulation or over-regulation resulted in inconsistent application of 
such legislation. For example, deficiencies in the mandatory disclosure of 
information pursuant to the repealed Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 903 had 
resulted in such disclosure confusing rather than informing consumers with 
the result that the consumer would either abandon the transaction (at a cost 
to the supplier) or not make good use of the information in the disclosure 
document.904 
The extra transaction and compliance costs incurred by businesses, arising 
because of the complexity and uncertainty of the previous legislation, were 
passed on to consumers.905  
 
(b) Costs arising because of unnecessary duplication of materials. 
Being required to prepare different documents for different jurisdictions for 
exactly the same circumstances and then to process such documents in 
different ways caused additional costs. A multi-jurisdictional lessor and 
lessee would prefer to have standardised documents and processes where 
the lessor, particularly where electronic registration is available, can conduct 
all business from one central point. For example, delays between executing 
a security document and registration of that document in all jurisdictions in 
Australia may, under the previous system, have caused loss of priority in 
some jurisdictions thereby increasing costs to lenders in perfecting their 
                                                             
903 S65D. Now ss134-136 Australian Consumer Law. In Australia, mandatory disclosure 
requirements apply in areas such as financial services; consumer credit; food; therapeutic goods; 
and motor vehicles. 
904 Productivity Commission, ‘Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework’ Report No. 45 
(30th April 2008), 11, 47. 
905 Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, ‘Review of the Law on Personal Property Securities – 
Discussion Paper No. 1 Registration and Search Issues’ (November 2006), [11]. 
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interests by registration.  The complexity of the law thereby slowed down 
business transactions.906  
 
3.3.2 Certainty 
Certainty of commercial advice could also be adversely affected because 
different legislation in different jurisdictions caused like transactions not to be 
treated alike907 or for outcomes to be variable.908 Parties may be required to 
obtain data from multiple jurisdictions to protect themselves909 and data from 
such multiple registries may not necessarily be the same resulting in greater 
uncertainty in dealing with other parties.910 Uncertainty arises where different 
legislation is applied to the same factual situation causing different results in 
each jurisdiction. Many of the differences in legislation are, in some cases, 
minor from the point of view of the transaction but still necessary for 
compliance purposes in the jurisdiction of the retail shop. For example, most 
jurisdictions require that disclosure statements must be provided 7 days911 
before the parties enter into a lease whereas in the Australian Capital 
                                                             
906 “Access Economics Pty Limited, The Costs and Benefits of Personal Property Securities (PPS) 
Reform – A Report for the Australian Attorneys-General’s Department (6 July 2006) 9. See also James 
Popple, “Personal Property Securities Reform and Security Interests in Ships’’, [2008] Australian and 
New Zealand Maritime Law Journal 16, 20. 
907 Access Economics Pty Limited, The Costs and Benefits of Personal Property Securities (PPS) 
Reform – A Report for the Australian Attorneys-General’s Department (6 July 2006) 9. For example, 
different jurisdictions had legislation dealing with crop, wool and stock liens but the legislation had 
different registration requirements and different effects were achieved by registration. See James 
Popple, “Personal Property Securities Reform and Security Interests in Ships’’, [2008] Australian and 
New Zealand Maritime Law Journal 16, 16. 
908 Productivity Commission, ‘Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework’ Report No. 45 
(30th April 2008),17. 
909 Australian Attorney Generals Department “Review of the Law on Personal Property Securities 
Option Paper”, (11 April 2006), Schedule E, [E3]. 
910 NSW Law Reform Commission, [1992] NSWLRCDP 28, [2.34]. 
911 Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s11; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s22; Retail Leases Act 2003 
(Vic) s17; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s6; Fair Trading (Code of 
Practice) Retail Tenancies Regulations 1998 (Tas) s6; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 
(NT) s19. 
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Territory such period is 14 days.912 This anomaly may be said to be arbitrary 
where there is no obvious procedural necessity for the additional disclosure 
period. 
 
With respect to disclosure itself, lack of certainty also meant that parties 
would err on the side of caution and disclose too much information resulting 
in overly long disclosure documents.913  
A divergence between State and Territory jurisdictions regarding the 
approach to be taken to ensure effectiveness resulted in a fragmentation of 
laws. For example, in the retail leasing context, all Australian jurisdictions 
require the lessor to give a sitting tenant (who has no option to renew) notice 
as to whether the lessor intends to renew the lease or not. In most 
jurisdictions,914 the obligation to give such notice is imposed upon the lessor.  
In Western Australia915 and the Australian Capital Territory916 however, the 
obligation only arises where the lessee requests such a notice from the 
lessor.  In those jurisdictions where the obligation is placed upon the lessor 
the notice is to be given in the period between six and twelve months before 
the expiry of the lease917 however in Tasmania the notice must be given only 
three months before expiry of the lease.918 
                                                             
912 Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001(ACT) s30. 
913 Productivity Commission, ‘Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework’ Report No. 45 
(30th April 2008), 9. 
914 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s64(4,5); Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s 46AA; Fair Trading 
(Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulations 1998 (Tas) cl 29(6,7); Retail & Commercial Leases 
Act 1995 (SA) s 20J; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s44(1); Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 
(NT) s60. 
915 Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s 13B (1). 
916 Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) s 107. 
917 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s 64(4,5); Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s 46AA; Retail and 
Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s 20J; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s44(1); Business Tenancies 
(Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) s60. 
918 Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulations 1998 (Tas) cl 29(6,7). 
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3.3.3 Bargaining Power 
Bargaining power of a large institutional lessor may be increased by the lack 
of understanding of lessees of the nature of the leasing transaction and by 
the complexity of the lease document and process.  Additionally, bargaining 
power in the hands of lessors exists naturally because of the limited number 
of shopping centres as compared to the high demand for shopping centre 
space. 
In 2008, there were around 1360 shopping centres in Australia contributing 
nearly 40 per cent of total retail space, with around 60 000 retail tenancy 
leases located in such shopping centres.919 Bargaining power was 
concentrated in the hands of a limited number of large shopping centre 
owners.920 Zoning regulations also placed an artificial restriction on the 
supply of retail places preventing the construction of another shopping 
centre in close proximity because of environmental and traffic issues.921  
Retail lessees feel that they must operate within the shopping centre for their 
business to succeed.922 As a result, demand for the supply of shopping 
centre space is constant, that of itself, preserving the lessors bargaining 
power.  The lessor is able to drive a hard bargain, not only at time of lease 
                                                             
919 Productivity Commission, ‘Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework’ Report No. 45 
(30th April 2008), xix. 
920 S Murdoch, P Rowland and N Crosby, “Looking after Small Business Tenants with Voluntary 
Codes or Statutory Intervention: A Comparison of Australian and UK Experiences” (Paper presented 
at the 7th Pacific Rim Real Estate Society Conference, Adelaide Australia, 21 – 24 January 20011) 25. 
921 Productivity Commission, “A Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia” Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008),  xx.    
922 A Preece, “Property: The Retail Shop leases Act 1984” 1984 April, Queensland Law Society 
Journal, April, 25.   
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renewal but at the initial grant of the lease 923 resulting in a “take it or leave 
it” attitude on the part of the lessor.924 
 
Complex legislation, often in flux because of amendment and regular review, 
led to complex contracts that could not be understood by a consumer but 
were signed anyway because the contract was presented as a “standard 
form” contract;925 Such complexity provided a disincentive to challenge a 
lessor or to self-enforce their rights,926 in effect, shifting the balance of power 
and giving rise to an imbalance in the rights of supplier and consumer.927 
 
Different but similar legislation in each jurisdiction meant that parties to a 
transaction in one jurisdiction may have lesser statutory protections than a 
similar party involved in a similar transaction in a different jurisdiction. The 
transaction, as agreed in one jurisdiction, may not be possible in another in 
major areas like rent review.  
For example, prior to the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) it was 
not possible to register security over some classes of property928 and that 
inability placed businesses whose capital is invested in such unregisterable 
property at a disadvantage thereby causing such businesses to face higher 
                                                             
923 Ibid. 
924 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 (31st 
March 2008), xxi. 
925 F Zumbo, ‘Are Australia’s Consumer Laws Fit for Purpose’ (2007)15 Trade Practices Law Journal 
227, 227. 
926 Ibid, 228. 
927 Ibid, 232. 
928 David E. Allan, “Uniform Personal Property Security Legislation for Australia”, [2002] Bond Law 
Review 1, [4]. For example, under the old system book debts were not registrable in any state or 
territory except Queensland. See James Popple, “Personal Property Securities Reform and Security 
Interests in Ships’’ [2008] Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal 16, 17. 
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cost of capital because they could not provide any security to lenders.929 In 
addition, lenders under one piece of legislation obtained better security than 
lenders advancing to retailers under another piece of legislation.930 
 
A further example in the retail leasing context would be that lessees in most 
Australian jurisdictions have a right to a minimum five year lease term931 
whereas there is no such minimum lease term in Queensland.932 As a result 
a lessee in Queensland would appear to have a weaker bargaining position 
than a lessee elsewhere because of the inability to rely upon such right. 
Conversely, the existence of minimum lease term legislation can lead to the 
five year lease term being the only lease term offered by lessors933 with the 
result that a lessee in minimum lease terms jurisdictions is, in fact, worse off 
because of such rigidity by lessors whereas lessees in Queensland are able 
to obtain more flexible lease terms, shorter or longer than 5 years,934 
however, this too may cause other problems. For instance, it often takes 
more than five years to amortise establishment costs. 
                                                             
929 D McGill, ’Surviving the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) (A speech to the 4th Annual 
North Queensland Symposium, 18-19 November2011, Hilton Cairns Hotel, Cairns, QLD), 
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/46917/. At 31 May 2012. 
930 Australian Central Credit Union v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1991] SASC 2724. 
931 Retail Tenancies Act 1986 (Vic) s21; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s16; Retail and Commercial 
Leases Act 1995 (SA) ss20B,20K; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s13; 
Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) s1; Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail 
Tenancies) Regulation 2008 (Tas) s10 (3) and 10(4); Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) 
s26. 
932 Five year minimum terms were included in the Retail Shop Leases Act 1984 (Qld) but were 
removed when the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) was enacted because of submissions by 
lessees that the minimum five year term was too restrictive.  See Productivity Commission, ‘Review 
of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework’ Report No. 45 (30th April 2008), 49. 
933 S Murdoch, P Rowland and N Crosby ‘Looking after Small Business Tenants with Voluntary 
Codes or Statutory Intervention; A Comparison of Australian and UK Experiences’ (Paper presented 
at 7th Pacific Rim Real Estate Society Conference, January 2001, Adelaide). 
934 Productivity Commission, ‘Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework’ Report No. 45 
(30th April 2008), 49. 
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Retail leasing legislation in each jurisdiction grants different rights to lessee 
in similar positions. For example, lessees in South Australia935 and the 
Australian Capital Territory936 have preferential rights of lease renewal 
whereas this is not the case in the rest of the country.  As a result of lessees 
having different rights granted by legislation, the bargaining power of such 
lessees in areas of high importance would differ in each jurisdiction. 
  
3.3.4 Protection of Market 
Increased transactional complexity arises because legislation differs from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction937 in its application and interpretation. Interaction of 
other legislation, even in the same jurisdiction, could create unpredictable 
outcomes.938 Such unpredictability increases economic barriers to entry into 
the market, thereby decreasing competition939 and impeding economic 
development940 resulting in increased costs. It is axiomatic that those who 
invest in business require as much certainty as possible. 
 
                                                             
935 Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) Part 4A, Division 3. 
936 Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) s108. 
937 For example, interests in boats were not recorded in all jurisdictions. See Australian Attorney 
Generals Department “Review of the Law on Personal Property Securities Option Paper”, (11 April 
2006), Schedule E, [E3]. 
938 Australian Central Credit Union v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1991] SASC 2724. In that 
case a company granted a registered Bill of Sale over a motor vehicle to the Credit Union. Shortly 
thereafter the same company gave to the Commonwealth Bank a registered floating charge over all 
of the assets of the company. The company fell into default and the Commonwealth Bank took 
possession of the company’s assets. The Credit Union was unsuccessful in its action for a declaration 
that the vehicle was its property. It was unsuccessful because the Goods Securities Act 1986 (SA) did 
not give it any priority and did not contain a provision providing that registration provided notice to 
the world at large.  Therefore, registration did not give notice to the Commonwealth Bank.  
939  Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, ‘Review of the Law on Personal Property Securities – 
Discussion Paper No. 1 Registration and Search Issues’ (November 2006), [10]. 
940 COAG Communique 14 July 2006, 7-8. 
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The problems arising from a multi-jurisdictional regime in regard to 
objectives, policy, interpretation and remedies results in the market itself 
suffering because: - 
(i)  Such problems make it difficult to respond to rapidly changing markets 
(meaning that the associated costs for consumers would grow).941 There is 
an inability to respond quickly to provide appropriate policy for emerging 
needs in rapidly changing commercial settings. For example, the inter-
jurisdictional nature of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code meant that any 
amendments to it took too long as they had to be effected in every 
jurisdiction.942  
(ii) Gaps and inconsistencies in legislation results in differential 
remedies.943 For example, the remedies available under the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission to assist consumers were more 
limited than the remedies available to some of the State Fair Trading 
Authorities.944 
 
Such problems prevent the development of nationally competitive markets 
and stunt productivity and innovation.945  For example, under the previous 
personal security legislation, newly created classes of property could not 
have security interests registered over them.  Often, it was businesses that 
                                                             
941 Ibid, 2. 
942 Productivity Commission, ‘Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework’ Report No. 45 
(30th April 2008),27. 
943 Ibid,10. 
944 Ibid, 43. 
945 Ibid, 2. 
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were involved with newly created property that were seeking capital to 
expand their business.946 
 
In the retail leasing context, similar problems occur in that: - 
(a) Inconsistencies in retail lease legislation could result in different 
adjudicated outcomes in each jurisdiction even though the factual matrix and 
the lease provisions may be the same.  As a result, a multi-jurisdictional 
lessor must use different lease documents and for certain purposes, for 
example dispute resolution, retain different lawyers in each jurisdiction; 
(b) Retail lease legislation in Australia is enacted in seven jurisdictions and 
evolves in a piece meal fashion, one jurisdiction after another, with each 
such evolution adopting innovation from the previous review of legislation in 
another jurisdiction. For example, the ACT Working Party in compiling its 
report,947 considered reports from several other jurisdictions.948 
(c) Complexities of leases result in additional costs for legal advice 
creating additional barriers to entry into the market. Such complexity and the 
need for ongoing compliance in one jurisdiction may result in a lessee 
deciding to take their business to another.949 
 
 
 
                                                             
946 For example, there were no registration arrangements for internet domain names or satellite 
transmission capacity. See Australian Attorney Generals Department “Review of the Law on Personal 
Property Securities Option Paper”, (11 April 2006), [52] – [55]. 
947 ACT Report 1984. 
948 Clarke Report 1984, Hill Report 1983 and Arnold Report 1984. 
949 Productivity Commission, ‘Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework’ Report No. 45 
(30th April 2008), 91. 
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3.4 Common Elements in Legislation Other Than Retail Leasing 
Legislation. 
Drivers for reform of non-retail lease legislation can also be drivers for reform 
of retail leasing legislation. 
In this chapter, we have considered other legislation such as the Australian 
Consumer Law, Personal Properties Securities legislation and the proposed 
reform of Work Health and Safety law. 
Each of these enactments has the following elements in common with the 
retail leasing legislation: 
a) all have as a relevant issue the question of an increase in expenses in 
establishing and operating a business.  All of the reviews950 regarding such 
legislation emphasised the cost to small business in complying with the 
terms of the legislation. 
b) all four areas of legislation have an effect upon how small business 
deals with consumers.  The government is, therefore, interested in its role as 
consumer watchdog to protect the interests of consumers and small 
business that employs most workers is equated to consumers. 
c) all four areas of legislation have a similar heritage in that the 
relationship (of lessor and lessee) existed at common law and then was 
substantially modified by the legislation to provide greater protection to 
                                                             
950 For Personal Property Security see Australian Attorney Generals Department “Review of the 
Law on Personal Property Securities Option Paper”, (11 April 2006) and Standing Committee of 
Attorneys-General, ‘Review of the Law on Personal Property Securities – Discussion Paper No. 1 
Registration and Search Issues’ (November 2006). For Work Health and Safety see Australian 
Government “National Review and to Model Occupational Health & Safety Laws Issues Paper” May 
2008 [1.1]. For Consumer Law see Productivity Commission, ‘Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy 
Framework’ Report No. 45 (30th April 2008). 
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consumers.  All four areas of law have the potential, if they are too complex 
or prescriptive,, to interfere with a seamless national economy. 
d) All four areas of legislation have relevance when dealing with 
international partners. The consequence of this becomes more important as 
Australia moves from being seven State or Territory based shops in an 
Australian village to being considered more as an Australian shop in a global 
village.  This is a result of the digital economy and the increased interest of 
foreign persons in purchasing Australian assets and corporations.   
 
The similarities of the four different areas of legislation mentioned indicate 
that a driver for reform of one area of legislation would be to each. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the drivers for reform leading to other 
commercial legislation when considering the benchmarks to be used for 
assessment of the desirability of retail lease legislation. 
 
4. Drivers of Reform of Leasing Regulation in England and Wales. 
4.1 Introduction 
It is instructive to consider the retail leasing statutory regime in the United 
Kingdom (UK) in comparison to the Australian situation as trading conditions 
in Australia and the UK are similar and many of the issues concerning small 
business lessees are shared between both countries.951  
There are obviously some differences. For example, Australia has retail 
lease legislation in all jurisdictions whereas the UK still has a voluntary code.  
Leasing processes also differ. The pre-lease process in the UK is for a 
                                                             
951 Neil Crosby, “Australian and UK Small Business Tenants- What Can We Learn from Each Other” 
(2007) 14 Australian Property Law Journal 297, 299. 
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lessee to be given details about rent and other terms by negotiation. A short 
heads of agreement is entered into before a solicitor is instructed to prepare 
a retail lease.  The result is that a lessee does not normally obtain legal 
advice until negotiations are completed. The UK government hoped that the 
lessors would distribute copies of the voluntary code to potential lessees to 
provide greater information to lessees but unfortunately this very rarely 
occurred.952 In contrast, a potential Australian lessee is, prior to entering into 
a lease given a draft lease and a disclosure statement to examine during a 
seven or fourteen day cooling off period.   
Although the processes may differ the intention of the government is the 
same, that is, to better inform the small business lessee so that that lessee 
may make better and informed decisions. The UK policy issue of ensuring 
that small businesses are aware of the effects of signing a lease953 is similar 
to the issue identified by the Productivity Commission as one of the 
principles for assessing the effectiveness of regulation, that is, to ensure that 
all lease conditions are clear and transparent to lessees and that lease and 
property rights are clearly defined.954 
 
In England and Wales, commercial leases are controlled by both a 
mandatory and voluntary method.  The mandatory regulation is provided by 
the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (UK) which, most importantly, provides a 
right to a lessee to insist upon a renewal of a lease.  Additional benefits are  
                                                             
952 Ibid, 308. 
953 Ibid, 303. 
954 Productivity Commission, ‘Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework’ Report No. 45 
(30th April 2008), 96. 
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provided by the Landlords and Tenants (Covenants) Act 1995 (UK)955and 
the Landlord and Tenants Act 1988 (UK).956 The voluntary regulation is 
provided by the 2007 Code for Leasing Business Premises in England and 
Wales957 (“UK Lease Code 2007” hereafter).   
 
4.2 Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (UK) 
Lessees in England and Wales have the benefit of the Landlord and Tenant 
Act 1954 (UK) (“LTA”) which provides certain rights to business lessees958 to 
automatically renew their Lease subject to the lessors right to object to such 
renewal on a small number of stated grounds.959 The procedure for a new 
lease term starts with a notice from the lessee to the lessor requiring a new 
term.  The lessor has two months960 in which to object, and if the lessor does 
object the matter is determined by the court.961 
The purpose of these provisions was to remedy a perceived power 
imbalance between the lessor and lessee and to ensure that the lessee 
could always receive some benefit at the conclusion of its lease. At the time 
of passing of legislation, the UK had recently endured a world war and there 
was a shortage of commercial buildings. Lessors, therefore, had significant 
                                                             
955  Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 (UK), s5 releases a lessee from ongoing liability 
under the lease upon assignment. 
956 Landlord and Tenant Act 1998 (UK), s1 requires the lessor not to unreasonably withhold consent 
to an assignment and to reply to a request for assignment within a reasonable time. 
957 The Joint Working Group on Commercial Leases, ‘The Code for Leasing Business Premises in 
England and Wales’ (2007).  
958 Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (UK), s23. 
959 Ibid, s30. For example, because the lessee has been late in paying rent, failing to repair or other 
substantial breaches of the lease. Other grounds include where the lessor can find suitable 
alternative premises for the lessee or where the lessor intends to demolish. 
960 Ibid, s26. 
961 Ibid, s29. 
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power because of the shortage of supply of suitable commercial premises.962 
The LTA was an attempt to remedy that imbalance and has operated 
successfully from 1954.  
Consideration of the LTA is relevant in the Australian context as the LTA was 
a method used to correct a power imbalance in favour of lessors arising from 
an economic cause (the negative effects of the Second World War) in the 
same way that minimum lease terms and preferential rights of renewal in 
Australian jurisdictions seek to reduce lessor bargaining power arising from 
another economic anomaly (i.e. the concentration of power in the hands of a 
limited number of lessors as a result of planning and zoning restrictions.).  
The right of renewal contained in Part II of the LTA continues to the present 
day although there have been some amendments. Originally, it was not 
possible to contract out of Part II of the Act, however, the Law of Property 
Act 1969 (UK) amended the LTA to provide that parties could contract out of 
the LTA if there was a joint application to the court for approval.963 The 
purpose of requiring a court application was to ensure that the parties had 
reached a genuine agreement and the lessee understood the value of what 
they were giving away.964 The court was not required to determine whether 
the lessee was getting a “good deal”965 merely to determine that consent by 
the lessee was genuine and freely given.966 
                                                             
962 Sarah Hill-Wheeler ‘Commercial Leases Code – Tenant’s Tool or Landlord’s Token?’ (University of 
Northumbria, August 2009), 21. 
963 Law of Property Act 1969 (UK), s5.  This section altered s38 of the LTA 1954. 
964 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1968-1969, 500. 
965 Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Palacegate [2000] 3WLR 519. 
966 House of Lords Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform, ‘Fourth Report’ 
(2002-2003), [17]. 
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As a result, the court applications were often successful but provided only 
modest protection to the lessee967 as the courts did not enquire into the 
substance of the transaction.968 It was doubtful that the court applications 
were an effective filter to prevent abuse of the lessor’s dominant position969 
as the involvement of lawyers in preparing the court application did not 
necessarily ensure that advice was given about the waiver of rights.970  
The requirement of court approval was, itself, abolished by regulation in 
2004971 to be replaced by a requirement only that the lessor give to the 
lessee a warning statement at least 14 days prior to the start of the lease, 
alerting the lessee to the consequences of giving up their rights to renew.972 
Both the 1969 amendment and the 2004 amendment were put in place not 
because of a government swing back in favour of lessors, but to allow 
business to be carried out more effectively, with minimal cost and delay, 
while still retaining the balance between lessor and lessee.973 
 The LTA was not a wide-ranging piece of legislation.  Although it covered all 
businesses, and not only retail leases, its provisions primarily dealt with 
security of tenure.  In addition, lease periods were viewed differently in the 
UK than in Australia in that long lease terms are considered more 
                                                             
967 Memorandum by the Office of Deputy Prime Minister to House of Lords Select Committee on 
Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform, 24 October 2002, [15]. 
968 Hagee (London) v Erikson (AB) and Larson [1976] QB 209. 
969 Business Tenancies (Report) 1992] EWLC 208 [2.16 (c)]. 
970 Memorandum by the Office of Deputy Prime Minister to House of Lords Select Committee on 
Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform, 24 October 2002, [15]. 
971 Regulatory Reform (Business Tenancies) Order 2003 (England and Wales) SI 2003 No 3096, [3]. 
972 The reforms were based on an earlier Law Commission report being Business Tenancies (Report) 
[1992] EWLC 208[2.59] 
973 For the 1969 reforms see Law Reform Commission (UK), ‘Landlord and Tenant: Report on the 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 Part II’ Law Com No 17, (1969) [33]. For the 2004 amendments see 
Business Tenancies (Report) [1992] EWLC 208[2.57]. 
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appropriate there to ensure continued income-stream.974 Long lease terms 
were the norm and lease terms of 20 years were not uncommon.975 Long 
term leases, with upward only rent reviews, continued original lessee liability, 
strong repair covenants and clauses shifting the burden of all outgoings to 
the lessee became the “Institutional” UK lease over several decades.976 
Such leases were sustainable by the lessee provided markets stayed 
buoyant such that the upward only rent reviews stayed at parity with the 
growth of the markets.977 
With the recession in the UK in the 1990’s, lessees started to see their 
income steadily decreasing while their rents continued to increase in 
circumstances where they were locked into long term leases.  Many lessees 
with no civil remedy available to them and suspicious of lessors hiding 
behind confidentiality clauses, complained to their local members.  The 
government subsequently indicated that unless a voluntary remedy could be 
determined they intended to legislate.978 This threat led to the creation of the 
first voluntary code for commercial leasing in 1995. At this time the main 
expressed concerns of the government were the effect of upward only rent 
reviews, confidentiality clauses and dispute resolution. 
The lack of a statutory right to renew in Australia and the risk that goodwill 
generated by a lessee will evaporate at lease end continues to be one of the 
                                                             
974 Neil Crosby, “Australian and UK Small Business Tenants- What Can We Learn from Each Other” 
(2007) 14 Australian Property Law Journal 297, 297. 
975 N Crosby and S Murdoch, ‘Cutting Edge 2000, Monitoring the UK Commercial Leases Code of 
Practice: Code, What Code?’ (London RICS 2000), 2. 
976 Sarah Hill-Wheeler ‘Commercial Leases Code – Tenant’s Tool or Landlord’s Token?’ (University of 
Northumbria, August 2009), 18. 
977 Crosby N. and Murdoch S., ‘Cutting Edge 2000, Monitoring the UK Commercial Leases Code of 
Practice: Code, What Code?’ (London RICS 2000), 1. 
978 Neil Crosby, “Australian and UK Small Business Tenants- What Can We Learn from Each Other” 
(2007) 14 Australian Property Law Journal 297, 298. 
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many (if not the major) issues between lessors and lessees. Australian 
lessors are generally opposed to an automatic right to renew, as the lessor 
loses the ability to effectively manage a shopping centre while lessees 
believe that an automatic right to renew will stop lessors abusing their power 
at lease expiry.979 
The lessons for Australia appear to be that automatic rights of renewal can 
work subject to the parties being able to avoid such provisions whether by 
court approval or by a warning statement.  The continued existence of the 
LTA since 1954 seems to suggest that lessors are able to effectively 
manage their leasehold even though their leases contain an automatic right 
to renew. Conversely, it would appear that avoiding the automatic renewal 
provisions in the UK has been going on for some time and the longevity of 
the legislation may be a testament to how easily it could be avoided rather 
than to its effectiveness. The statutory right to renew applies in England and 
Wales but not in Scotland and Scottish lessors do not appear to be abusing 
the privilege.980  
 
4.3 Can Australia Learn Anything from the United Kingdom Voluntary 
Codes for Commercial Leasing? 
The UK does not have retail lease legislation to the same level as Australia.  
Rather than adopting extensive legislation, the UK has attempted to manage 
the lessor-lessee relationship through the use of voluntary codes and the 
application of the Common Law.  
                                                             
979 Ibid 310. 
980 Ibid. 
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In all, there have been three voluntary codes for commercial leasing. The 
first code was introduced in 1995.981 It was generally regarded as a 
failure. 982 The second code was introduced in 2002983  and the third code 
was introduced in 2007 (“UK Lease Code 2007” hereafter).984 
Consideration of the code is relevant to the Australian situation because 
many of the problems that the voluntary codes seek to address are similar 
problems that occur in Australia.   For example, the introduction to the UK 
Lease Code 2007 provides that the objectives of the Code are to create a 
document which is clear and concise which will help promote “efficiency and 
fairness in landlord and tenant relationships”.985 Issues regarding fairness of 
lessor and lessee relationship have echoed through numerous Australian 
inquiries in particular the 1997 Reid Inquiry which concluded that unfair 
conduct by big business had been a matter of grave concern for years. 986 
The subsequent Joint Select Committee Report that followed two years later 
also considered issues regarding unfair business conduct.987  
Identified issues that led to the drafting of the first code shared points of 
interest with complaints made by Australian lessees.  These issues were: 
a) upward only rent reviews;  
b) the dominance of 20 to 25 year institutional leases; 
                                                             
981 The Commercial Leases Working Group, ‘A Code of Practice for Commercial Leases in England 
and Wales’ (1995). 
982 Faculty of Urban and Regional Studies, University of Reading, ‘Monitoring the Code of Practice 
for Commercial Leases ‘(April 2000). 
983 The Commercial Leases Working Group, ‘A Code of Practice for Commercial Leases in England 
and Wales’ (2nd ed, 2002). An archived copy appears here 
<http://www.sutherlandsurveyors.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2012/12/Code_of_practice_for_commercial_leases.pdf> 
984 The Joint Working Group on Commercial Leases, ‘The Code for Leasing Business Premises in 
England and Wales’ (2007). 
985 UK Leasing Code 2007, Introduction. 
986 Reid Report 1997, v (Foreword). 
987 Joint Select Committee on the Retailing Sector, Parliament of Australia, Fair Market or Market 
Failure, A Review of Australia’s Retailing Sector, August 1999, 103.  
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c) the defective system of dispute resolution; and 
d) confidentiality clauses in leases.988 
The upward only rent reviews meant that even when the economy had 
suffered a downturn the rent would still increase in circumstances where 
customer spending would be severely diminished. The long term institutional 
leases meant that lessees were unable to escape unjustified rents in areas 
that had become unpopular because of newer shopping centres or business 
parks. In Australia, similar concerns were raised in relation to “ratchet 
clauses” that resulted in an increase in rent at every rent review. 
The UK issues regarding dispute resolution provisions were that leases 
commonly provided that when a lessee disputed the rent review, the matter 
could be appealed to an arbitrator. To resolve that dispute the arbitrator 
would seek evidence of the rental levels in comparable property. 
Comparable evidence of rental value could only be obtained from other 
properties which also had high rent, as rather than there being new lettings 
with which to compare rent there were only empty shops. If there was a new 
letting, any information from that new letting would remain secret through the 
use of confidentiality clause. The result was that there was no way for the 
arbitrator to obtain a proper assessment of the market.989 Similar concerns 
were raised (and are still raised) in Australia about the lack of information 
available to valuers in order to carry out a market valuation.990  Although 
                                                             
988 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 10 November 1992, Volume 213, 
851 - 852. 
989 Ibid. In Re Dickinson [1992] 2 NZLR 43 a lessee was successful in using subpoenas to obtain 
details from lessors of comparable premises of side deals.  Any such attempt must balance the 
requirement for valuations to be based on correct rent paid and the right of the lessor to 
confidentiality. 
990 W D Duncan et al, Commercial and Retail Leases in Australia, (Thomsen Reuters, 7th edition, 
2012 [50.2100]. 
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leases are registered in several jurisdictions such registration does not 
provide information regarding side agreements between lessors and 
lessees. Lack of such information can distort the rent valuations.991 So far, 
no Australian jurisdiction has legislated for a separate property databank 
where all details of a lease including side deals would be recorded and they 
are not likely to do so. 
The small business sector was seen as one of the most important engines 
for economic growth992 in the UK. However, the lack of free-flow of 
information and the antiquated993 and medieval994 leasehold system 
prevented the market from operating effectively.995 As we have seen, archaic 
regulation was one of the reasons for the far reaching amendment to the 
personal property securities law in Australia specifically its effect on the 
market efficiency. 
It was submitted to the UK Government that it should intervene to free up the 
market and safeguard small business.996 The Government responded that 
long term leases, upward only rent reviews and arbitration clauses were all 
within the power of the parties to negotiate when they entered into the 
lease997 and that if the government began to interfere in the freedom of 
contract, then distortions in the market would arise.998   
                                                             
991 See, for example, Ropart Pty Ltd V Kern Corp Ltd [1992] ANZ ConvR 103; Re McCafferty [1994] 2 
Qd R 538; State of New South Wales v SAS Trustee Corp [1998] ANZ ConvR 163; Eureka Funds 
Management Ltd v Freehills Services Pty Ltd (2007) ANZ ConvR 223. 
992 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 10 November 1992, Volume 213, 
851 - 852., Column 851. 
993 Ibid. 
994 Ibid, 853. 
995 Ibid, Column 852-853. 
996 Ibid, Column 854. 
997 Ibid, Column 855. 
998 Ibid, Column 855. 
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The “freedom of contract” argument adopted by the UK government is the 
same argument adopted by Australian lessors in opposing any changes to 
legislation to favour lessees i.e. interference with long held contractual 
principles regarding freedom of contract would result in a significant and 
unpredictable aberrations in the market thereby causing shopping centres to 
no longer be a favoured form of investment for developers or investment 
funds. The decline in shopping centres would then result in job losses, 
closure of businesses, a loss of investment income by those who invested in 
shopping centres and overall a dip in the economy.  It was these fears that 
resulted in various governments inserting mandatory review of legislation 
clauses into their retail lease legislation 
In reality, UK lessees were unable to negotiate lease terms or fully 
appreciate the implications of such lease terms as an upwards only rent 
review.999 Additionally, the confidentiality clauses inserted into the leases 
made it more difficult to understand such clauses as the lessees could not 
compare notes.1000 
In 1993, the UK Department of Environment issued a consultation paper as 
to whether legislation controlling upward only rent reviews would be 
appropriate. It considered that there were arguments for and against the 
regulating of upward only rent reviews as follows: 
a) upward only rent reviews had become the market norm and that 
therefore adopting them and thereby adopting established market practice, 
                                                             
999 Ibid. 
1000 N Crosby and S Murdoch, ‘Cutting Edge 2000, Monitoring the UK Commercial Leases Code of 
Practice: Code, What Code?’ (London RICS 2000), 1. 
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meant that the market could operate more efficiently and with more 
certainty.1001 
b) conversely, upward only rent reviews made it harder to assign leases 
in areas where rents were falling and thereby inhibited free market choice 
and created market imperfections.1002 
The Department of Environment Consultation Paper only took into account 
the effect upon the economy1003 and issues of fairness were not considered 
although it was conceded that the ‘limitation of risk to the investor achieved 
by an upward only rent review clause unhealthily diverts resources away 
from other sectors of the economy’.1004  The UK Government proposed 
legislating in relation to these matters1005  however, after receiving industry 
responses, the UK Government decided not to legislate and instead to rely 
upon the industry to self-regulate.1006  
It was at this moment that the UK leasing scene became the “other side of 
the coin” to the Australian retail leasing scene. In 1981 the Cooper 
Committee recommended that there should be no legislation and that the 
industry should self-regulate.  That recommendation was not adopted by the 
subsequent Joint Committee in 1983 who recommended legislation thereby 
leading to the Retail Shop Leases Act 1984 (Qld). Consideration of the UK 
experience is therefore valuable as it shows what the Australian retail 
                                                             
1001 Department of Environment, Commercial Property Leases Consultation Paper (London, HMSO 
27 May 1993), [2]. 
1002 Ibid, [1.6]. 
1003 Sarah Hill-Wheeler ‘Commercial Leases Code – Tenant’s Tool or Landlord’s Token?’ (University 
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leasing scene could have been and illustrates the inefficacy of a system 
involving a voluntary code.1007 
The first voluntary Leasing Code of Practice was issued a short time after 
the UK Department of Environment Consultation Paper in 1995 (“UK Lease 
Code 1995”). In 2000, after an analysis of the effectiveness of the UK 
Leasing Code 1995, the English Property Advisory Group, reported that the 
Code had had little impact and that lessees were not sufficiently aware of 
property matters with the result that upward only rent reviews remained the 
norm.1008 
The Property Advisory Group was of the view that the essential need was to 
empower lessees by providing them information that they needed to operate 
effectively in the market.1009 In relation to upward only rent reviews the 
Group found that lessors were unwilling to abandon the use of upward only 
rent reviews because: 
a) they found alternative pricing difficult; 
b) they were fearful of a downward impact upon their year-end valuations; 
c) overseas investors were attracted by upward only provisions; and 
d) lessors did not wish to carry out the management required to instate 
turnover leases.1010 
Lessees were not willing to challenge upward only clauses because: 
a) there was strong competition for space; 
                                                             
1007 The New South Wales Retail Tenancy Leases Code of Practice was adopted in 1992 but only 
lasted 2 years. 
1008 Property Advisory Group Annual Report (2000) 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/regeneration/pdf/155871.pdf as at 12/11/2012.  
1009 Ibid. 
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b) lessees were required to pay a premium for a non-upward only rent 
review; 
c) lessees who wanted flexibility or where uncertain about their future, 
were more likely to request a break clause than an alternate rent review 
clause; and 
d) upward only rent review clauses were an “off the shelf” product.  The 
simplicity of such a product meant that lower legal fees could be charged.1011 
A further enquiry into the impact of the UK Lease Code1995 found that: - 
(a) lenders and investors were reluctant to adopt any alteration to the 
institutional lease norm of an upward only rent review because existing 
valuation methods were unable to adequately price different lease terms.1012 
Accordingly, upward only rent review clauses were still the dominant form of 
rent, however, lease terms had reduced and more break clauses had been 
inserted into leases;1013 
(b) the LTA with its statutory right of renewal perpetuated existing lease 
provisions1014 but there was no increasing trend to contract out of the 
statutory right of renewal provisions1015 
(c) alternative rent review provisions such as turnover rents or indexation 
were rare and five (5) years continued to be the most prevalent period for 
rent reviews;1016  
(d) the use of confidentiality clauses was low;1017 
                                                             
1011 Ibid. 
1012 N Crosby and S Murdoch, ‘Cutting Edge 2000, Monitoring the UK Commercial Leases Code of 
Practice: Code, What Code?’ (London RICS 2000), 4. 
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(e) that most lessees (and in particular those who were unrepresented) 
took their leases based on the first offer made to them and sought to 
negotiate nothing more than the initial rent.1018 Although lessees were aware 
of the upward only rent review provisions, most of them did not understand 
the process by which any dispute over the reviewed rent would be 
determined.1019 
Although the UK Government had partially achieved its objectives (which 
were shorter leases, greater flexibility in rent reviews and greater 
transparency), such results were achieved because of the change in the 
economy and not because of the effective penetration of the UK Lease Code 
1995.1020 As a result, the 1995 edition of the Code was abandoned and a 
second edition of the Code was produced in 2002.   
 
An Inquiry in 2005 found that the second Code was better disseminated than 
the previous Code but did not directly influence leasing negotiations or 
practice.1021 A third Code was introduced in 2007 but unfortunately the 
dissemination of the third Code was no better than that of the second 
Code.1022 
The Government was understandably disappointed about the ineffectiveness 
of the Code and that it had not become a primary tool for negotiation of new 
                                                             
1018 Ibid. This was still the position when research was carried out in regards to the 2002 Code. See 
N Crosby, S Murdoch and C Hughes, ‘Monitoring the 2002 Code of Practice for Commercial Leases’ 
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leases except in the hand of larger lessees. The Government was also 
concerned that small business lessees were not properly informed about the 
leasing choices that they were making.1023 
The UK Lease Code 2007 sought to improve the position of the lessee by 
urging the lessor to provide concessions to the lessee. The Code consists of 
a one-page list of items to be inserted into a lease, a three page occupier’s 
guide with hints and tips and a two page Model Heads of Terms (which is 
similar to an item schedule in a lease, in that it contains, for example, details 
of the premises, the parties, lease duration, rent, rent review and outgoings.  
An analysis of the UK Lease Code 2007 reveals the various shortfalls in 
lease documentation and inequities in the lessor-lessee relationship that the 
Code seeks to remedy.  Such shortfalls mirror problems that have arisen in 
the Australian retail leasing context. For example, issues in relation to 
complexity and certainty can be seen in the introduction of the Code which 
states that its’ objective is: - 
(a)  to create a document which is clear, concise and authoritative; 
(b) to be used as a checklist for negotiations for new leases and renewals; 
and 
(c) to provide easy access to information explained in plain English. 
Limitation of delay is emphasised in Clause 10 of the Code regarding 
“Ongoing Management” which provides time limits on the lessor regarding 
decisions about alterations, requests for additional information and provision 
of a schedule of dilapidations.  
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Protection of the bargaining position of the lessee is reinforced by the 
encouragement in Clause 1 of the Code for lessors to provide lessees with 
flexible lease terms. In Clause 4 lessors are expected to provide alternate 
rent review clauses to the standard upward only rent review clause and to 
provide reasons if they cannot provide such alternatives. Further protection 
is provided by clause 5 of the Code which provides that a lease should 
contain a clause allowing lessees to assign the lease with the lessors 
consent not to be unreasonably withheld or delayed.1024  
Since the first edition of the Code was introduced in 1995, the focus of the 
government has altered from being solely in relation to economic efficiency 
and now such focus is on the small business lessee and their awareness 
and use of the Code.1025 
 
4.4 Conclusions Regarding Commercial Leasing Law in England and 
Wales – Lessons for Australia  
The UK Lease Code 2007 sets out standards of conduct for the lessor and 
lessee.  As a voluntary code it is only a “wish list” and contains no sanctions 
for not following the Code. It does, however, illustrate the areas of the 
leasing transaction which are of concern and where improvement in the 
conduct of the parties, but primarily lessors, is required. In summary, the 
issues in relation to the reform of commercial leasing law in England and 
Wales are as follows: 
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(a) Transactional costs – Costs are increased by out-dated practice or 
legislation. According to the UK Government the leasing regime in the United 
Kingdom was “medieval” and required updating.1026 For example, reduction 
of costs was achieved by the removal of the need to obtain Court approval 
for the parties to contract out of the statutory right of renewal.  
Complexity increases legal costs incurred by the parties in obtaining legal 
advice regarding their position. Most lessees in England and Wales took 
leases based upon the first offer made to them and sought to negotiate 
nothing more than the initial rent. They were generally not aware of the 
upward only rent review provisions nor were they aware of the process by 
which any rent review dispute would be determined.1027 Upward only rent 
review clauses would often be drafted in complicated language and 
commercial leases themselves would often be over 100 pages in length. 1028 
Similar problems in relation to legal costs have arisen in the Australian retail 
leasing context.  For example, complex leases and procedures would require 
that a lessee obtain legal advice. Retail lease legislation would allow a lessor 
to demand that the lessee obtain such legal advice and evidence that this 
had occurred. 
(b) Delay – The UK Lease Code 2007 attempts to limit delay by setting 
time limits upon lessors to provide responses to certain queries by lessees. 
Similar time limits are imposed only upon lessors in Australian retail leasing 
legislation in relation to responses to a request for assignment of lease. 
                                                             
1026 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 10 November 1992, Volume 
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(c) Balance of Power – The obvious focus of the UK government is to give 
greater power to lessees in relation to negotiation of lease terms and 
operation of leases.  This is shown by their continued condemnation of the 
upward only rent review clauses and their requirement that lessors be more 
flexible in relation to the length of lease terms and rent review clauses. In 
Australia, the issue of upward only rent review (ratchet clauses) has been 
resolved by the banning of such clauses, a remedy that has not been 
adopted by the UK Government.  
However, the problem of the “sitting tenant” not being preferred for a further 
term has been ameliorated in the UK by the guaranteed right of renewal 
provided by the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (UK). The “sitting tenant” 
problem remains unresolved in Australia.   
In common with Australian governments, the UK Government also seeks to 
empower lessees by educating them and providing them with explanatory 
information. UK lessees are under no obligation to take advantage of such 
education or to receive such information. Similarly, UK lessors are under no 
statutory obligation to provide information to the lessee.  
The UK Government hoped that lessors would provide a copy of the 
voluntary code to lessees so that the lessee would be better informed.  This, 
unfortunately, has rarely happened.1029 In contrast, Australian retail leasing 
legislation requires that the lessor provide a disclosure statement to the 
lessee before the lessee enters into the lease. It is submitted that the 
Australian method, which mandates a particular process to protect the 
lessee, is a more effective solution to the problem of lessees’ lack of 
                                                             
1029 Neil Crosby, “Australian and UK Small Business Tenants- What Can We Learn from Each Other” 
(2007) 14 Australian Property Law Journal 297, 308. 
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awareness and shortage of information than the UK method of relying upon 
the voluntary code. 
(d) Protection of Market – The UK government is aware that small 
business is a significant sector of the economy requiring its protection. 
however, they have so far adopted a “light touch” preferring self-regulation 
over legislation. In contrast, all Australian State and Territory governments 
have elected to legislate in relation to retail leasing in order to protect that 
market. 
Lessons that can be learned from the UK experience with voluntary codes 
are that: - 
(a) Voluntary Codes are not effective. In the UK the government made it 
quite clear that unless suitable self-regulation was put in place that they 
would legislate.  Despite such threats, three versions of a voluntary lease 
code have been attempted and failed. This experience is similar to the 
experience in New South Wales where a voluntary Code was also attempted 
and failed.  One of the problems of drafting a voluntary Code is that the 
parties responsible for preparing the Code do not represent the whole 
market and, in addition, have no power over their own members to force 
them to accept it.  In the UK, the existence of the voluntary code (in 
whatever version) was simply to have the government focus on other issues 
and not to regulate transactions. 
(b) “Protection of the Market” and “Standard Market Procedure” are often 
seen as the same thing. In the UK, the Department of Environment 
determined that upward only rent reviews were the established market 
practice and, therefore, their continued existence would mean the market 
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could operate with more certainty.1030 Both lessees and lessors were 
reluctant to abandon upward only rent review clauses as leases containing 
such clauses were “off the shelf” and therefore easier to produce and less 
expensive for the lessee.  In addition, existing valuation methods were 
unable to adequately price different lease terms.1031  The point is that a 
market may still be protected even though there has been a substantial 
change to standard market procedure. Protection of a standard market 
procedure should be only a minor consideration in determining the 
effectiveness of regulation; 
(c) Giving mandatory rights of renewal to a lessee will not necessarily 
result in damage to the market as such rights have been in operation in the 
UK since the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (UK). This legislation operates, 
however, in the context of longer leasing terms than in Australia. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This chapter has involved an examination of the nature of the leasing 
transaction to establish criteria to evaluate current retail lease legislation.  
Such examination reveals uncertainties existing within the lease itself, 
inequity between the parties to the lease and distortions in the retail lease 
market.  These anomalies are features of a lease arising from the long term 
relational nature of a lease. These manifest themselves as opportunities that 
become available to the lessor because of the inability of the parties to 
predict future plans regarding the use of the shopping centre. Other matters 
                                                             
1030 Department of Environment, Commercial Property Leases Consultation Paper (London, HMSO 
27 May 1993), [2]. 
1031 N Crosby and S Murdoch, ‘Cutting Edge 2000, Monitoring the UK Commercial Leases Code of 
Practice: Code, What Code?’ (London RICS 2000), 4. 
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like changes to tenant mix and the construction of competing centres are 
also impossible to predict.  
Additionally, although the parties may begin their relationship as neutral 
parties interested only in maximising their business opportunities and 
requiring the co-operation of the other party to do so, by the time the lease 
has run its course, the parties may have distinct feelings of ill-will towards 
each other to the extreme extent that they are prepared to damage their own 
business to inflict economic harm upon the other party.1032  
Unconscionability provisions within the Australian Consumer Law and the 
various State and Territory retail leasing legislation attempt to provide a 
remedy to a lessee but the lessee will incur legal costs enforcing such 
remedies. The existence of such unconscionability provisions has not, in any 
event, prevented such conduct from occurring1033 although its frequency has 
reduced as a complaint against lessors. 
 
As the lessee is often one who initiates action regarding the lease (with the 
lessor often simply being required to grant or refuse consent to the lessee’s  
proposals), in cases where a discretion is afforded to a lessor unfettered by  
terms requiring the lessor to act reasonably, the lessor has a degree of 
control over the future of the lessee subject to regulations regarding 
unconscionable conduct and   
                                                             
‘The idea there is a ‘war’ going on in shopping centres around Australia, between retail 
tenants and property owners and managers, conveys accurately the tenor of evidence given 
to the Fair Trading inquiry on retail tenancy issues.’  
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Resources, Parliament of 
Australia, Finding a Balance: Towards Fair Trading in Australia, May 1997, 15. 
1033 N Crosby, S Murdoch, E Webb, ‘Landlord and Tenants Behaving Badly? The Application of 
Unconscionable and Unfair Conduct to Commercial Leases in Australia and the United Kingdom’’ 
(2007) 33 UWAL Rev 207, 208. 
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any implied obligation of good faith.1034 Such good faith obligation may 
require the lessor to take into account the reasonable expectations of the 
lessee.1035 
 
The nature of the lease favours the lessor (particularly in regard to shopping 
centre leases) as an imbalance of power arises between the experienced 
professional lessor and the novice amateur lessee who, unlike the lessor, 
has no access to data regarding similar leased premises. 
The broader leasing market also favours the lessor in that zoning restrictions 
provide the shopping centre lessor with a monopoly of retail space.  
Constant revision of retail leasing legislation burdens both parties, but its 
effects are felt more by a lessee who can, commonly, only afford basic legal 
advice and who does not have the experience of the lessor in dealing with 
change. 
A review  of retail leasing law may be effected on a normative or non-
normative basis. Non-normative review is based on the premise that 
simplification alone will achieve the primary goal of financial and economic 
gains. Normative review seeks a standard of regulation that is better than the 
current standard or, at least, the best of the current standard so as to ensure 
economic efficiency.1036 
                                                             
1034 Section 22(1)(l) of the Australian Consumer Law requires the court to consider the extent to 
which the parties have acted in good faith. 
1035 N Crosby, S Murdoch and E Webb, ‘Landlord and Tenants Behaving Badly? The Application of 
Unconscionable and Unfair Conduct to Commercial Leases in Australia and the United Kingdom’’ 
(2007) 33 UWAL Rev 207, 219. 
1036. Roger A Shiner “Law and its Normativity” in  Dennis Patterson (ed), A Companion to 
Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2010) 417, 421. 
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Normative simplification, although still primarily concerned with economic 
considerations, is additionally based on notions of justice and fair play.  It is 
proposed that consideration of any revised retail leasing statutory regime  
should proceed on a normative basis such that change  will not only provide 
financial and economic benefits but also limit the power imbalance between 
the parties and so correct any market inefficiencies which may benefit either 
party but which may, in addition, damage the retail leasing market. 
It is this over-riding search for parity between the parties that has led to the 
numerous tribunals and inquiries which, in turn, has led to the constant 
review of retail leasing regulation throughout Australia with the added burden 
of the provisions of the Australian Consumer Law. 
It is essential, in order to draft such retail lease legislation, to determine 
major subjects of dispute that have arisen between lessors and lessees over 
the years and to consider the effectiveness of remedies to such disputes 
adopted in each state and territory.  Such subjects may then be used as 
benchmarks to allow a comparison of retail leasing legislation in each State 
and Territory in Australia to determine whether any legislation in any 
jurisdiction is more effective than another or whether all must be abandoned 
to be replaced by new legislation or an amalgam of existing legislation. 
In this chapter these benchmarks have been determined by: 
a) identifying topics that have been identified over the years in Australia 
as being of value or meaning to both lessor and lessee.   
b) identifying drivers for reform of other commercial legislation specifically 
the Australian Consumer Law, the Personal Properties Securities Act and 
the reform of the Work Health and Safety Law. 
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c) examining the drivers for reform of the leasing landscape in England 
and Wales specifically in relation to the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (UK) 
and the voluntary lease codes. 
 
The purpose of examining the history of retail leasing reform in Australia is to 
identify historical benchmarks against which proposed future legislation may 
be assessed.  Examination of the retail leasing landscape in England and 
Wales allows one to compare drivers for reform in England and Wales with 
the drivers for reform for retail leasing in Australia.  Other areas of Australian 
commercial law are also relevant to consider as such areas, being similar to 
retail leasing in that they are commercial in nature, allow identification of 
further drivers for reform which may not have been considered in any retail 
leasing reform recommendation previously. 
Drivers for reform of any law often can be of a similar nature. For example, 
the issue of costs was relevant in all areas, whether retail leasing in 
Australian, leasing in England and Wales or reform of Work Health and 
Safety Law, Australian Consumer Law or Personal Properties Securities 
Law. 
This is unsurprising, taking into account that all of the above areas of law are 
commercial in nature, as the issue of costs of implementation is a primary 
consideration for business.  Although normative simplification may be based 
on the grounds of justice, both normative and non-normative simplifications  
are ultimately grounded primarily in economic considerations.1037 
                                                             
1037 Roger A Shiner “Law and its Normativity” in  Dennis Patterson (ed), A Companion to Philosophy 
of Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2010) 417, 421. 
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In the leasing field the question of costs applies not only to the lessor and 
lessee but also applies to costs incurred by government in providing services 
to facilitate the retail leasing legislation (i.e. tribunals, mandatory mediation, 
and production of standard documentation such as disclosure statements). 
From the point of view of protection of the retail leasing market the 
government is also concerned about any additional costs that may be 
imposed upon consumers arising from the legislation or passed on to them 
because of additional compliance required of the lessor or lessee. Any 
additional compliance costs may discourage any new entrants in the market 
thereby decreasing competition in the retail leasing marketplace and 
reducing economic efficiency. 
Costs play a similar role in the leasing market in England and Wales.  For 
example, under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (UK), a lessee had a 
statutory right for an extension of lease term which could only be waived with 
the consent of the lessee and with the approval of the Court. 
In 1995, the Landlords and Tenants Act 1954 (UK) was amended to provide 
that the approval of the Court was no longer required provided there was an 
appropriate warning statement attached to the lease. One of the 
Government’s motivations for taking this step was to reduce the costs for 
both lessor and lessee in having to make an application to the Court. The 
abolition of the need for court approval would, at first blush, appear to 
deprive the lessee with an important protection. In circumstances where 
such applications were often “rubber stamped”, the level of protection is 
minimal as compared with the cost of having to bring a court application. 
Thus, the level of protection afforded by regulation must be balanced with 
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the cost of obtaining such protection. A similar consideration arises in 
relation to the requirement that a lessor at no cost to the lessee provide a 
disclosure statement to a lessee before a lease is entered into.  The lessee 
may incur extra cost in having the disclosure statement explained however, it 
is submitted that the benefit to the lessee far outweighs such cost to either 
party. 
Costs were an issue in relation to the Australian Consumer Law and 
personal property security reform in that the complexity of the prior 
legislation resulted in greater costs for suppliers in complying with such 
regime and greater costs for business for legal or accountancy advice. Work 
Health and Safety Law differed in each State and Territory which resulted 
not only in increased costs but also increased safety risks for workers. 
Costs are increased where there is a lack of certainty regarding 
interpretation or application of legislation. The enactment of retail shop lease 
legislation in Australia has provided greater certainty for both lessor and 
lessee in that the legislation provides direction to both lessor and lessee as 
to how they should conduct their business with regard to items such as 
disclosure, conduct at end of lease term, dispute resolution, rent review etc. 
As a result of reform to the Australian Consumer Law and the Personal 
Properties Securities Law there is now one law rather than multiple laws 
spread out over each State and Territory in Australia. The abolition of 
multiple securities registries to be replaced by a single Personal Properties 
Securities register provides greater ease of access to information to lenders, 
borrowers and purchasers of personal property. 
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In the event that any new law is adopted throughout Australia, the reform 
provides greater certainty by reducing the cost of interpreting laws in multiple 
legislations in each State and Territory. 
Costs can be increased as a result of out-of-date systems, procedures or 
legislation and modernisation of these items can involve modernisation of 
terminology, process or approach particularly with advances in technology. 
For example: - 
(a) Prior to the commencement of the retail leasing codes in the United 
Kingdom, the government believed that the leasing regime in that country 
was medieval and in need of an overhaul. 
(b) Reforms of any law modernise terminology, provide more efficient 
processes by use of the internet and more modern processes to record 
transactions easily available to search. 
 
Besides costs, delay was another area common in all areas of enquiry.  
Delay can be caused by either the lessor or the lessee and may be caused 
innocently or for ulterior motives.   A lessor may delay consent to an 
assignment or granting an extension of lease because they may have an 
alternate lessee available to them who they find more acceptable. 
Moreover, delay may arise in relation to the availability of remedies. For 
example, prior to the enactment of the Australian Consumer Law applying 
consumer law was difficult because of delays involved regarding the 
availability of regulatory remedies and dispute resolution.  Delay was also a 
problem with the leasing regime in England and Wales in that the system of 
dispute resolution was defective making it costly and cumbersome. In 
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addition, the process whereby application was made to the Court to allow the 
lessor and lessee to contract out of the mandatory lease extension 
provisions of Part 2 of the Landlords and Tenants Act 1954 (UK) was 
something that delayed the execution of the lease. 
Issues of redundancy are also relevant. For example, retail lease legislation 
in Australia may contain redundant provisions either because they re-enact 
law which is pre-existing in a more complex way.  
Bargaining power was a significant topic in all areas examined. Attempts to 
provide greater bargaining power to a lessee is plain in the UK Lease Code 
2007 in that lessors are required to be flexible in relation to lease terms and 
to provide alternative rent review to the standard upward only rent review 
clauses. If no alternative can be provided, then reasons for that should be 
provided by the lessor.  
In Australia, the retail leasing legislation has been characterised as being 
consumer protection in nature to prevent the abuse by the lessor of its 
greater bargaining position.  The Australian Consumer Law is obviously 
consumer protection legislation in nature and as such its primary aim is to 
empower the consumer in its dealings with the supplier.  Removing the 
requirements for a prospective lessee to pay for the cost of preparation of a 
lease1038 allows small businesses with limited budgets greater ability to 
negotiate with larger businesses with deeper pockets. 
Both the Australian and British governments recognised the need to protect 
the retail leasing market. In 1992 it was the concern of the British 
                                                             
1038 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s 51; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s 48; Fair Trading (Code of 
Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulations 1998 (Tas) cl 8(2); Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) 
Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s 14B; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s 14; Leases (Commercial and Retail) 
Act 2001 (ACT) s 23;  
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government that the lack of free-flow of information prevented the leasing 
market from operating efficiently and that the government should consider 
legislating to free the market and safe-guard small business. 
Similarly, in Australia It was generally considered that the more consistent   
the law, particularly commercial law, the  more efficient is the operation of 
the market. Small businesses can now compete on a more level playing 
field. This is particularly the case for entities trading in a similar way  in all 
parts of the federation and across State and  Territory borders. 
Protection of the market place was also important in the reform of Australian 
retail leasing in that it was a consideration of government as to what extent 
retail legislation should impose itself upon the retail leasing market beyond 
which the marketplace is itself damaged or can no longer operate efficiently. 
In summary, it is proposed that the following areas of law are relevant in 
relation to reform of retail leasing: 
a) Costs; 
b) Redundancy; 
c) Delay; 
d) Balance of Power; 
e) Protection of Market; 
 
It is proposed to adopt these subjects as benchmarks in the assessment of 
retail leasing legislation in each State and Territory in Australia in relation to 
the areas of security of tenure, disclosure, assignment, dispute resolution 
and rent review. 
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These benchmarks will allow the effectiveness of such legislation to be 
ascertained. Once such legislation has been graded according to 
effectiveness it will then be possible to determine whether:- legislation from 
one jurisdiction is superior to all others and should be adopted; or 
(a) all of the current legislation is ineffective and should be abandoned and 
completely new legislation drafted; 
(b) the current legislation is partially effective and effectiveness may be 
achieved by some amendment or amalgam of the existing legislation. 
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CHAPTER 5  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Problem with Retail Lease Legislation in Australia 
Problems regarding retail leasing first occurred in numerous Australian 
jurisdictions in the early 1980’s resulting in government Inquiries in 
Queensland, Victoria, South Australia, Australian Capital Territory and 
Western Australia.1039 Each of these Inquiries, with the exception of the 
Cooper Inquiry, recommended that there should be retail lease legislation 
introduced.1040  The recommendations of the Cooper Enquiry were 
subsequently reversed by the subsequent Queensland Joint Committee in 
1983 which recommended that retail lease legislation be enacted in 
Queensland.1041 
Retail lease legislation first appeared in Queensland in 1984.1042  Since then 
legislation has been adopted in every Australian jurisdiction.1043  In addition, 
Federal legislation has been enacted which impacts upon the retail leasing 
arena, particularly in relation to the area of unconscionable conduct in 
                                                             
1039 The Committee of Enquiry into Shopping Complex Leasing Practices (“Cooper Inquiry”) was 
formed in Queensland in 1981. In 1983 the Victorian Retail Tenancies Advisory Committee (“Arnold 
Inquiry”) was formed. The Western Australian Inquiry into Commercial Tenancy Agreements 
(“Clarke Inquiry”) and the ACT Working Party on Business leases (“ACT Working Party”) were formed 
in 1984. The South Australian Working Party on Shopping Centre Leases (“Hill Inquiry”) was formed 
originally in 1981 and then again in 1983. 
1040 Report of the Retail Tenancies Advisory Committee, Victoria, (February 1984) (“Arnold Report 
1984”); Report of the Inquiry into Shopping Centre Leases, South Australia, (1983) (“Hill Report 
1983”); Report of the Inquiry into Commercial Tenancy Agreements, Western Australia, (February 
1984) (“Clarke Report 1984”); Report of the ACT Working Party on Business Leases Review 
Legislation, ACT (1984) (“ACT Report 1984”).  
1041 Queensland Joint Committee Report 1983, 5. 
1042 Retail Shop Leases Act 1984 (Qld). 
1043 Retail Lease Act 1994 (NSW); Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic); Retail and Commercial Leases Act 
1995 (SA); Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT); Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail 
Tenancies) Regulations 1998 (Tas); Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA); 
Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2004 (NT). 
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business transactions.1044 The concept of the implication of a contractual 
duty of good faith into commercial contracts has also been accepted by the 
Courts.1045 
The legislation in each Australian jurisdiction varies in relation to the solution 
that the legislation provides to the problems as identified by the original 
enquiries and the numerous State, Territory and Federal enquiries that have 
followed since.  Each piece of legislation amounts to a significant reduction 
in the freedom of contract1046 between the parties specifically with a view to 
reducing the power of the lessor in the leasing transaction. However, by way 
of balance their market power as owners of the property is reinforced by 
town planning regulation which restricts nearby competition.1047 The 
monopoly granted to the lessor reduces market efficiency and decreases 
benefits to the community1048 
The traditional characteristics of the parties themselves also reinforce the 
strength of the lessor’s bargaining power in that the lessor is normally more 
experienced than the lessee and is used to carrying out leasing negotiations 
on a daily basis whereas the lessee has little interest in the lease itself and 
sees the lease as only a stepping stone to achieve the lessee’s real 
objective which is to operate a successful business.  In addition, the lessors 
                                                             
1044 Australian Consumer Law, s21. 
1045 Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd –v- Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234; Alcatel 
Australia Ltd –v- Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349; Burger King –v- Hungry Jacks Pty Ltd [2001] 
NSWCA 187; Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd –v- Southern Pacific Petroleum NL [2005] VSCA 228; 
Alstom Ltd –v- Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd (No. 7) [2012] SASC 49; Trans Petroleum (Australia) Pty 
Ltd –v- White Gum Petroleum Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 165. 
1046 Beatson, Ansons Law of Contract (30th Edition Oxford University Press 2016) 4. See also JW 
Carter, Elisabeth Peden and G J Tolhurst , Contract Law of Australia (5th Edition, Australia, 2007) 8. 
1047 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 
(31st March 2008), 259-260. 
1048 G Dawson ”The Market and Efficient Resource Allocation” (1989) 9(5) Economic Affairs, 40. 
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of shopping centres are normally well resourced1049 and able to employ 
persons with retail leasing experience, afford more sophisticated legal 
advice1050 and assistance. Additionally, through the use of turnover clauses, 
lessors have access to information regarding the viability of the businesses 
of other lessees within the same shopping centre complex.1051 This is 
valuable information not commonly available to commercial lessors of other 
forms of property. 
The lessee, although they may receive legal advice, leasing consultant 
advice and the assistance of a tenant’s group may only be a novice in 
relation to lease negotiations1052 and ill equipped to understand the 
complexity of the transaction.  The emphasis of a professional lessor is to 
obtain the best commercial deal possible where as often the emphasis of a 
lessee is to obtain the fastest lease possible so that the lessee can get on 
with running their business.  
Lessees also often view the relationship with the lessor as one of a 
partnership or joint venture in that the lessee believes that the success of the 
lessee’s business will also result in greater success for the lessor especially 
where a turnover clause exists.  Lessors can, however, act opportunistically 
to obtain advantages for themselves1053 or allow a lessee to suffer for the 
benefit of the centre as a whole. The relational nature of the leasing contract 
and the inherent difficulty in predicting future events that may affect the 
                                                             
1049 Eileen Webb, “Unconscionable conduct in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v 
Dukemaster Pty Ltd — A Recognition of ‘Acoustic Segregation’ in Retail Leasing Transactions?” 
(2010) 18 Australian Property Law Journal, 48. 
1050 Hasler Transport Co Pty Ltd v. Avelian Pty Ltd and Pied Properties Pty Ltd [2009] QRSLT 7. 
1051 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 
(31st March 2008), 165. 
1052 ACCC v Dukemaster [2009] ATPR 42-290. 
1053 Opera House Investments Pty Ltd v Devon Buildings Pty Ltd [1936] 55 CLR 110. 
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viability of a centre effectively means that the lessor shifts some future risk to 
the lessees.1054 
 
Chapter 1 is an introduction to the thesis.  It provides a general background 
of retail leasing and an analysis of leases generally which includes a 
discussion of the principle of freedom of contract and the relational nature of 
contracts.  It also discussed the retail leasing market and the nature of 
lessors and lessees. 
Chapter 1 concluded that the traditional freedom of contract principles would 
not be effective as the bargaining power of the lessor is so great that the 
marketplace is distorted.  The power of the lessor comes not only because 
town planning restrictions provide the lessor with a monopoly but also 
because the lessor is experienced in the field and has access to information, 
resources and advice while the lessee has only limited access to such 
things. In addition, the long term relational nature of leases allows the lessor 
to act opportunistically at the expense of the lessee.  
  
Chapter 2 of this Thesis identified the drivers for reform that led to retail 
leasing regulation and five main areas of focus by considering the reports 
and recommendations of early inquiries.  These five main areas were: - 
• Security of Tenure; 
• Assignment of Lease; 
• Disclosure; 
• Dispute Resolution; and 
                                                             
1054 Bobux Marketing Limited –v- Raynor Marketing Limited [2002] 1 NZ L R 506, 516 (Thomas J.).    
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• Rent Review.  
Chapter 2 then discussed how these areas of focus were considered by later 
inquiries and concluded that these issues had never been properly resolved. 
 
Chapter 3 traced the performance of retail leasing legislation since its 
inception in 1984 to the present time by considering reports of various 
inquiries since the commencement of retail lease legislation and considered 
to what extent the solutions adopted have achieved the initial purpose as set 
out in the early inquiries.  The chapter concludes that despite retail lease 
legislation being imposed in the 1980s the situation became worse such that 
by 1997 lessors and lessees are described as being at war.1055 
A subsequent Inquiry by the Productivity Commission in 20081056 found that 
the retail leasing market was working well but that problems still existed with 
dispute resolution, disclosure and transparency. Despite such findings the 
problem of the sitting tenant remains as does the ability of the lessor to delay 
or frustrate assignment of leases or to affect the market review or rent by 
concealing rental information through confidentiality clauses in leases. 
 
Chapter 4 discussed the current retail leasing environment before comparing 
legislation in each jurisdiction using benchmarks identified by analysing case 
law, inquiry reports and journal articles in Australia and the United Kingdom. 
The voluntary leasing codes of the United Kingdom as well as other areas of 
uniform legislation such as the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) 
and the Australian Consumer Law and the proposed Work Health and Safety 
                                                             
1055 Reid Report 1997, [2.1} – [2.2]. 
1056 PC Report 2008. 
287 
 
Law were considered to identify common factors leading to such voluntary 
codes or uniform legislation. These common factors were used to identify the 
benchmarks for evaluation of the current retail lease legislation to determine 
whether such legislation was effective or required amendment or repeal. 
 
In this Chapter it is intended that each of the five areas of concern will be 
considered and current retail lease legislation will be assessed using the 
criteria developed in Chapter 4 to determine the effectiveness of such 
legislation.  
 
Finally, if reform is indicated then this chapter will provide recommendations 
for such reform.  
 
2.  Regulation –v- Voluntary Codes 
Voluntary codes can be more flexible1057 than regulation however they can 
also be highly ineffective.1058 Three voluntary codes that have been 
promulgated in United Kingdom have all failed.  In addition, the voluntary 
Code briefly used in New South Wales in 1991 was also a failure1059 and 
legislation in New South Wales quickly followed.   
Broadly, the voluntary codes generally failed for the following reasons: - 
(a) The New South Wales voluntary Code had the benefit of bi-partisan  
                                                             
1057 Nicola Howell, "Revisiting the Australian Code of Banking Practice: Is Self-Regulation Still 
Relevant for Improving Consumer Protection Standards?" [2015] UNSWLawJl 19, 20. 
1058 Ibid, 19. 
1059 S Murdoch, P Rowland and N Crosby, Looking after Small Business Tenants with Voluntary 
Codes or Statutory Intervention: A Comparison of Australian and UK Experiences, (PPRES Conference, 
January 2001) 19. 
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support in that the Code was supported both by lessors and lessee 
organisations.  The difficulty was that the supporting organisations 
were themselves voluntary organisations which did not represent 
between them 100% of the retail leasing landscape.  In addition, the 
supporting organisations were not able to force the use of the Code 
upon their members.  
(b) Similar problems arose in relation to the UK voluntary codes.  An 
attempt was made to have the codes adopted by lessors on the basis 
that the code made it more likely that lessees would be willing to deal 
with a lessor who had agreed to be bound by a code.  Such an attempt, 
however, failed to take into account the fact that most lessees had no 
real understanding about the terms of their leases, nor any 
understanding about the benefits to them of a voluntary code.  
Generally, it was found that UK lessees accepted the first offer made to 
them by the lessor and there was no reliance upon voluntary codes by 
the lessees and, as a result, no regard was given to the codes by the 
lessors.1060  
(c) These voluntary codes can be compared to the Australian Casual Mall 
Licencing Code of Practice which is a code of practice promoted by the 
Shopping Centre Council of Australia which also has support of retail 
lessee organisations.  That Code of Practice is based upon the Casual 
Mall Licencing Code enacted by the South Australian Government in 
2002.  
                                                             
1060 Cathy Hughes and Neil Crosby, The Challenge of Self-Regulation in Commercial Property 
Leasing: a Study of Lease Codes in the UK, IJLBE (2012) 4(1) 23, 24. 
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Like the codes mentioned above the Casual Mall Licencing Code of 
Practice is a voluntary code, but unlike the UK code or the New South 
Wales Code, compliance with the Casual Mall Licencing Code of 
Practice has been authorised by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission.  Authorisation provides statutory protection 
from Court action for conduct that might otherwise be a breach of the 
competition provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. 1061 
The Casual Mall Licencing Code of Practice therefore is a hybrid 
voluntary code in that adopting the code is completely voluntary. 
However, the statutory protection from court action arising out of a 
breach of competition provisions provides a real incentive to the parties 
to adopt and observe the terms of the Casual Mall Licencing Code of 
Practice.  
Such a hybrid voluntary code may be effective in regulating the retail 
leasing relationships as the code has the same characteristics as the 
UK codes and New South Wales codes (that is, developed by members 
of the industry with bi-partisan support) but in addition has the added 
benefit of statutory protection from court action.  
 
Irrespective of the success of the Casual Mall Licencing Code, however, it is 
unlikely that lessees in the retail leasing market would need to adopt an 
entirely voluntary code now as retail leasing legislation has existed in one 
form or another for over 30 years since 1984 with the result that most 
                                                             
1061 Media Release of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 6th February 2013 
“ACCC Authorises Casual Mall Licencing Code of Practice” <https://www.accc.gov.au/media-
release/accc-authorises-casual-mall-licensing-code-of-practice-0.> 
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lessees have accepted the conduct of their business under the umbrella of 
legislation. Reverting from legislation to a voluntary code would be seen as a 
significant loss of power by the lessees. The Productivity Commission has 
recommended the removal of prescriptive legislation and the use of 
voluntary codes regarding certain issues such as transparency, lease 
lodgement, information provision and dispute resolution.1062 However, there 
does not appear to be any appetite to institute this change in any jurisdiction 
with retail leasing legislation. 
 
 
 
 
3. Broad Considerations of Control of Market Power 
Retail lessors have more bargaining power than retail lessees.  Such 
bargaining power arises from the usual characteristics of the parties 
themselves, the nature of the leasing transaction and the context of the 
transaction in the leasing market place. There is little doubt that lessees 
have accepted that the best place to earn money from their business is 
inside a large shopping centre as opposed to a strip shopping centre or 
individual premises.1063 The lessors’ position is also reinforced by town 
planning regulations which restrict construction of neighbouring shopping 
                                                             
1062 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia, Report No. 43 (31 
March 2008), 257. 
1063 A Preece, “Property: The Retail Shop Leases Act 1984” 1984 April, Queensland Law Society 
Journal, April, 25.  
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centres thereby ensuring that there is no competition for shopping centre 
space in the near proximity.1064  
The solution of Australian jurisdictions to this bargaining power disparity has 
been to enact legislation to interfere with the negotiations between lessors 
and lessees, the terms of the lease contract itself, the conduct and 
obligations of the parties during the lease term affecting the parties even 
after the relationship has ended. Such legislation attempts to balance the 
consumer protection of the lessees against the lessors’ traditional property 
rights and the rights of the parties to freely negotiate their own 
agreements.1065 
In the United Kingdom there has been only a small degree of legislative 
prescription in relation to commercial leases. Principally, the Landlord and 
Tenants Act 1954 (UK) interferes with the freedom of contract rights of both 
lessors and lessees to a limited extent. For example, it provides for 
automatic extension of any lease term. In Australia, regulation is seen as a 
method to achieve that objective because the leasing market is economically 
important and thought to require protection in that the continued failure of 
businesses results in undesirable market outcomes.1066 
It is submitted that the use of legislation to limit the bargaining power of 
lessors is a clumsy method to achieve that objective. Limits placed upon the 
party’s conduct reduce commercial options for both parties.1067 Once 
legislation is enacted the parties immediately start attempting to legally 
                                                             
1064 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 
(31st March 2008), 235.  
1065 P S Atiyah, Essays on Contract (Clarendon, Oxford 1990) 359. 
1066 ‘New Deal: Fair Deal - The Federal Government's Fair Trading Statement - Giving Small Business 
a Fair Go’, Ministerial Statement, House of Representatives, September 1997, 4. (Peter Reith, 
Minister for Workplace Relations and Small Business.) 
1067 G Dawson ”The Market and Efficient Resource Allocation” (1989) 9(5) Economic Affairs, 91. 
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circumvent it for their benefit.  For example, provisions that provide for a 
minimum lease term of five (5) years often resulted in a five (5) year lease 
being the only term that a lessee could obtain.  Prescribing that, where an 
option to extend the lease existed, and the lessee asking for a market 
assessment of the new rental to be paid prior to exercising the option, 
resulted in such options no longer being granted by lessors. 1068 
Legislation, therefore, often leads to more complex legislation. Issues  that 
were not considered or even imagined by the legislature originally nor 
canvassed by the various Inquiries prior to the enactment of the initial  
legislation are often introduced as each party endeavours at every reiteration 
of the legislation to better their respective positions   In addition, changes in 
the market place and consumer preferences also bring amendments  to 
legislation.1069 As a result legislation is often developed in a “leap frog” 
fashion such that legislation enacted in one particular jurisdiction is adopted 
in another jurisdiction with embellishments.   
Furthermore, Governments ignore principles based legislation and instead 
pass legislation that accommodates very small variations in circumstances 
often to meet a noisy minority.  The legislation also tends to be overly 
prescriptive in that it is very detailed and often not amenable to judicial 
interpretation because it is mainly considered by tribunals on a case by case 
basis. In the operation of a business it can prove inflexible1070 and confusing 
                                                             
1068 Department of Justice and Industrial Relations Consumer Affairs (Tas), ‘Review of the Fair 
Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulation 1998 Final Report’ March 2002, 46. 
1069 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 
(31st March 2008), xxvi.  
1070 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 
(31st March 2008), 90. 
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to the parties, especially the lessee.1071 Complexity and over prescription in 
legislation can discourage investment and thereby damage the retail leasing 
market. Costs of compliance are passed onto lessees and customers thus 
causing market inefficiencies.1072 
A better course would be to reduce or roll back the current retail lease 
legislation to focus on the areas of operation where it has proved to have 
been effective such as disclosure requirements, education programs and low 
cost and accessible dispute resolution alternatives.1073 More restrictive 
elements of retail tenancy legislation should be removed and lessors and 
lessees should move towards greater self-regulation.1074 In this regard, the 
development of the unconscionable conduct provisions of the Australian 
Consumer Law may be developed to further particularise conduct which 
amounts to unconscionable conduct in a retail leasing context. 
It is unlikely that such self-regulation would be successful by use of a 
voluntary code unless such voluntary code either had a “carrot” or a “stick” 
attached to it which would make the adoption of the voluntary code by 
lessors attractive.  
Reduction in the lessors bargaining power can be achieved without 
interference in the parties’ contractual rights by the relaxation of prescriptive 
town planning regulation that restrict the supply of retail space.1075 Such 
relaxation will result in greater competition between lessors which may result 
in their offering more generous lease terms. The construction of more 
                                                             
1071 D & D Ventures Pty Ltd v Evans [2000] NSWADT, 30. 
1072 Shopping Centre Council of Australia, Submission No 83 to the Productivity Commission, The 
Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia, August 2008, 17. 
1073 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 
(31st March 2008), xxiv. 
1074 Ibid, xxvi. 
1075Ibid, 259-260. 
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shopping centres will, however, result in greater traffic flow, parking 
problems and environmental concerns. 
A better course would appear to be to allow shopping centres to be 
constructed as community title properties (with common areas such as 
carparks, amenities and food courts) such that different parts of the shopping 
centre are owned by different lessors with the result that the lessors will 
compete amongst themselves for lessees. High levels of competition are 
achieved without the need to construct shopping centres in close proximity to 
each other. 
 
4. Security of Tenure 
The problem of granting security of tenure to a sitting lessee has not been 
solved despite the various attempts to do so.  An existing lessee has a lease 
for a finite term.  The finite term is a problem for a lessee in that: - 
(a) The lessee may not be able to amortise the costs incurred in setting up 
the business including fit out costs;1076 
(b) There may be insufficient time left in the lease term to make the lease 
and the business attractive to any buyer;1077 
(c) The initial years of any business are often the hardest years and it is 
only when the lease is coming to an end that the lessee has been able to 
develop its business sufficiently to provide a good return on such investment 
of money and time;1078 and 
                                                             
1076 ACT Report 1984, 47; Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in 
Australia - Report No.43 (31st March 2008), 100. 
1077 ACT Report 1984, 46. 
1078 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates,  Legislative Assembly, 5th March 1985, 503 (Court). 
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(d) The fact that the lessee has invested such time, energy and money into 
the business means that at the end of the lease the lessee is at the lessor’s 
mercy in relation to negotiation of a new lease.1079 
 
Proposals to solve the above problems were: - 
(a) Leases to have a minimum term of five years.1080 
(b) Lessees to have first right of refusal to a lease extension.1081 
(c) Automatic right of renewal.  In the United Kingdom, lessees have the 
automatic right to extend the term of their lease subject to certain 
exceptions.1082 The lessees can contract out of this right.1083 
 
Current legislation in Australia does not satisfactorily address all of the 
above issues. 
(a) Minimum lease term 
In many jurisdictions the legislation provides for a minimum lease term of five 
(5) years.1084 Although such a minimum lease term may allow a lessee to 
amortise its initial set up and fitout costs, it does not solve any of the other 
problems referred to above.  In addition, the prescription of a five (5) year 
minimum lease term has resulted in Australia in the five (5) year lease term 
                                                             
1079 Arnold Report 1984, 32; Preece A, Legislative Regulation of Leases of Business Premises (1985) 
1 QIT Law Journal, 140. 
1080 Small Business Development Corporation (Qld), Leases by Small Tenants in Shopping Centres 
referred to in Cooper Report 1981, Appendix 2; Reid Report 1997,[2.6]; Cooper Report 1981, 30.    
1081 Clarke Report 1984, 25; South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 28 
November 1996, 611 (Levy). 
1082 Landlord and Tenants Act 1954 (UK), Part 2. 
1083 Regulatory Reform (Business Tenancies) Order 2003 (England and Wales) SI 2003 No 3096, [3]. 
1084 Retail Tenancies Act 1986 (Vic) s21; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s16; Retail and Commercial 
Leases Act 1995 (SA) ss20B, 20K; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s13; 
Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) s1; Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail 
Tenancies) Regulation 2008 (Tas) s10 (3) and 10(4); Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) 
s26. 
296 
 
becoming the norm, whereas prior to legislation lease terms of longer 
duration were often negotiable.1085 
The prescription of a minimum lease term has therefore resulted in less 
flexibility to a lessee than the situation prior to the existence of the 
legislation.   
The market place is also affected generally in that the bargaining position of 
the lessee has, once they have entered into a lease, been diminished further 
in that prior to entering into a lease they had nothing to lose whereas at the 
end of a five (5) year lease term when they have established a substantial 
business, they are unable to afford the risk of losing that business and 
therefore will more readily agree to demands made by the lessor in the 
negotiation of a further term.  The lessor’s bargaining position is therefore 
enhanced at the conclusion of a lease term whether it is a prescribed 
minimum lease term of five (5) years or otherwise.   
Extension of the five (5) year lease term to either seven (7) or ten (10) years 
will not solve this problem. Queensland abandoned the lessee’s right to a 
minimum five year term and left this aspect of the transaction negotiable. 
There has been little clamour to have it return. 
Nor will it solve the problem where the lessee wishes to sell their business 
with a sufficient period left in their lease term to make the business attractive 
to a buyer or the problem where the lessee has developed the business to a 
stage where it is profitable and the lessee wishes to continue in the 
business.  
                                                             
1085 Reid Report 1997, 19; Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in 
Australia – Report No.43 (31st March 2008), 100. 
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The only attempts to solve these problems arise out of the automatic right of 
renewal contained in the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (UK) and the 
purported preferential rights of renewal referred to in the South Australian 
and Australian Capital Territory Legislation.  
 
(b)  Automatic right of renewal  
No Australian jurisdiction provides for a true automatic right of renewal of 
lease.  Such a provision only appears in the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 
(UK) which gives the lessee a right to renew their lease unless the lessor is 
able to establish some reason to not renew the lease.  The provisions of the 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (UK) initially could not be contracted out of, 
however, the provisions have subsequently been watered down such that 
the parties could contract out of the provisions provided they had court 
approval.  The provisions were further watered down to provide that the 
parties could agree that the provisions of the Act did not apply provided that 
the lessee was given a warning statement.   
The position in the United Kingdom was however different to that in 
Australia, in that in the United Kingdom long term leases of twenty-five (25) 
years or more were the norm as lessors and investors saw that a long term 
lease meant a long term return on investment.  
In Australia, short leases were preferred to allow lessors to control tenant 
mix and changes in retail patterns which can occur over shorter periods than 
ever before. It also allows lessors, in consequence, to extract the greatest 
rental possible from either the sitting lessee or any new lessee1086 and 
                                                             
1086 Cooper Report 1981, 4. 
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allows maximum advantage for refurbishment and redevelopment. The risk 
of lack of demand for shopping centres based in Australia is less than the 
United Kingdom because the Australian town planning regulations limit 
competition by restricting the number of shopping centres which could be 
built nearby.  
 
As the UK legislation can be contracted out of both lessors and lessees will 
incur additional costs in taking steps to contract out of those provisions. In 
addition, an automatic right of renewal can reduce certainty in a lease,1087 
significantly reduce the lessor’s ability to control tenant mix1088 and allows a 
poor performing lessee to remain in occupation.1089  
 
(c) Preferential Rights of Renewal 
The preferential rights of renewal contained in the South Australian1090 and 
Australian Capital Territory legislation1091 provide significant avenues for a 
lessor to contract out of those provisions.1092 Accordingly, those provisions 
are ineffective in resolving the sitting tenant problem.  In addition, both lessor 
and lessee will incur costs in contracting out of the provisions as it is likely 
that a retail lessor would simply provide that he would not enter into a lease 
unless a lessee agreed to contract out of the provision. Even if preferential 
                                                             
1087 ACT Report 1984, 214. 
1088 Ibid, 216. 
1089 Ibid. 
1090 Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA), Part 4A Division 3. 
1091 Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) s108. 
1092 Senate Economics Reference Committee, Parliament of Australia, Need for a National 
Approach to Retail Leasing Arrangements, 18 March 2015, 18. 
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rights to renew were mandatory government intervention reduces the parties’ 
scope to negotiate a mutually beneficial result.1093 
Accordingly, the provisions are both ineffective and costly and should be 
discarded.  
 
(d) Conclusions 
(i) Roll Back Legislation 
It is submitted that all legislation which prescribes the minimum lease terms 
or preferential rights of renewal should be repealed and the subject of lease 
term and options to renew should be left to negotiations between the parties.  
Lessors should, however, as the more well informed party be required to 
provide disclosure of information and even advice to the lessee where it is 
apparent to the lessor that such information or advice is required.  For 
example, where a lessor, in attempting to maintain standards within a 
shopping centre, requires a high level of fit out, the lessor should have an 
obligation to provide credible information to the lessee as to the likelihood of 
the lessee being able to amortise such costs over the period of the lease 
term as far as the lessor’s future proposals are concerned. Such information 
would include a calculation or estimate as to the amount of income that the 
lessee would be required to achieve in order to fully pay for the cost of the fit 
out as required by the lessor over the period of the lease term. 
 
                                                             
1093 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 
(31st March 2008), 124-125. 
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In relation to entering into a lease for a finite time warning statements should 
be provided by the lessor to the lessee about the fact that at the end of the 
lease term, the lessee may not necessarily be granted a new lease with the 
result that the substantial investment of time, money and effort into the 
lessee’s business would be wasted and the possibility of selling the 
business, with only a small amount of time left on the lease term would be 
minimal.  
The effect of the roll back of legislation would be to allow the lease duration 
to be of a period which the lessee would consider sufficient to allow them not 
only to amortise their expenses but also to achieve a return upon their 
investment either by way of the sale of the business or by financial returns 
from the business they have developed.   
The market is also protected in that there is no automatic right of renewal or 
preferential right of renewal, such that new entrants into the market are not 
precluded.1094 
(ii) Lessee to have statutory right to request lease renewal 
In circumstances where the lease is about to end and the lessee has no 
option to renew the terms of the lease the lessee should be entitled to 
request the lessor to grant an extension of the lease.  In the event that the 
lessor is willing to grant such an extension, the lessor should provide an offer 
to the lessee as to upon what terms the lessor is prepared to grant a lease.   
In the event that the lessor is not willing to grant an extension of the lease 
then the lessor should be required by legislation to provide a reason for their 
                                                             
1094 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 
(31st March 2008), 124-125. 
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decision. Currently the lessor is not required to provide any reason for 
refusing to grant an extension of the lease.  
The purpose of requiring the lessor to provide a reason for their refusal to 
grant an extension of the lease is for the lessee to provide some method of 
ensuring that the lessor’s conduct in refusing to grant the extension is not 
unconscionable and also to allow the lessor’s conduct to be examined for the 
purposes of Section 22(1)(f) of the Australian Consumer Law which, applied 
to this situation, provides that a court, in determining whether someone has 
acted unconscionably can consider the extent to which the lessor’s conduct 
towards the lessee was consistent with the lessee’s conduct in similar 
transactions between the lessor and other lessees. Where the premises are 
leased for retail purposes, and there appears no reason for the lease not to 
be renewed, the onus should be on the lessor to establish such a reason.  If 
no valid reason can be given, the lessee should be entitled to a limited term 
extension.1095 A valid reason would be, for example, redevelopment of the 
centre, a new lessee offering to pay rent greater than that paid by the 
existing lessee. 
 
Additionally, if a lessee who has no option to extend the term of the lease 
requests an additional lease term from the lessor but the parties cannot 
reach agreement and the lessee has to vacate, the lessor shall not be 
entitled to lease the premises to a new lessee for substantially the same 
purpose for a period of three (3) months after the termination of the first 
lease.  The purpose of this provision is to ensure that the lessor cannot take 
                                                             
1095 Clarke Report 1984, 27. 
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over the goodwill of the lessee’s business by refusing to renew the lessee’s 
lease and then permitting the opening up of a similar business immediately 
thereafter.1096 
If the lessor wishes to lease the premises out for a similar purpose within the 
three (3) month period, the lessor may do so only with the consent of the 
lessee which may be granted by the lessee. However, the extent to which 
these mechanisms would protect reluctantly departing lessees is open to 
question. In stark terms, there can be very little a sitting lessee can ultimately 
do to protect and capitalise upon its good will except through sale of its 
business at a profit. This can only be realistically achieved where a 
reasonable term remains in the lease or where the lessor agrees to 
surrender the existing lease and grant a new lease for a longer period to the 
incoming buyer as a condition of the sale. Despite all the legislative attempts 
to give a sitting lessee preferential consideration upon a renewal of an 
existing lease, ultimately the lessor must have the final say without any 
recourse by the lessee. The problem has possibly been exacerbated by the 
propensity of retail lessors to offer only 3 to 5 year terms to some speciality 
traders which is often not sufficient time to amortise establishment costs and 
return a respectable profit. The lessor’s knowledge of turnover figures of the 
lessee’s business for the term of the lease may also be influential in the 
decision not to offer a new lease when there is the prospect of replacement 
of the lessee with a better trader. 
 
 
                                                             
1096Clarke Report 1984, 25; South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 23 March 1995, p 2152 
(Atkinson). 
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5. Dispute Resolution 
Prior to retail lease legislation, problems with dispute resolution concerned: - 
(a) Dispute resolution through traditional courts took too long1097 and was too 
costly;1098 
(b) The formal nature of the court proceeding suited the lessor more 
because of the lessor’s financial ability to employ more experienced 
lawyers and stand the cost of litigation; 
(c) Lengthy and costly court proceedings would damage the lessor and 
lessee relationship.1099 
(d) Court proceedings often did not lead to a satisfactory result for either 
party  
 
Proposed solutions to these problems were: - 
(a) Establishment of low cost tribunals1100 which could deal with matters in a 
timelier manner without recourse to the formalities of a superior court, for 
example, applying the rules of evidence. There was a suggestion that the 
tribunal system be to be split into two tiers with the higher tier dealing 
with more complicated matters;1101 
(b) Mediation by specialist mediators familiar with the retail leasing 
business;1102 
                                                             
1097 N Mumford, The Retail Shop Leases Act 1984-1989- Does the Act Achieve the Purposes 
Identified in the Cooper Report 1981 (1992) QLSJ, 91, 106; Australian Capital Territory, 
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18.10.2000, 3170 (Chief Minister Humphries). 
1098 Clarke Report 1984, 14; Professor H Tarlo, Pioneering in the Deep North: Tinkering with Shop 
Leases, (1987) 8 Qld Lawyer 67, 90. 
1099 ACT Report 1984, 66; Clarke Report 1984, 33; Queensland Joint Committee Report 1983, 3. 
1100 Arnold Report 1984, 30. 
1101 Arnold Report 1984, 29. 
1102 Queensland Joint Committee Report, 6; Hill Report 1983 (Referred to in ACT Report 1984, 64). 
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(c) Establishment of a Government entity to intervene in disputes, such as a 
retail tenancy advisory board or Small Business Commissioner; and 
(d) Disputes about rent to be determined by the Valuer-General. 
All Australian jurisdictions now provide for mediation.1103 Low cost and timely 
dispute resolution through tribunals and mediation1104 has been one of the 
successes of retail lease legislation. The creation of the office of a Small 
Business Commissioner has allowed early intervention into retail lease 
disputes.1105 
Dispute resolution through Tribunals and the Small Business Commissioners 
result in a saving of costs for both lessors and lessees and reduction in 
delay.  The ability to obtain timely and low cost dispute resolution provides 
greater power in a relationship to the lessee who can normally not afford to 
conduct litigation through the traditional courts.  
The early resolution of disputes is a general benefit to the retail leasing 
market generally as, upon resolution, both parties can then get on with 
running their business.  
Recommendations in relation to dispute resolution therefore are as follows: - 
(a) Establish the role of Small Business Commissioner each jurisdiction.  
(b) The Small Business Commissioner to be provided with powers of 
investigation which may be used when a dispute is referred to the Small 
Business Commissioner.  This would also require the Small Business 
                                                             
1103 Retail Leases Act 1984 (NSW) s68; Retail Leases Act 2003 (VIC), Part 10; Commercial Tenancy 
(Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s25D; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) 
Part 11; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (QLD) s55; Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) ss63-69; 
Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulations 1998 (Tas) s39. 
1104 Senate Economics Reference Committee, Parliament of Australia, Need for a National 
Approach to Retail Leasing Arrangements, 18th March 2015, 28. 
1105 Ibid. 
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Commissioner to have the power to demand information and documents 
from either lessors or lessees.  
(c)  At the conclusion of this investigation the Small Business 
Commissioner to release its opinion as to the solution to the dispute.  Such 
solution may or may not be adopted by the parties.   
(d) If the parties accept the Small Business Commissioner’s opinion, then 
this is to be reduced to an agreement signed by the parties.  If one or both of 
the parties do not accept the Small Business Commissioner’s determination 
then, depending upon the nature of the dispute, the Commissioner may refer 
the matter to: - 
(i) A Valuer appointed by the Commissioner from a panel of 
Valuers maintained by the Commission; 
(ii) A Mediator appointed by the Commissioner from a panel of 
Mediators maintained by the Commission; 
(iii) Case appraisal; 
(iv) A hearing at a Tribunal; or 
(v) Any combination of the above.  
In deciding which method to adopt the Small Business Commissioner shall 
be entitled to receive submissions from the parties.  
In relation to valuation, if the Commissioner believes that a matter can be 
wholly or partially resolved by valuation, the matter may be referred to a 
valuer whose determination will be binding upon the parties.  The parties are 
entitled to provide submissions to the valuer and the valuer may demand 
information and documents from the parties including confidential documents 
such as side deals.  
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Similarly, in relation to mediation the Small Business Commissioner may 
refer the matter to mediation.  The mediation will then proceed in the manner 
as determined by the Mediator.  The Mediator is also entitled to demand 
information and documents from the parties.  
In relation to Tribunal hearings such hearings should be divided into two 
separate tiers as follows: - 
(i) First tier hearings – For matters where the amount in dispute is 
$50,000.00 or less that does not involve (in the opinion of the 
Commissioner) complicated matters of law or where time is of 
the essence.  The first tier tribunal will commonly consist of one 
(1) non legal member.  Appeals from the first tier tribunal shall 
be to the Appeal Panel of the tribunal only.  
 
Lawyers would not be entitled to appear in the first tier tribunal 
without permission from the Tribunal, even where both parties 
agree on legal representation.  Any costs incurred by the 
successful party (such as expert reports) are payable by the 
other party only where the Tribunal believes that the claim was 
vexatious or obviously had no chance of success.  
 
(ii) Second tier hearing – For matters over $50,000.00 or where 
the Small Business Commissioner believes that the matter 
involves complicated areas of law then the matter shall proceed 
by way of a second tier hearing.  Appeals from the second tier 
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hearing are to the Appeal Panel as of right or to the Court of 
Appeal by leave only on matters of law. 
 
Within thirty (30) days after the determination by the Tribunal both parties 
must file a Notice as to whether they intend to appeal and if so whether they 
intend to appeal to the Appeal Panel or the Court of Appeal.  
 
If one of the parties advise that they intend to appeal to the Court of Appeal, 
then any appeal to the Appeal Panel is not possible.  If the Court of Appeal 
refuses leave then the matter may not be appealed to the Appeal Panel and 
the matter effectively ends.  
 
Legal representation of the parties is allowed for a second tier hearing.  The 
second tier hearing normally consists of a panel of three (3) members of 
which at least one (1) must be a legally qualified person.  
 
(e) Case Appraisal – If the Small Business Commissioner believes that a 
matter qualifies for a first tier hearing but the speedy determination is 
required where the Tribunal list will not allow such an early hearing then the 
Commissioner may refer the matter to Case Appraisal.  The Commission is 
to maintain a panel of suitably qualified persons (such as Barristers, 
Solicitors or ex-Judges) to carry out a case appraisal.  The person appointed 
shall be entitled to ask for information or documents from both parties and 
after receiving information submitted by the parties shall hand down their 
308 
 
decision.  The decision of the Case Appraiser is appealable in the same 
manner as a decision from a first tier hearing.  
 
The benefit of the structure referred to above is that: - 
(i) Costs incurred by the parties are kept to a minimum.  Legal 
representation is generally not allowed unless the matter proceeds by way of 
second tier hearing.  Rights of appeal are limited to ensure that a matter 
cannot be appealed and then appealed again.  
(ii) Decisions achieved by a tribunal are likely to involve less delay than 
decisions obtained by a court hearing.  In addition, the ability of the Small 
Business Commissioner to form an early opinion also eliminates delay as 
does the ability of the Small Business Commissioner to refer the matter to 
case appraisal where the Tribunal list is too long.  
However, whether this process may be more effective than the current 
mediation and later tribunal hearing is moot. Many disputes, except those 
relating to the non-payment of rent or outgoings, caught at an early stage by 
the intervention of an independent third party in whom the parties have some 
confidence can be often speedily resolved. 
 
6. Assignment 
Prior to retail lease legislation, problems in relation to assignment of leases 
included the lessor delaying or frustrating the assignment, lessors refusing to 
consent to assignment on spurious grounds, attempts by the lessor to obtain 
additional benefits for itself as part of its consent and lack of disclosure of 
lease terms by lessees to potential assignees. 
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Proposed solutions to these problems were:- 
(a) Legislation to provide that the lessors consent cannot be unreasonably 
withheld. 
Current retail lease legislation provisions provide that the lessor may not 
unreasonably withhold consent to an assignment.1106 Such provisions are 
redundant, however, where existing legislation1107 in some jurisdictions 
already provides that the lessors consent to the assignment of a lease 
cannot be unreasonably withheld1108 where the lease requires that the 
lessor’s consent be obtained to an assignment. This is not invariably the 
case outside the retail leasing sphere. Such redundant legislation adds 
additional complexity to the leasing relationship which incurs additional 
costs. The reason for the redundancy is to bring the assignment dispute 
within the jurisdiction of the mediators or tribunal as the case may be. In 
non-retail instances these disputes may have to be heard in the 
respective Supreme Courts. 
Where the lessor refuses to consent to an assignment the lessee can, 
pursuant to retail lease legislation, refer the matter to a tribunal for 
determination.1109 Such a provision is useful as the resolution of disputes 
through tribunals is low cost and timely. Rather than re-enacting existing 
                                                             
1106 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic), s60; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985  
(WA), s10; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001(ACT), s100; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) 
Act 2003 (NT), s53; Fair Trading (Code of Practice) Retail Tenancies Regulations 1998 (Tas), s28; 
Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), s50; Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA), s43; Retail 
Leases Act 1994 (NSW), s39. A similar provision occurs in the United Kingdom being Landlord and 
Tenants Act 1927 (UK), s19(1) . 
1107 Property Law Act 1974(Qld) s121 (1); Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s133B; Property Law Act 
1958 (Vic) s144; Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s80 (1). 
1108 C Anderson, The Retail Shop Leases Act 1984 (Qld): Does it Remedy a Mischief?” (1992) 4(1) 
Bond Law Review, 89. 
1109 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s50. 
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legislation however,1110 retail lease legislation should simply provide that 
disputes relating to the refusal of consent to the assignment of a retail 
shop lease apply the general law but be heard in the manner of any retail 
lease dispute, that is through access to mediation and the respective 
tribunals.1111 In all jurisdictions, the retail lease legislation has enhanced 
provisions relating to assignment which may smack of over regulation 
given the fact that the general law on this refusal of consent to lease 
assignment is relatively settled. However, it is conceded that some 
enhancements may be desirable in the particular instance of retail 
leasing assignment issues. 
(b) Restrict lessors delay in assignment proceedings. 
Retail leases are of a limited time only.  A lessee may lose a purchaser 
because of the delay caused by the lessor in consenting to the 
assignment.1112 Retail lease legislation currently requires lessors to 
respond to a request for an assignment in a set period of time.1113 A 
similar provision occurs in the United Kingdom.1114 Such provisions 
should be retained because they reduce the power of the lessor, as the 
party in the superior bargaining position, to frustrate the assignment of 
                                                             
1110 In this regard s144 of the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) is expressly excluded from applying to 
retail leases by s60 (2) Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic). The Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) is therefore the 
only remedy available to retail lessees in Victoria in relation to unreasonable refusal to consent. 
1111 For example, s50 (3) of the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) provided that s50 does not limit 
the circumstances the way in which a retail shop lease dispute may exist. 
1112 Reid Report 1997, 40; Professor H Tarlo, “The Great Shop Lease Controversy” (1983) University 
of Queensland Law Journal 13 (1), 18. 
1113Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s 61; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s 50(1); Fair Trading (Code 
of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulations 1998 (Tas) cl 28(5); Retail & Commercial Leases Act 
1995 (SA) s 45; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s 10(2); Retail Leases 
Act 1994 (NSW) s 41; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) s 99(2); Business Tenancies 
(Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) s 55. 
1114 Landlord and Tenant Act 1988 (UK), s1(3). 
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lease or to provide their consent only at the last minute when the lessee 
will agree to anything in order to make sure the sale proceeds.  
 
The consequences of the lessor exceeding the required time limit to 
provide consent are not consistent in Australia. The lessors delay means 
either that the matter can be referred to a tribunal for determination1115 or 
that the lessor is deemed to consent.1116 In the United Kingdom, the 
failure by the lessor to give or communicate a decision within a 
reasonable time will be treated as equivalent to a refusal of consent 
without reasons which allows a lessee to take the lessor to court in a 
claim for damages for breach of statutory duty.1117  
Access to the court, or to a tribunal, allows the parties to make 
submissions upon the reasons for the delay which is appropriate. 
Deemed consent, however, seems to be unfair where the delay of the 
lessor might be reasonably explained. In addition, where consent is 
deemed to be granted there is no guidance upon the terms the 
assignment is granted and the lessee is uncertain as to such matters 
until the lessee applies to the courts or tribunal for a determination.1118 
Additionally, there is no reference as to what documentation is required 
to be produced as a result of the lessors “deemed consent”.  Where an 
assignee is prepared to proceed with a purchase of the lessees’ 
                                                             
1115 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s50. 
1116 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s61 (6); Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985  
(WA) s10(2); Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001(ACT) s99; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) 
Act 2003 (NT) s55; Fair Trading (Code of Practice) Retail Tenancies Regulations 1998 (Tas) s28(5); 
Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s45; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s41. 
1117 Go West Ltd. v Spigarolo & Anor [2003] EWCA Civ 17 (31 January 2003) [24]. 
1118 Small Business Commissioner (SA), Discussion Paper re the Retail and Commercial Leases Act 
1995, December 2014, [1.7]. 
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business relying upon the “deemed consent”” provisions, the question 
arises as to how the assignee is, at a later date, able to prove to any 
subsequent potential purchaser that they have any rights under the 
lease when the lease documents are presumably still in the name of the 
original lessee and no formal written consent from the lessor is explicit. 
The Australian Capital Territory legislation requires the person who holds 
the lease to deliver a lease to the Registrar-General to allow 
endorsement of the assignment but this can only occur after an 
application to the Magistrates Court.1119 As any deemed consent may 
result in the lessee being required to proceed to a hearing in any event, 
the better course would appear to be that the delay of the lessor may, on 
application by a lessee, be reviewed by a tribunal or official (such as a 
Small Business Commissioner) who may make orders that are relevant 
to the lessee’s situation after considering any submissions from either 
party.  The Tribunal or Commissioner may then issue a document 
authorising the assignment. The application to the Tribunal or 
Commissioner will have little cost for the lessee. The assignment of the 
lease will be further delayed but the outcome for the lessee (an official 
document authorising the assignment) warrants such delay.  The 
balance of power between the parties may be significantly affected in 
that the lessor may lose control of the assignment process. However, 
such loss of control only results from the lessor’s own conduct.  The 
lessor has the additional benefit of being able to make submissions to 
the Tribunal or Commissioner regarding the lessors delay. 
                                                             
1119 Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001(ACT) s99(5). 
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(c) Restrict lessors’ reasons for refusal. 
Some jurisdictions precisely state the reasons that the lessor can rely 
upon in refusing consent to an assignment.1120 Such grounds for refusal 
include where there is a proposed change of use or where the proposed 
assignee has financial resources or retailing skills inferior to the lessee. 
Highly prescriptive regulation, however, means that other grounds for 
refusal are excluded even if such reasons are valid. The legislation is, 
therefore, not effective in that it favours the lessees’ interests over the 
lessor and should be removed.  
(d) Restrict lessors’ ability to obtain additional benefits for itself as part of 
consent to assignment. 
In Queensland, a lessor cannot, in granting consent to an assignment, 
impose on the assignee an obligation not imposed on the lessee, or seek 
to remove a right from the assignee conferred on the lessee.1121 Such a 
provision appears to be unnecessary as under the common law courts 
may consider any conditions imposed by a lessor to determine whether 
such conditions are unreasonable.1122 According to Duncan: - 
“The provisions of the retail tenancies legislation merely, and somewhat 
unnecessarily, provide an overlay to the already existing provisions of the 
statutes which were adequate to meet the particular contingencies to which 
this legislation was directed.”1123 
 
                                                             
1120 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s60; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) s53; Fair 
Trading (Code of Practice) Retail Tenancies Regulations 1998 (Tas) s28; Retail and Commercial 
Leases Act 1995 (SA) s43; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW)  s39; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 
2001(ACT) s100. 
1121 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s 50(2). 
1122 W Duncan, “The Regulation of Commercial Tenancies – Heading for the Sunset”, (1990) 2 Bond 
Law Review, 34. 
1123 Ibid. 
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Redundant provisions only lead to greater cost for both parties in dealing 
with two sets of legislation.  These provisions should be removed. 
Removal of these provisions will not alter the balance of power between 
the lessor and lessee as the underlying legislation will remain. 
(e) Disclosure to be provided to potential assignee. 
Disclosure statements between the lessee and the proposed assignee 
are valuable in that they prevent the assignee from having a misguided 
view of what they are purchasing.  Such disclosure documents would be 
better coming from the lessor alone at the assignor’s expense. In some 
jurisdictions, the assignee receives disclosure statements from the lessor 
and assignor which seems unnecessary duplication. 
(f) Abolition of ongoing liability of original lessee. 
Prior to legislation retail lessees complained about their ongoing liability 
under the lease even after assignment. 1124 Retail lease legislation in 
some jurisdictions now provides that original lessee liability after 
assignment has now been abolished.1125  
The abolition of original lessee liability results in damage to the market in 
that an outgoing assignor has no interest in the merits of the assignee 
and is concerned only with settlement of any business contract                     
to which consent to assignment is subject.1126 Although a lessor is 
entitled to carry out investigations and request information and 
documents from an assignee it is more likely that an assignee will be 
                                                             
1124 Cooper Report 1981, 31. 
1125 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s 62; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s 50A; Fair Trading (Code of 
Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulations 1998 (Tas) cl 9(1); Retail & Commercial Leases Act 1995 
(SA) s 28; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s 10; Retail Leases Act 1994 
(NSW) s 41A; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) s 58. 
1126 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 
(31st March 2008), 234. 
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suitable to operate the leases where the assignee has been vetted both 
by the lessor and the outgoing lessee.   
 Original lessee liability, therefore, for both the outgoing lessee and its 
guarantors should be reinstated such that the outgoing lessee and its 
guarantors shall remain liable only for, for example, a period of twelve 
(12) months from the date of assignment or the balance of the lease 
term, whichever is the lesser.1127  
(g) Lessor not to benefit from lessee’s good will. 
One of the complaints of lessees is that where the lessor refuses consent 
to an assignment of lease the lessor can then lease other premises within 
the same centre to the refused assignee or, where the lessee vacates the 
premises, lease the premises to that same assignee. The assignee 
receives the benefit of the lessee’s good will for nothing which allows the 
lessor to demand greater rent from the assignee.  Meanwhile, the original 
lessee has lost its lease and the goodwill of its business.   
To avoid this result, regulation should provide that where the lessee 
locates through its own endeavours a purchaser for its business and the 
lessor refuses consent to assignment, the lessor is not entitled to 
subsequently lease premises within the same shopping centre to the 
refused purchaser for the same use without the consent of the lessee for 
a period of three months after the lessee vacates. This will ensure that 
the lessee keeps its goodwill in its business and prevents the lessor from 
benefiting from such goodwill. The purpose of this restriction is to ensure 
that the lessor does not sabotage the sale of the lessee’s business 
                                                             
1127 In South Australia, the outgoing lessee remains liable for two years or for the balance of the 
lease. See Retail & Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s 28. 
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simply for the purposes of the lessor then approaching the proposed 
assignee and leasing to them other vacant premises within the same 
shopping centre to operate the same sort of business as the original 
lessee.  If that was to occur, then the lessee would not only lose a 
potential sale of the business but it would immediately gain a competitor.  
 
7. Rent Review 
Problems in relation to rent review, prior to retail lease legislation, related to 
issues such as the cost of the review, arbitrariness of result,1128 the lack of 
transparency,1129 delays in rent reviews being finalised in consequence of 
which the lessee was unaware as to the new reviewed rent prior to 
exercising its option to renew.1130 Ratchet clauses1131 or upward only rent 
review1132 clauses in leases allowed a lessor to nominate several different 
methods of rent review and select the method most profitable to the 
lessor.1133 Such clauses also provided that the rent review could not result in 
the rent being less than the previous year’s rent.   
Delays in rent reviews resulted in the lessee being unable to afford to pay 
any retrospective amount when once the new rent had been finally 
determined.1134 
Proposals regarding solutions to these problems were that: - 
                                                             
1128 ACT Report 1984, 25. 
1129 Arnold Report 1984, 26;  Clarke Report 1984, 13. 
1130 Cooper Report 1981, 22. 
1131 ACT Report 1984, 30. 
1132 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 10 November 1992, Volume 13 
Column 858, (T. Baldry, Parliamentary Secretary of State for the Environment); Neil Crosby, 
’Commercial Lease Reform in the UK: Can we Learn Anything about the Awareness of Small Business 
Tenants?’ in Findings in Built and Rural Environment (RICS, September 2006) 1.   
1133 ACT Report 1984, 30. 
1134 Clarke Report 1984, 18. 
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(a) All rents be regulated by the Government.  
In addition to the costs to the Government involved in such a proposal, 
regulation of rent would result in inefficient markets1135 and discourage 
investment in shopping centres.1136 Such a proposal should never be 
adopted. 
(b) That lessees have the right to have a new rent arbitrated by a tribunal.1137 
Western Australia is the only jurisdiction that allows a rent review matter 
to be referred to a tribunal and then only after the failure of the review 
process.1138 Arbitration of rent is a significant interference with the rights 
if the parties and should be avoided.1139 
(c) That the rent to be paid after the exercise of an option to renew be 
determined prior to the lessee exercising such option.  
Such a solution has now been enacted in Queensland and New South 
Wales.1140 The purpose of such legislative provisions is to allow the 
lessee to know the amount of rent that they will be required to pay in the 
event that they did exercise their option to extend the lease.  
Traditionally, only after the lessee had exercised their option, would the 
parties negotiate the rent review.   
The difficulty with the legislation in this regard is that by allowing the early 
determination of rent review prior to the lessee exercising its option 
results in lessors simply not granting options to renew a lease.  Without 
                                                             
1135 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 
(31st March 2008), 142-143, 151, 257. 
1136 ACT Report 1984, 25. 
1137 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 28 November 1996, 612 (Levy).   
1138 Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s 11(5). 
1139 Professor H Tarlo, “The Great Shop Lease Controversy” (1983) University of Queensland Law 
Journal 13 (1), 26. 
1140 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s 27A (2); Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s 32. 
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an option the lessor can demand any rent that the lessor requires from 
the lessee and the lessee, who has no option to extend, is left to choose 
between either accepting such proposal or vacating the premises and 
perhaps losing their business.  
Legislative provisions that provide for early determination of rent review 
prior to exercising an option to renew a lease should therefore be 
removed which would make lessors more likely to grant options within 
retail leases.  
(d) Restrict methods of rent review.   
Legislation has now been introduced which proscribes any lease 
provision that prevents rent from decreasing on review1141 and also 
limiting the methods of rent review contained in the lease.1142  Such 
methods commonly provide for rent review to be based only on the 
lessee’s turnover, movements in an independent index such as the 
Consumer Price Index, a market review, a fixed percentage or dollar 
increase. Prescribing the methods of rent review appears to be too 
prescriptive and limits the freedom of the parties in negotiations and 
should be removed. Proscribing any lease clause which restricts rent 
from decreasing, however, is appropriate as it puts the lessee and lessor 
on a more equal footing.  Rent review clauses that allow rent to be 
increased by a fixed amount or a fixed percentage are, in fact, clauses 
                                                             
1141 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s 35(3); Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s 36A; Fair Trading (Code 
of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulations 1998 (Tas) cl 12(8); Retail & Commercial Leases Act 
1995 (SA) s 22; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s 11(2)(c); Retail 
Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s 18(4); Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) s 46; Business 
Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) s 28(3). 
1142 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s 35(2); Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s 27(5); Fair Trading 
(Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulations 1998 (Tas) cl 12(2); Business Tenancies (Fair 
Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) s 28(2). 
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that prevent rent from decreasing and should also be proscribed except 
where the lease provides for a market review every three years. 
(e) Prohibit turnover rent clauses or limit the lessor’s right to receive and use 
turnover information. 
Lessees complained that often the turnover information sought by the 
lessor had nothing to do with ascertaining any turnover rent but was 
simply a method whereby the lessor could access the lessee’s financial 
performance which the lessor could use against the lessee when the rent 
was due to be reviewed. A lessor is entitled to require that a lease 
contain a turnover rent provision and, although turnover information is 
protected by confidentiality provisions in retail leasing legislation,1143 it is 
difficult to see how a lessor can be prevented from using that information 
in any subsequent rent reviews. In addition, however, lessors can use 
turnover information to ascertain whether or not a lessee is performing 
efficiently or whether the lessor should take steps to ensure the ongoing 
health of the shopping centre generally by either insisting the lessee 
relocate or requiring that the lessor vacate the premises pursuant to a 
performance clause in the lease. Such performance clauses are 
prohibited in most Australian jurisdictions.1144 In Queensland however, it 
                                                             
1143 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s 65; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s 26(2); Fair Trading (Code 
of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulations 1998 (Tas) cl 10(7); Retail & Commercial Leases Act 
1995 (SA) s 51; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) s 50; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) s 
129; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) s 66. 
1144 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s 73; Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) 
Regulations 1998 (Tas) cl 36; Retail & Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s 58; Retail Leases Act 1994 
(NSW) s 58; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) s 142; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) 
Act 2003 (NT) s 73. 
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is legitimate purpose to collect turnover information to ascertain the 
performance of the centre1145 as a whole. 
It is submitted that the use of turnover information by the lessor to 
ascertain the health of the lessee’s business is a legitimate use of the 
information to allow the lessor to ensure that the shopping centre 
generally is operating efficiently especially where the lessor is unable to 
limit the reduction of rent upon review.   
It is recommended therefore that turnover rent clauses not be prohibited 
and that it be the subject of an agreement between the parties. 
(f) Limiting the arbitrary nature of rent reviews by requiring that the method 
and timing of such reviews be set out in the lease. 
Legislation now exists in this regard1146 which limits the time period in 
having rent reviewed to market.  Such legislation will prevent any large 
retrospective amounts being paid by the lessee. Such provisions should 
be retained. 
 
(g) Require full disclosure by the lessor of all lease terms and side 
agreements. 
One of the main difficulties with rent review is that there is no requirement 
upon lessors or lessees to disclose any side agreements that may exist 
between them.  The only information available to a new lessee, valuer or 
a bank, is the actual lease itself which may or may not be registered.  
Registration of the lease would provide a limited benefit to potential 
                                                             
1145 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s 26(4) (a). 
1146 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) s35; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001(ACT) s50; Business 
Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) s28 (1); Fair Trading (Code of Practice) Retail Tenancies 
Regulations 1998 (Tas) s12; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994(Qld) s27. 
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lessees as the formal terms of the lease only become public record.  Full 
disclosure of all lease arrangements will provide a major benefit to a 
potential lessee attempting to enter into the leasing market.  Such 
disclosure would therefore be of benefit to the leasing market generally 
because new lessees would be fully informed. 
On the other hand, side agreements come into operation because a 
lessee has requested a lower rent than that to which the lessor is willing 
to agree generally in the centre. Lessors, when faced with a request from 
a lessee to accept a rent less than what the lessor requires, will only 
consent to such rent where the lessee agrees to enter into a lease which 
specifies a higher rent with a side agreement between the lessor and the 
lessee where the lessor agrees to accept the lesser rent provided that the 
lessee complies with the terms of its lease.   
The benefit to the lessor is that in subsequent negotiations with other 
lessees the lessor can point to the lease which contains a falsely inflated 
rent figure.  This inflated figure can also be provided to the lessor’s banks 
and the bank’s valuers to justify the market capitalisation of the lessor’s 
premises as an investment as this value is often determined through the 
total yield achievable.   
There is also, however, a substantial benefit to a lessee who is a party to 
such a side agreement for such side agreements to remain confidential 
as, if the side agreements become readily available or known the result 
will be that lessors will cease making such side agreements to the 
ultimate detriment of the lessees.  In addition, the parties are entitled to 
expect a degree of confidentiality in relation to their dealings.  
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There have been proposals to the effect that there be a separate lease 
registry which will contain a copy of the lease itself together with copies 
of any side agreements between the parties.  The justification of this 
registry is to allow full disclosure to be made to other lessees, banks and 
valuers.   
It is likely that any such separate lease registry would have to be funded 
by the government to the cost of the community generally. It is also likely 
that if such a registry has come into existence that side deals no longer 
be given to the ultimate detriment of lessees.  
For these reasons, it is not recommended there be separate lease 
registry where the parties are required to disclosure side agreements.  
There should, however, be an obligation upon a lessee attempting to sell 
its business to provide copies of not only the lease but any other relevant 
side agreements to a proposed assignee subject to such information 
being provided on a confidential basis.  
This would mean that information in relation to side agreements would be 
made available to the relevant parties but not to the world at large.  
Leases should however be subject to mandatory registration.  Mandatory 
registration will of course involve additional expense which would 
normally be paid for by the lessee; however, the benefit to persons such 
as banks seeking valuations of premises outweighs the small cost of 
registration.  
Current disclosure requirements upon assignment where the lessee is 
obliged to provide a copy of the lease and disclosure document to an 
assignee which include details of any side agreements should be 
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retained.  In addition, the obligation of the assignee to provide a 
disclosure statement to the lessee should also be maintained.  In 
circumstances where a lessee is taking over a vacant shop then the 
lessor should also be required to provide a copy of a lease of the most 
recent lessee occupying the premises prior to the current potential lessee 
to allow the potential lessee to compare the lease proposal by the lessor 
to the prior lease.  The lessor’s disclosure statement should also provide 
details as to the circumstances arising in relation to the termination of the 
previous lessee’s lease together with the contact details of the previous 
lessee.  This would allow the lessee to make a better informed decision 
about whether or not to take up a lease with the lessor, in particular, after 
being informed as to why the previous lease ended and also having the 
benefit of speaking to the previous lessee as to the reason by the 
previous lessee vacated the premises.  
 
8. Disclosure 
Problems with disclosure prior to retail leasing legislation were that: - 
(a) Information about the lessor’s future intentions was not disclosed.1147 
(b) Lessees over-relied upon oral representations by lessors’ or their 
agents;1148 
(c) Lessors would exaggerate the likely performance of the premises of the 
centre;1149 
                                                             
1147 Arnold Report 1984, 2. 
1148 Cooper Report 1981, 5. 
1149 Arnold Report 1984, 20. 
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(d) There was poor communication between lessees and lessors managing 
agents;1150 
(e) Leases were not provided prior to occupancy;1151 and 
(f) Lease documents were too complex to understand.1152 
 
Proposals to deal with such problems were as follows: - 
(a) Greater education of lessees regarding their obligations under a 
lease.1153  
Unfortunately, lessees cannot be forced to educate themselves and will 
suffer no sanction if they choose not to be better informed.  Education 
programs are offered by both State and Federal organisations, however, 
education alone is unlikely to provide any benefit to lessees. Experience 
in a market is still the best teacher. 
 
(b) Provision of disclosure statements by lessors to lessees with draft lease.  
Despite legislation requiring disclosure by lessors1154 the information 
asymmetry between lessors and lessees continues.1155 Disclosure 
statements have become more detailed since first introduced and more 
                                                             
1150 Small Business Development Corporation (Qld),  Leases by Small Tenants in Shopping Centres 
referred to in Cooper Report 1981, Appendix 2. 
1151 Cooper Report 1981, 5. 
1152 Arnold Report 1984, 20; Victoria, Parliamentary Debates (Second Reading Speech of Retail 
Lease Bill ), Legislative Assembly, 8 May 1986, 1959-1960 (Fordham). 
1153 ACT Report 1984, 65. 
1154 Retail Tenancies Act 1986 (Vic) s17; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994(Qld) s22; Retail Leases Act 
1994 (NSW) s11; Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s12; Commercial Tenancy (Retail 
Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA) s6; Leases (Commercial and Retail) Act 2001 (ACT) s36; Fair 
Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulation 2008 (Tas) s6; Business Tenancies (Fair 
Dealings) Act 2003 (NT) s19. 
1155 Productivity Commission, The Market For Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 
(31st March 2008), [153]. 
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complicated to the detriment of lessees.1156 Disclosure statements 
generally, however, have been a significant increase to the bargaining 
power of lessees and should be retained.  The creation of an industry 
standard lease1157 has been suggested by several Inquiries1158 however 
a complete lease document may be too complex1159 to be relevant to all 
transactions. A standard lease document containing basic terms1160 
would allow for the reduction in the size of disclosure statements while 
still assisting in the lessees’ understanding of the transaction and allow a 
body of case law to develop around such standard lease. The standard 
lease should not be mandatory but the extent which the lessor complies 
with the standard lease document should be one of the considerations in 
determining whether the lessor has acted in good faith if that becomes 
necessary.  
Additional information should be provided within the lessor’s disclosure 
statements being details about the fit-out required by the lessor and the 
lessor’s estimate of the cost of that fitout and the costs to amortise that 
cost over the length of the lease term.  This will provide some warning to 
the lessee about the consequence of taking a lease for too short a period 
 
(c) Lessees to have the right to terminate the lease or seek compensation if 
the disclosure statement is misleading or is not given.  
                                                             
1156 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 
(31st March 2008), 157. 
1157 Beddall Report 1990, 104. 
1158 Arnold Report 1984,53; Cooper Report 1981,24. 
1159 Clarke Report 1984, 29 -30. 
1160 Such as those contained in the UK Lease Code 2007. 
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Termination of a lease for misleading information1161 seems unfair when 
such misleading information may have arisen as a result of an error by 
the lessor. In order to force the delivery of disclosure statements, the 
obligation of the lessee to pay rent should abate until the disclosure 
statement is provided in the proper form. In the event that the disclosure 
statement contains misleading information, the lessee should have a right 
to claim compensation in the first instance.1162 Termination of the lease 
should only be available where a tribunal considers that compensation 
alone is insufficient. 
 
(d) Lessors to provide warning statements to lessees to obtain legal and 
financial advice or, alternatively, lessees be required to obtain certificates 
from legal and financial advisers.  
Obtaining legal advice certificates and financial advice certificates1163 is a 
costly process and causes delay while such certificates are obtained.  
The requirement for such certificates should be abolished and replaced 
by a warning statement1164 provided as part of the disclosure statement 
that the lessee should obtain legal and financial advice before entering 
into the lease.  
 
                                                             
1161 Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic), s17; Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 
(WA), s6; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT), s20; Fair Trading (Code of Practice) Retail 
Tenancies Regulations 1998 (Tas), s7; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), s22; Retail and Commercial 
Leases Act 1995 (SA), s12; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW), s11.  
1162 Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA), s6; Leases (Commercial and 
Retail) Act 2001(ACT), s37; Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 (NT), s18; Fair Trading (Code 
of Practice) Retail Tenancies Regulations 1998 (Tas), s5; Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), s43; 
Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA), s12; Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW), s10. 
1163 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) s 22D. 
1164 Cooper Report 1981, 33; Arnold Report 1984, 20. 
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(e) Additional disclosure by lessors by requiring mandatory registration of 
leases or through the creation of a separate lease register.  
Neither of these options has been adopted in any jurisdiction. Side 
agreements between lessors and lessees continue to remain hidden. 
Registration of leases is not mandatory so information contained within 
such leases also remains hidden. Registration of leases is, however, a 
simple matter as all Australian jurisdictions allow for such registration.1165 
Such registration will not reveal side agreements1166 however the 
creation of a separate public registry to record side agreements is too 
expensive1167 and the obligation to register side agreements too difficult 
to enforce.1168  Forcing lessors to divulge any side agreements they have 
with lessees will result in the lessor not utilising side agreements to the 
detriment of lessees.1169 The better course would be to require leases to 
be registered but not require a separate lease registry. 
 
9. Conclusion. 
This thesis has considered retail lease legislation in Australia, since its 
beginnings in the 1980’s to the present time, through multiple Inquiries both 
regional and federal, in order to determine what form modified retail lease 
legislation might take in the five topics of concern being lack of security of 
tenure, ineffective disclosure, costly dispute resolution and unfair assignment 
                                                             
1165 Productivity Commission, The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia - Report No.43 
(31st March 2008), 157. 
1166 Ibid, 175. 
1167 Ibid, 24. 
1168 Law Society of New South Wales, Submission 9 to Productivity Commission, The Market for 
Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia, Report No. 43 (31 March 2008), 26. 
1169 QUT Property Law and Research Centre, Submission No 12 to Senate Economics Reference 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Need for a National Approach to Retail Leasing Arrangements, 
18th March 2015, 12. 
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and rent review provisions.  Such legislation is a significant encroachment 
into the contractual rights of both lessors and lessees. Retail lease 
legislation has only increased in size and complexity since first inception as 
the legislature continues to under estimate the ingenuity of lessors and their 
advisors in circumventing such legislation. 
The Australian experience of nation-wide retail lease legislation has been 
compared to the experience in the United Kingdom where the Government 
applies only a “light touch” of regulation preferring instead to rely upon 
voluntary codes and market forces to achieve what the Government sees as 
desirable outcomes. 
As retail lease legislation has now been part of the retail leasing scene for 
over three decades it is highly unlikely that such legislation will be repealed, 
however certain aspects of that legislation can be rolled back to allow the 
parties to negotiate a mutually beneficial arrangement, particularly provisions 
regarding lease duration. Certain inequities within the legislation should be 
remedied to provide a fairer solution. Voluntary codes are unlikely to be 
effective in Australia unless such codes contain some incentive for the 
parties to comply with them. 
 
The difficulty with any major alteration to the current law is that often 
Governments will not have the courage to implement such alterations out of 
concern that market aberrations will occur.  Such was the concern of the 
Queensland Government when retail lease legislation was first established. 
Nevertheless, unless Governments carry out a cost-benefit analysis of retail 
lease legislation and discard overly prescriptive regulation, retail lease 
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legislation will continue to grow in size and complexity to the ultimate 
detriment of both parties.  
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